Tanner v. Reynolds Metals Co.

Decision Date25 June 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98 CA 1456.,98 CA 1456.
Citation739 So.2d 893
PartiesRanda B. Hall TANNER v. REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY and Carl Anderson.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Jill Craft, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff-Appellant Randa B. Hall Tanner.

William R. D'Armond, Baton Rouge, for Defendant-Appellee Reynolds Metals Company.

Carl Anderson, Port Allen, Defendant-Appellee, pro se.

Before: FITZSIMMONS, GUIDRY, and PETTIGREW, JJ.

PETTIGREW, J.

The instant suit was filed by Randa B. Hall Tanner to recover damages for alleged sexual harassment that she endured while an employee at Reynolds Metals Company ("Reynolds"). Reynolds filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it was not responsible for any alleged conduct by its employee, Carl Anderson. The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Reynolds was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment in favor of Reynolds was granted, dismissing Ms. Tanner's claims with prejudice.

Ms. Tanner now appeals this judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Reynolds.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about March 13, 1996, Randa B. Hall Tanner was hired by Reynolds as a laborer. According to Ms. Tanner, she was working the night shift at Reynolds on September 21-22, 1996. Sometime after midnight of September 22, 1996, or early September 23, 1996, she encountered another Reynolds' employee, Carl Anderson, who was working as step-up supervisor at the time. Ms. Tanner had gone into the load-out shack to work and noticed that the lights were out. After turning the lights on, she realized that Mr. Anderson was in the load-out shack, and they began discussing what was going to be loaded onto the rail cars. When they walked out onto the catwalk towards the rail cars, Mr. Anderson asked Ms. Tanner if she would be offended if he asked her for some "p* * *y." She told him she was not interested, but he persisted.

Ms. Tanner returned to the load-out shack, and Mr. Anderson followed her in and turned the lights out. He cornered her in a chair and started asking her again for sex. Mr. Anderson pinned her back into the chair. According to Ms. Tanner, he tried to kiss her, grabbed her breasts, and grabbed her between her legs. Ms. Tanner tried pushing him off, and he eventually backed away from her. She was shaking and scared and wanted to get out of the shack and finish her job. When Ms. Tanner got up to get a pen and some paper, Mr. Anderson sat down and pulled her onto his lap. He again was grabbing at her breasts and between her legs, and he ripped her shirt. Ms. Tanner noticed that his penis was exposed, and Mr. Anderson was trying to get her to touch it and sit on it. Mr. Anderson kept saying, "Just a little bit, I've never had a white woman before, you know, let me just try it one time. Have you ever had a black man?" Ms. Tanner kept telling him "no" and tried to get away from him. When Ms. Tanner finally got away from him, Mr. Anderson zipped up his pants, and "was back to business as usual." Later that morning, Ms. Tanner was in the ladies' locker room when Mr. Anderson again approached her. He asked her if she was hiding from him. When Mr. Anderson entered the locker room, he turned the light out and grabbed at her from behind. Ms. Tanner started screaming, and he left. Ms. Tanner finished her shift, and before leaving to go home, she told A.B. "Happy" Perry, the Union representative, what had happened.

Later that afternoon, the supervisor on duty, Brian Leachman, called Ms. Tanner at home to find out what had happened. Joseph DeBeir, human resources manager for the Carbon Products Division of Reynolds, and Robert Stokes, the Union president, were also notified about Ms. Tanner's allegations. Reynolds immediately began an investigation of the incident and interviewed both Ms. Tanner and Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson strongly denied Ms. Tanner's allegations. Several other employees of Reynolds were also interviewed. At the request of Mr. DeBeir, James H. Taylor, III, Reynolds' manager of corporate security, also joined in on the investigation.

On September 27, 1996, Ms. Tanner was offered paid leave pending the completion of the investigation. Ms. Tanner was on paid leave for approximately 30 days, and was scheduled to return to work on October 25, 1996. However, according to Ms. Tanner, after September 27, 1996, she never returned to her job at Reynolds. Despite a note from her physician releasing her as of January 1, 1997, to "return to full activity," and the fact that Mr. Anderson had been terminated from Reynolds, Ms. Tanner continually refused to return to work, indicating that she feared for her safety because Reynolds' management had failed to protect her safety and interests. Ms. Tanner remained on unpaid leave until she was finally terminated from Reynolds on April 1, 1998.

On October 24, 1996, Mr. Anderson was notified by letter that he was being suspended for the purpose of discharge. A second letter from Reynolds dated October 31, 1996, advised Mr. Anderson that his employment with Reynolds was terminated effective October 24, 1996. Not only was Mr. Anderson terminated from Reynolds, but he was also barred from the premises.

