Tangblade v. Lear Corporation, WD59330

• Decision Date: 23 October 2001
• Docket Number: WD59330
• Citation: 58 S.W.3d 662
• Parties: Debby Tangblade, Respondent, v. Lear Corporation, Employer/Appellant, and Constitution State Service Company, Insurer/Appellant. WD59330 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Debby Tangblade, Respondent v Lear Corporation, Employer/Appellant, and Constitution State Service Company, Insurer/Appellant

WD59330

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

10/23/2001

Appeal From: Labor and Industrial Relations Commission

Counsel for Appellant: Lee M. Baty, A. Scott DeVouton and Randall W. Schroer

Counsel for Respondent: Steven C. Effertz

Opinion Summary:

Lear Corporation and Constitution State Service Company appeal from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarding workers' compensation benefits to the respondent, Debby Tangblade, for a work-related mental injury.

In their sole point on appeal, the appellants claim that the commission erred in awarding Tangblade temporary total disability benefits for her claimed mental injury of major depressive disorder due to work-related stress because neither the facts found by the commission nor the evidence in the record support the award in that they do not establish that the respondent's mental injury arose out of her employment, as required by section 287.120.1 and .8.

Division I holds: Pursuant to section 287.020.3(2), an injury arises out of and in the course of employment if it is apparent that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury. As to the appellants' claim that the commission's findings do not establish that Tangblade's work-related stress caused her mental injury, they assert that the stress was merely a precipitating factor, and that her predisposition to depression was the substantial factor in causing her major depressive disorder. The appellants' claim that as a precipitating factor, the work-related stress simply aggravated an existing condition, and thus did not rise to the level of a compensable injury. While it is true that a wholly innate condition merely precipitated by a work-related accident is not compensable, if it can be shown that the accident was a substantial factor in causing the onset of a condition or aggravating an existing condition, it is compensable. The commission found that the work-related stress was a substantial factor in causing Tangblade's mental injury.

The appellants contend that there is not sufficient and competent evidence in the record for the commission to find that Tangblade's work-related stress was a substantial factor in causing her major depressive disorder. The record reflects that Tangblade's physician, Dr. Harris, testified that he believed that the cause of her depression was the excessive work stress she endured while employed by the appellants. The commission found the testimony of Dr. Harris to be credible, and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the commission as to the issue of witness credibility. Thus, we find that the commission's award of temporary total benefits to the respondent for major depressive disorder was supported by its findings and sufficient competent evidence in the record, and was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Howard and Holliger, JJ., concur.

Edwin H. Smith, Presiding Judge

Lear Corporation and Constitution State Service Company appeal from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) awarding workers' compensation benefits to the respondent, Debby Tangblade, for a work-related mental injury.

In their sole point on appeal, the appellants claim that the Commission erred in awarding temporary total disability benefits to the respondent for her claimed mental injury of major depressive disorder due to work-related stress because neither the facts found by the Commission nor the evidence in the record support the award in that they do not establish that the respondent's mental injury arose out of her employment, as required by section 287.120.1 and .8.¹

We affirm.Facts

The respondent was employed by Lear, a supplier of automotive parts, for approximately 22 years. Although the respondent had held several different positions with Lear, at the time that her alleged mental injury occurred, she was working as a shipping supervisor. In this position, she was directly responsible for overseeing 20 to 30 employees. Her regular duties involved maintaining inventory control for furnished goods, shipping and receiving goods, and overseeing the shuttle service. Prior to the fall of 1998, she typically worked around 8-hour days, but occasionally would be required to work anywhere from 14 to 18 hours per day. In mid-October of 1998, longer hours were implemented at Lear, resulting in a substantial increase in the respondent's duties during late 1998 and early 1999. She was asked to supervise an additional shift, in addition to helping organize a move to a new warehouse and implementing a new computer system, which involved training and troubleshooting.

The respondent's last day at Lear was May 4, 1999. Earlier that day, she was questioned by a supervisor about a timecard that she had signed. She also had to deal with a truck driver who was complaining about another employee who had shipped a product improperly. The respondent testified that on her last day, "something went wrong; her mind wouldn't think right." She proceeded to walk out of work and stood in the rain, screaming for an hour, before finally going home. She never returned to work following this incident.

On November 29, 1999, the respondent filed a claim for disability benefits with the Division of Workers' Compensation. She alleged that extraordinary and unusual stress at work caused her to suffer a nervous breakdown and subsequent depression, which had left her permanently and totally disabled. Lear filed its answer to the claim on December 10, 1999. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on May 26, 2000, to determine whether the respondent sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Lear.

At the compensation hearing, the respondent and her husband, Mark Tangblade, testified as to her work conditions and depression. The respondent also introduced deposition testimony from Dr. George Harris, who concluded that work-related stress caused her major depressive disorder. On their behalf, the appellants called several former co-workers of the respondent as witnesses. The appellants also introduced deposition testimony from their own medical expert, Dr. Michael Pronko, who concurred with the respondent's diagnosis of major depressive disorder, but did not believe that it was caused by workplace stress.

On July 7, 2000, the ALJ issued findings of fact upholding the respondent's claim, finding, inter alia, that she suffered from major depressive disorder which arose out of and in the course of her employment with Lear. The ALJ awarded the respondent temporary total disability benefits from May 4, 1999, through May 26, 2000, as well as temporary total disability benefits from May 27, 2000, into the future, as was necessary. In addition, the ALJ awarded her benefits for past medical expenses, along with benefits to compensate her for the current outstanding medical bills accumulated in connection with her mental injury, as well as continuing medical care.On July 26, 2000, Lear and its workers' compensation carrier, appellant Constitution State Service Company, filed an application with the Commission for review of the ALJ's award. On October 26, 2000, the Commission adopted the findings of the ALJ and affirmed the award of benefits.

This appeal follows.Standard of Review

Our review is governed by section 287.495.1, which provides, in relevant part:

Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the commission within its powers shall be conclusive and binding. The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other:

(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;

(2) That the award was procured by fraud;

(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award;

(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.

In reviewing a workers' compensation award under this statute, "we review the findings of the Commission and not those of the ALJ." Sutton v. Vee Jay Cement Contracting Co., 37 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Mo. App. 2000) (citation omitted). However, when "the Commission affirms or adopts the findings of the ALJ, we review the decision and findings of the ALJ as adopted by the Commission." Id. (citation omitted).

In our review, we are bound by the factual determinations of the Commission and will only review questions of law. Williams v. DePaul Health Ctr., 996 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Mo. App. 1999). Thus, with respect to our review of the Commission's decision, pursuant to section 287.495.1(3) and (4), we must determine whether its findings of fact support its award, under the law as we find it, and whether there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support its findings. If we determine that the Commission's award is supported by sufficient competent evidence, then we must consider whether the award is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, based on a review of all the evidence in the record, including that which opposes or is unfavorable to the award. Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 570 (Mo. App. 1995). In considering the effect of all the evidence in the record, we view it in a light most favorable to the Commission's decision. Id. On appeal, we do not defer to the Commission on questions of law, but do defer to the Commission's findings of fact. Williams, 996 S.W.2d at 625. Absent any evidence of fraud, we will consider the Commission's findings of fact to be conclusive and binding. Section 287.495.1.I.

In their sole point on appeal, the appellants claim that the Commission erred in awarding temporary total disability benefits...