Talps v. Arreola

• Decision Date: 18 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 42886,42886
• Citation: 83 Wn.2d 655,521 P.2d 206
• Parties: Lillie J. TALPS, Appellant, v. Manuel ARREOLA et al., Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 655

83 Wn.2d 655

521 P.2d 206

Lillie J. TALPS, Appellant, v. Manuel ARREOLA et al., Respondents.

No. 42886.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 18, 1974.

Rehearing Denied June 24, 1974.

Richard B. Sanders, Seattle, for appellant.

Olwell, Boyle & Hattrup, Lee Olwell, Seattle, for respondents.

STAFFORD, Associate Justice.

Lillie J. Talps has appealed the trial court's judgment dismissing her complaint with prejudice and granting the relief claimed in respondents' cross-claim. Respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal.

Lillie J. Talps delivered her car to Mannie's Auto Rebuild for some repair work. At that time, she signed an authorization for repairs. When she returned for the vehicle, a dispute arose as to the amount of work she had authorized respondents to perform. Appellant paid only a portion of the bill and respondents refused to release the automobile until she paid in full.

Appellant filed a complaint for damages alleging respondents' conversion of her vehicle and asserting further that respondents' action constituted an 'unfair or deceptive act or practice' under RCW 19.86.020. Her prayer for relief asked for specific money damages as well as treble damages and attorney's fees as provided in RCW 19.86.090. Respondents answered and by way of affirmative defense claimed a possessory chattel lien pursuant to RCW 60.08. They also cross-claimed for the unpaid portion of the bill.

The trial court found that appellant had authorized all repair work done by respondents and dismissed appellant's complaint with prejudice. The court also entered judgment on respondents' cross-claim, ordered foreclosure of respondents' lien and the sale of appellant's car. The proceeds of the sale were ordered applied to the amount owed by appellant.

Although Mrs. Talps has appealed, she has not furnished us with a statement of facts of any kind. In the absence of a properly certified statement of facts, this court must assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact. Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wash.2d 215, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972); Roller v. Blodgett, 74 Wash.2d 878, 447 P.2d 601 (1968). Further, lacking a statement of facts we have no way of ascertaining what transpired at trial, including whether appellant's proof may have expanded her pleadings or whether appellant raised issues beyond those disclosed by the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment.

Appellant's sole assignment of error is that '(t)he court erred in holding that respondents were entitled, pursuant to RCW 60.08, to retain possession of appellant's automobile prior to any judicial hearing.' We cannot tell, from the assignment of error, whether it challenges some portion of the findings of fact, some conclusion of law or the judgment. However, if it is intended as an assignment of error to a finding of fact, we have held that '(a)n assignment of error to a 'holding' of the trial court is insufficient to present . . . a finding of fact to this court for review.' Becwar v. Bear, 41 Wash.2d 37, 38, 246 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1952).

Appellant acknowledges the deficiency of the assignment of error but argues that the facts, even as found, do not support the judgment. Rather than unnecessarily prolonging the opinion by reciting the findings that support the judgment, it is sufficient to say that we have examined them and do not agree with appellant's assertion of insufficiency.

Appellant's brief and reply brief make it evident that she has, for all intents and purposes, abandoned her original claim of conversion as well as the assertion that respondents have violated RCW 19.86.020 et seq. for which she had asked treble damages. She has not argued these matters and his cited no cases. Contentions that are not supported by argument or authority will not be considered by us. State v. Van Auken, 77 Wash.2d 136, 142, 460 P.2d 277 (1969); State v. Alden, 73 Wash.2d 360, 363, 438 P.2d 620 (1968); See also ROA I--43.

Appellant now argues that RCW 60.08 is violative of due process because it does not provide for an evidentiary hearing at or near the time one is deprived of the use of his or her property. Respondents assert, however, that appellant's new theory was not argued at the time of trial but is presented here for the first time. That being the case, say respondents, the Supreme Court should not consider the new theory as a ground for reversal. Appellant counters with the contention that even though the unconstitutionality of RCW 60.08 was not pleaded, it was in fact argued at the time of trial. Thus, appellant asserts, she has not raised the issue for the first time on appeal. This, of course, raises a factual issue capable of being resolved by reference to a statement of facts.

Unfortunately, appellant has not furnished us with a statement of facts and thus is unable to establish that the unconstitutionality of RCW 60.08 was raised at the time of trial. Lacking the support of a statement of facts, appellant directs our attention to an undated document entitled 'trial brief', found in the supplemental transcript. However, this document does not support her position. Comparison of the appeal bond contained in...