Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital Dist.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1953
• Citation: 257 P.2d 22,41 Cal.2d 33
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: TALLEY et al. v. NORTHERN SAN DIEGO COUNTY HOSPITAL DIST. L. A. 22537.

Page 22

257 P.2d 22

41 Cal.2d 33

TALLEY et al. v. NORTHERN SAN DIEGO COUNTY HOSPITAL DIST.

L. A. 22537.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 15, 1953.

David S. Casey, San Diego, for appellants.

Belli, Ashe & Pinney, San Francisco, and Renetzky & Davis, San Luis Obispo, amici curiae on behalf of appellants.

Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye and Ward W. Waddell, Jr., San Diego, for respondent.

SHENK, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment for the defendant in an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of the defendant's agents in caring for the plaintiff while she was a patient at the defendant's hospital. Judgment was entered upon the sustaining of a demurrer on the ground that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the defendant is a local hospital district, organized under Section 32000 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code, and applied the rule that a hospital performing a governmental function is not liable for personal injuries suffered by patients as a result of the negligence of its employees.

The amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff was admitted to the defendant's hospital for the purpose of delivering her of a child; that while she was in a state of unconsciousness brought about by the use of an anaesthetic the defendant and its agents allowed her body and legs to become burned by the negligent use of hot water bottles; that as a result she suffered serious and permanent injuries; that the defendant's hospital was 'open to the public as a hospital where a person, for a money consideration, could obtain hospital and medical services'; that the plaintiff was accepted as a patient 'for a money consideration * * * and became indebted and was given a bill for services rendered' by the defendant.

For the purpose of testing a question of law all facts well pleaded are of course admitted. Additional facts of which judicial notice may be taken will also be considered by the court although not pleaded. French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 608, 80 P. 1031, 69 L.R.A. 556; Mullan v. State, 114 Cal. 578, 46 P. 670, 34 L.R.A. 262. The defendant hospital district was organized under the provisions of The Local Hospital District Law, Stats. 1945, ch. 932, p. 1738, § 32000 et seq., Health and Safety Code. The question presented is whether that statute has created an agency immune from liability in tort for the negligence of its agents.

It is generally recognized that when acting in its governmental capacity a sovereign may not be sued except where the doctrine has been specifically departed from by constitutional or statutory law. People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 756, 178 P.2d 1. The plaintiffs contend that a statutory departure from the doctrine has been brought about in this state.

In 1893, Stats.1893, p. 57, the legislature enacted its first general statute providing for suits against the state. The rule is expressed today by Section 16041 of the Government Code, Stats.1945, p. 511, as follows: 'Any person who has a claim against the State (1) on express contract, (2) for negligence, or (3) for the taking or damaging of private property for public use within the meaning of Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution, shall present the claim to the board in accordance with Section 16021. If the claim is rejected or disallowed by the board, the claimant may bring an action against the State on the claim and prosecute it to a final judgment, subject to the conditions prescribed by this chapter.'

In Chapman v. State, 1894, 104 Cal. 690, 38 P. 457; recovery was sought for a loss alleged to have been due to the negligence of the Harbor Commissioners in maintaining a wharf. The facts involved occurred prior to the enactment of 1893. The court refused to apply the act retroactively to create any liability against the state for past negligence, leaving open the question of the prospective effect of tortious acts of officers of the state. The court concluded, however, that a contractual liability existed prior to the act of 1893 and allowed the plaintiff to recover his loss in the action as an additional remedy given by the statute. The rule of the Chapman case with regard to tortious actions was followed in Melvin v. State, 1898, 121 Cal. 16, 53 P. 416, again involving facts prior to the enactment of 1893. Denning v. State, 1899, 123 Cal. 316, 55 P. 1000, 1001, directly presented the question of the state's prospective tortious liability under the act. Without nothing the problem left open in prior cases, the court applied the language of the Chapman and Melvin cases as holding that the act of 1893 'did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted.'

In reviewing the foregoing line of decisions, this court in People v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754, 178 P.2d 1, 4, stated: 'Thus there was adopted in this state the doctrine that state consent to be sued for negligence did not waive sovereign immunity from liability for tort.'

Prior to the enactment of 1893 the court was confronted with a statute authorizing the commencement of actions against the state for damages resulting from the construction of a channel in the American River by a levee commission. The court held, Green v. State, 1887, 73 Cal. 29, 11 P. 602, 14 P. 610, that the statute did not waive any legal defense except that of immunity from suit. Thus, where the state was engaged in a public work for the common good, that is in a governmental activity as distinguished from a commercial enterprise, the former constituted a defense to the action authorized by the statute.

In Melvin v. State, supra, 121 Cal. 16, 53 P. 416, in denying the retroactive application of the act of 1893, the court pointed out that the state was engaged in a governmental activity. In Denning v. State, supra, 123 Cal. 316, 55 P. 1000, in denying the prospective application of the act the court noted that the plaintiff was employed by the state in a governmental activity at the time of his injury. Following these decisions it was generally held that the doctrine of sovereign nonliability for tort applied to state subdivisions but only where they were acting in a governmental capacity in the discharge of official duties. People v. Superior Court, supra. 29 Cal.2d 754, 760, 178 P.2d 1; Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542, 269 P. 171; Kellar v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 P. 505; Davoust v. City of Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 70, 84 P. 760, 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 536; Madison v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Cal.App.2d 232, 234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d 141. On the other hand, 'where the state engages in industrial or business enterprises, as distinguished from purely governmental activities, tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated pursuant to the consent statute.' People v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754, 178 P.2d 1; see also Yolo v. Modesto Irr. Dist., 216 Cal. 274, 13 P.2d 908.

The defendant hospital district is a public corporation, § 32001, Health and Safety Code, duly formed as the result of the favorable vote of majority of the voters in the district, § 32003, Health and Safety Code. Although no section of the statute specifically declares the purpose for which the district is created that purpose is made apparent from the statute as a whole. Thus, in Section 32125 (powers of a local hospital district) it is declared that: 'The board of directors shall be responsible for the operation of all hospitals owned or leased by the district, according to the best interests of the public health * * *.' In Section 32128 (minimum standards of a local hospital district) it is staed that 'The rules of the hospital, established by the board of directors pursuant to this article, shall include * * * 5. Such limitations with respect to the practice of medicine and surgery in the hospital as the board of directors may find to be in the best interests of the public health and welfare * * *.'

Section 32129 prohibits the district from rendering any professional services, either the hospital. Professional services may be the hospital. Professional services may be rendered by physicians and surgeons who contract to do so with the district, but only on a basis which does not result in any profit or gain to the district. Section 32125 provides that 'In fixing the rates the board shall, insofar as possible establish such rates as will permit the hospital to be operated upon a self-supporting basis.' Section 32200 gives the district the right to finance itself by taxation of 'real and personal property within the district,' and Section 32201 et seq. provide means by which an annual tax may be levied and collected to support the operations of the district during the next ensuing fiscal year.

It is the contention of the defendant district that it is exercising a governmental function under the laws of the state; that it is not acting in a proprietary capacity, and that as a result it is immune from a suit for personal injuries. It is insisted that the same rule should apply to hospitals organized under the provisions of The Local Hospital District Law as apply to county hospitals organized and operated under Section 200 et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The principal difference between the two appears to be that county hospitals are administered by county boards of supervisors while hospitals operated by local hospital districts are administered by a board of directors. But both are governmental agencies. County hospitals may charge patients for hospitalization and medical care, § 203.5, Welfare and Institutions Code; are supported by taxation, § 200, Welfare and Institutions Code; and tend to promote the public health and welfare, § 203, Welfare and Institutions Code....