Tamez v. Sullivan
| Citation | 888 F.2d 334 |
| Decision Date | 13 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1404,89-1404 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15046A Pedro TAMEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. Summary Calendar. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Gilbert Rodriguez, West Texas Legal Services, Abilene, Tex., William Kimble, West Texas Legal Services, Ft. Worth, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
Joseph B. Liken, Asst. Regional Counsel, U.S. Dept. of HHS, Marvin Collins, U.S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before WILLIAMS, SMITH and DUHE, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits. We affirm.
Pedro Tamez is a 49 year-old male who suffers from diabetes mellitus and spondylolisthesis (anterior movement of a lumbar vertebra). The Administrative Law Judge found that Tamez was capable of light work and, based on Rules 202.16 and 202.17, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (1988), that he was not disabled.
On review of a final decision of the Secretary we inquire whether substantial evidence supports the Secretary's decision and whether the Secretary applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir.1988).
Tamez states that the ALJ erroneously found he was capable of light work, and that under Rule 201.17 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines a claimant with Tamez' profile who is limited to sedentary work is deemed disabled. Tamez argues that light work assumes " 'an ability to stand and walk at least 6 hours in an 8-hour work day,' " Lawler v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ), and that substantial limitations restrain Tamez from meeting these requirements.
The medical evidence generally shows that Tamez experiences certain limitations related to his impairments. None of the evidence, however, indicates that he is incapable of performing light work. Dr. Murtha, Tamez' treating physician, reported that Tamez complained of a numbness on the left side that was probably caused by high blood sugar. Dr. Ramachandran, the consultative physician, reported that Tamez walked with a limp and could not bend down to touch his toes, squat down and stand up, or walk on his heels or toes. Tamez complained of back pain radiating down into his legs and, during the hearing before the ALJ, revealed that he had an ingrown toenail. The medical evidence submitted to the Appeals Council after the decision of the ALJ 1 showed that circulation changes in the feet and ankles were improved, and that Tamez exhibited peripheral diabetic neuropathy, diabetic dermopathy, background retinopathy, and impotency with diabetic neuritis.
In short, unlike the facts in Lawler, the facts in the present case do not show that Tamez is incapable of standing and walking at least 6 hours in an 8-hour day. On the contrary, the ALJ correctly noted that Tamez' ordinary physical activity--driving, picking up around the house, sweeping, doing yard work, occasional car repairs, and doing dishes--was consistent with the ability to perform light work. The ALJ's finding that Tamez was capable of light work is therefore supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ correctly applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines to determine that Tamez was not disabled.
Tamez next argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his diabetes was remediable in view of the fact that he was financially unable to purchase diabetes medication. If a claimant cannot afford a...
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