Tanishia T. v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 06 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20 C 6293 |
| Parties | TANISHIA T.,[1] Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,[2] Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Tanishia T.'s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [dkt. 16, Pl.'s Mot.] is denied, and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [dkt 22, Def.'s Mot.] is granted.
On October 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since September 22, 2018, due to pain in both of her knees. [Dkt. 15-1, R. 256-57, 286.] Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. [R. 147 187.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on March 2, 2020. [R. 112-38.] Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. [R. 114, 119-32.] Vocational expert (“VE”) Thomas Grzesik also testified. [R. 13237.] On March 23, 2020, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act. [R. 19-29.] The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. [R. 1-4.]
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff's claim in accordance with the Social Security Administration's five-step sequential evaluation process. [R. 19-29.] The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of September 22, 2018. [R. 21.] At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity and disorders of bilateral knees, including osteoarthritis, chondromalacia, and a meniscus tear, with a history of arthroscopic surgery. [Id.] The ALJ concluded at step three that her impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal one of the Social Security Administration's listings of impairments (a “Listing”). [R. 2223.] Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work[3] with the following additional limitations: she is able to stand or walk for no more than 10 minutes at a time; after sitting for 45 minutes, she must have the opportunity to stand at a workstation for 2 minutes; she is unable to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, crawl or kneel; she may occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, crouch or operate foot controls with the bilateral lower extremities; and she must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold. [R. 23-28.] At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would not be able to perform her past relevant work. [R. 28.] At step five, based upon the VE's testimony and Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that she is not disabled under the Social Security Act. [R. 28-29.]
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry, asking whether: (1) the claimant has performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for which she claims disability; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) the claimant retains the RFC to perform her past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is able to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). “A finding of disability requires an affirmative answer at either step three or step five.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, after which at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner.” Id.
Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner and is reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court plays an “extremely limited” role in reviewing the ALJ's decision. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). Judicial review of the ALJ's decision is limited to determining whether it adequately discusses the issues and is based upon substantial evidence and the proper legal criteria. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). “To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court reviews the record as a whole but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ's by reweighing the evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014). While this review is deferential, “it is not intended to be a rubber-stamp” on the ALJ's decision. Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court will reverse the ALJ's finding “if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is the result of an error of law.” Id. at 327.
The ALJ has a basic obligation both to develop a full and fair record and to “build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result [so as] to afford the claimant meaningful judicial review of the administrative findings.” Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 837. Although the ALJ is not required to mention every piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ's analysis “must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind [his] decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001); accord Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ “must explain [the ALJ's] analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 351). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the claimant is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ's opinion is adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) failed to address the line of evidence concerning Plaintiff's mental health difficulties, (2) erred in evaluating Plaintiff's subjective statements about her symptoms, and (3) improperly rejected the opinion of Plaintiff's treating doctor. [Dkt. 17, Pl.'s Mem. at 7-14; dkt. 24, Pl.'s Reply at 1-9.] The Commissioner argues in opposition that the ALJ did not err in not addressing the sparse mental health evidence or further developing the record as to those conditions, the ALJ reasonably evaluated Plaintiff's subjective symptoms in accordance with the applicable regulations, and the ALJ sufficiently supported his assessment of the treating doctor's opinion. [Dkt. 23, Def.'s Mem. at 3-14.] For the reasons that follow, the Court affirms the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by ignoring “an entire line of evidence” regarding her mental health conditions, citing in support her own statements on function reports and her hearing testimony, treatment records where depression and bipolar disorder were mentioned, and an emergency room record indicating that Plaintiff was once prescribed an anti-anxiety medication. [Pl.'s Mem. at 7-8; see also Pl.'s Reply at 1-4.] This evidence, Plaintiff contends, was at least sufficient such that the ALJ should have further developed the record by questioning Plaintiff about her depression and/or obtaining her prior mental health treatment records from the Bowen Center. [Pl.'s Mem. at 8.]
Although Plaintiff characterizes this unaddressed evidence as “an entire line,” [Pl.'s Mem. at 7], a review of the records does not bear out this characterization by Plaintiff. The treatment records from her orthopedist in 2017, which was prior to her alleged onset date, indicated that depression was part of her “past medical history” by a simple “Y” (meaning “yes”) notation and reported that she took some medications, which Plaintiff now explains in her brief to this Court are used to treat, as relevant here, bipolar disorder and depression. [R. 386, 390; see Pl.'s Mem. at 7-8 & nn. 4-6.] In September 2018, a different provider identified the same medications as in the 2017 records and listed depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and depressed mood as “current problems” during visits, although the treatment focused on Plaintiff's knee condition. [R. 424-47.] At the same time, however during visits to that provider, Plaintiff denied “anxiety and depression.” [R. 427-47.] In March 2019, Plaintiff went to the emergency room for pressure in her chest, reported a history of anxiety, and was...
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