Tanner v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 16 April 1906
• Citation: 85 P. 876,34 Mont. 121
• Parties: TANNER v. BOWEN.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

85 P. 876

34 Mont. 121

TANNER v. BOWEN.

Supreme Court of Montana

April 16, 1906

Appeal from District Court, Teton County; J. E. Erickson, Judge.

Action by Ed. Tanner against J. R. Bowen. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

E. S Bishop, for appellant.

HOLLOWAY J.

The facts disclosed by the record are that John H. Devlin was the owner of a certain horse and let it to the plaintiff Tanner who was a livery stable keeper at Conrad, Teton county, for use in his livery business. The defendant Bowen hired a team and buggy from Tanner on December 1, 1904, to drive to Chouteau, and the Devlin horse and another were furnished to him by Tanner. Bowen made the trip with the team to Chouteau and on the following morning it was ascertained that the Devlin horse had died. Devlin asserted a claim for the value of the horse against both Tanner and Bowen and demanded a settlement for the same from each. Upon the trial it was made to appear that Tanner admitted Devlin's claim, acknowledged his own liability, paid to Devlin the value of the horse in satisfaction of Devlin's claim, took an assignment of Devlin's cause of action as against Bowen, and as such assignee brought this action to recover from Bowen the value of the horse, alleging in his complaint that the death of the horse was caused by negligence on the part of Bowen. The answer denies any negligence on Bowen's part. A verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, a judgment entered thereon, and from the judgment and an order denying him a new trial, the defendant appealed.

The only error assigned in the brief of appellant is that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant as requested by him. In discussing this alleged error, counsel for appellant makes three distinct contentions, only one of which it will be necessary to consider. It is said that plaintiff Tanner, having paid to Devlin the amount of Devlin's claim in satisfaction of the same, thereby discharged Bowen from liability. As to whether Tanner was in fact liable might be a question, but this liability was admitted. The payment by Tanner to Devlin and the attempted assignment of Devlin's cause of action operated as a complete satisfaction of Devlin's claim and a release of Tanner from any further liability. In Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 2 N.E. 107, it is said "The validity and effect of a release of a cause of action do not depend upon the validity of the cause of action. If the claim is made against one and released, all who may be liable are discharged, whether the one released was liable or not." The principle underlying this decision is that if when the release was given, Devlin was asserting against Tanner a liability for the same act for which Tanner now asserts the liability of Bowen, the two causes of action are the same and the release of one...