According to Ms. Tanner's deposition testimony, she had been sexually harassed by other Reynolds' employees prior to the incident with Mr. Anderson on September 22, 1996. She named three other co-employees who had sexually harassed her while at work. Ms. Tanner indicated that the incidents with these three co-workers "occurred frequently" and basically involved flirtatious comments containing sexual innuendoes. She described one incident where one of her co-workers actually kissed her and she pushed him away. Ms. Tanner acknowledged that she had never complained to company officials about these incidents, but explained that she did in fact tell A.B. "Happy" Perry and Mike Smith, another co-worker, about the incidents. Mr. Perry advised her that if it "was to get out of hand," she should report them. Ms. Tanner stated, however, that she was afraid to report the incidents because she did not want "to jeopardize [her] job or anything."

Ms. Tanner filed the instant suit for damages on February 12, 1997. Named as defendants were Reynolds and Mr. Anderson. Among the allegations in Ms. Tanner's petition, she asserted that "[t]he actions and/or inactions of defendants constitute discrimination based on [her] sex, female, under the meaning and intent of the provisions of Louisiana law." As alleged by Ms. Tanner, her petition was "instituted pursuant to the provisions of Louisiana law."

Reynolds filed a general denial to Ms. Tanner's petition, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reynolds sought dismissal of Ms. Tanner's claims on the basis that under Louisiana respondeat superior principles, it was not liable for Mr. Anderson's alleged sexual assault of Ms. Tanner. Following a hearing on this matter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Reynolds and dismissed Ms. Tanner's claims with prejudice. Ms. Tanner filed a motion for new trial that was summarily denied by the trial court.

Ms. Tanner has appealed the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Reynolds, assigning the following specifications of error:

1. The trial court erred in finding no liability for the harassment Ms. Tanner endured during her employment with Reynolds.

2. The trial court erred in not finding Reynolds vicariously liable for the sexually harassing behavior of its supervisors.

3. The trial court erred in not finding Reynolds liable where Reynolds failed to prevent and correct sexual harassment in employment.

4. The trial court erred in not finding Reynolds liable under La. C.C. Art. 2320.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Sanders v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 96-1751, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 696 So.2d 1031, 1035, writ denied, 97-1911 (La.10/31/97), 703 So.2d 29. A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine factual dispute. Sanders, 96-1751 at 5, 696 So.2d at 1034. Summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ. P. art. 966 B. Summary judgment is favored and "is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."1 La.Code Civ. P. art. 966 A(2).

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment remains with the movant. The burden is not shifted to the non-moving party until the mover has properly supported the motion and carried the initial burden of proof. Only then does the amended law require the non-moving party to "submit evidence showing the existence of specific facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact." Scott v. McDaniel, 96-1509, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/97), 694 So.2d 1189, 1191-1192, writ denied, 97-1551 (La.9/26/97), 701 So.2d 991.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record in the instant case and conclude that Reynolds satisfied the initial burden of proof on its motion for summary judgment. Thus, the burden was effectively shifted to Ms. Tanner to "produce factual support sufficient to establish that [she] will be able to satisfy [her] evidentiary burden of proof at trial." See La.Code Civ. P. art. 966 C(2). We agree with the trial court that Ms. Tanner failed in this respect and that Reynolds was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

As previously indicated, Ms. Tanner brought this...

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    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • July 26, 2002
    ...1274 (5th Cir. 1989); McMillon v. Corridan, No. 97-3981, 1998 WL 560334, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 1998); Tanner v. Reynolds Metals Co., 739 So. 2d 893, 899 (La. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, the proof required by Smith on the federal and state employment discrimination claims will involve "substant......
  • Smith v. Amedisys Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 26, 2002
    ...1271, 1274 (5th Cir.1989); McMillon v. Corridan, No. 97-3981, 1998 WL 560334, at *3 (E.D.La. Aug.31, 1998); Tanner v. Reynolds Metals Co., 739 So.2d 893, 899 (La.Ct.App.1999). Thus, the proof required by Smith on the federal and state employment discrimination claims will involve "substanti......
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    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • April 26, 2021
    ...duties. See Boudreaux, 762 So.2d at 1204-05. Excel's reliance on Tanner v. Reynolds Metals Company, 98-1456 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/25/99), 739 So.2d 893, is misplaced. In Tanner, this court found that Article 2320 was applicable to the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim made under general to......
1 books & journal articles
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    • United States
    • Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law No. XXIV-2, January 2023
    • January 1, 2023
    ...within the authorized limits of time and space; and (3) is performed in part to serve the employer); Tanner v. Reynolds Metals Co., 739 So. 2d 893, 897 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that an employer is vicariously liable if the tortious conduct of its employee is “so closely connected in tim......

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