Tanner v. State

• Decision Date: 10 February 1958
• Docket Number: No. 19951,19951
• Citation: 213 Ga. 820,102 S.E.2d 176
• Parties: TANNER v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 176

102 S.E.2d 176

213 Ga. 820

TANNER v. The STATE.

No. 19951.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 10, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

For the reasons given in division 3 of the opinion, it was error to deny the defendant's motion for new trial.

H. Cliff Hatcher, George W. Fryhofer, Waynesboro, Emory L. Rowland, Wrightsville, W. W. Larsen, Jr., Larsen & Larsen, Dublin, for plaintiff in error.

George Hains, Solicitor-General, Augusta, Lewis & Lewis, Preston B. Lewis, Waynesboro, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., J. R. Parham, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

MOBLEY, Justice.

Gordon Tanner, a former police officer of the City of Waynesboro, was convicted of the murder of Herman DeLaigle and was recommended to the mercy of the court. His motion for new trial on the general and nine special grounds was denied and the defendant excepts.

1. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict of the jury, and the general grounds are without merit.

2. In ground 4 of the motion for new trial, the defendant assigns as error the ruling of the trial court in permitting a witness for the State, R. N. DeLaigle, to remain in the courtroom during the course of the trial. In view of the statement of the trial court, when ruling that this witness could remain in the courtroom, that 'The solicitor-general states that he needs him for advice and assistance in the trial of the case and we usually allow one investigating officer,' and no further objection being made thereafter, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this ground. This court has held that it is within the discretion of the trial court to permit a witness whom the solicitor-general states he needs to aid in the trial of the case to remain in the courtroom. Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 95 S.E.2d 792.

3. In ground 5 it is contended that the trial court erred in permitting a witness for the State, W. C. Rogers, to testify as to the evidence heard by Rogers and given by a witness at the commitment trial of the defendant. This ground shows that the absent witness, Mrs. Story, was not present at the trial because, as testified to by her husband, she was suffering from a heart ailment. A doctor's certificate was submitted to the trial court, and in answer to the solicitor's question, 'Is Mrs. Story physically able to attend court at the present term,' the husband, Mr. Story, replied, 'No, sir.' This was the extent of the showing by the State as to the witness being inaccessible. Before the witness Rogers related his evidence as to his remembrance of the testimony given by Mrs. Story at the commitment trial, the defendant's counsel interposed objections upon the ground that the defendant was entitled to have the witness at the trial to be interrogated in order that the jury might see the witness and observe her demeanor. Code, § 38-314 provides: 'The testimony of a witness, since deceased, or disqualified, or inaccessible for any cause, given under oath on a former trial, upon substantially the same issue and between substantially the same parties, may be proved by anyone who heard it, and who professes to remember the substance of the entire testimony as to the particular matter about which he testifies.' The sole question for decision raised by this ground is whether or not Mrs. Story was shown to be inaccessible in the instant case, so as to permit her testimony at the commitment trial to be given by the witness Rogers. The question whether a witness is inaccessible within the meaning of the above Code section so as to allow his testimony rendered on a former trial to be related by one who professes to remember it, is in each particular case a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court (Atlanta & Charlotte Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 371, 20 S.E. 550, 26 L.R.A. 553), and his decision thereon will not be disturbed unless a manifest abuse of discretion is made to appear. Robinson v. State, 128 Ga. 254(1), 57 S.E. 315; Estill v. Citizens & Southern Bank, 153 Ga. 618(6), 113 S.E. 552; Sheppard v. State, 167 Ga. 326(3), 145 S.E. 654. The defendant contends that the State's showing, that Mrs. Story would be unable to attend court at that term, was not a sufficient showing of inaccessibility, and that in permitting the witness Rogers to testify the court abused its discretion. We have found no case in this State which defines 'inaccessible' within the meaning of Code, § 38-314. In a number of cases, a witness out of the State has been held to be inaccessible (Estill v. Citizens & Southern Bank, supra, and cases cited in 153 Ga. at page 623, 113 S.E. 552), and in Robinson v. State, supra, it was stated that proof of inability to find a witness after diligent search may, in some circumstances, be sufficient to establish the inaccessibility of a witness. See Sheppard v. State, supra. But no case in this State has been found to support the ruling that inability to attend court at the term when a defendant is tried, due to illness, constitutes inaccessibility within the meaning of the statute. The courts of other jurisdictions are not in agreement upon this question. In 20 Am.Jur. 591, § 704, it is stated: 'In criminal prosecutions, according to the weight of authority, the mere temporary illness or disability of a witness is not sufficient to justify the reception of his former testimony; it must appear that the witness is in such a state, either mentally or physically, that in reasonable probability he will never be able to attend the trial.' Cases supporting this view are: McCrorey v. Garrett, 109 Va. 645, 64 S.E. 978, 24 L.R.A.N.S., 139; Spencer v. State, 132 Wis. 509, 112 N.W. 462; State v. Wheat, 111 La. 860, 35 So. 955; Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am.Rep. 95; Commonwealth v. McKenna, 158 Mass. 207(2), 33 N.E. 389. In this same paragraph from American Jurisprudence the following statement also appears: 'The tendency of the recent criminal cases is to permit testimony given at a former trial or at the preliminary hearing to be reproduced when the witness who gave the testimony is too ill to attend court at the term at which the case is tried.' Cases holding to this effect are: Williams v. State, 156 Ark. 205, 246 S.W. 503; State v. McCarty, 49 N.D. 912, 194 N.W. 335; Rich v. State, 51 Okl.Cr. 418, 1 P.2d 805. After a careful examination of the cases, we are of the opinion that the sounder view does not support the admission of the testimony here involved upon a mere showing that the absent witness, who is within the jurisdiction of the court, is, on account of sickness, unable to testify at the term during which a defendant is tried. There was absolutely no evidence that the absent witness would not be able to testify at the next term of court, nor was there any evidence to show a reasonable probability that she would never be able to testify. The rule permitting the introduction of testimony of a witness on a former trial arises from the necessity of the case (Herndon v. Chamberlain, 39 Ga.App. 207, 146 S.E. 503); and while such evidence is not subject to the usual objections urged against hearsay evidence, because it has been delivered under oath and the witness was subject to the right...