TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini
| Decision Date | 23 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-SA 2003-0067.,2 CA-SA 2003-0067. |
| Citation | 76 P.3d 874,206 Ariz. 200 |
| Parties | TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 13 OF PIMA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Petitioner, v. Hon. Deborah BERNINI, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent, and Tanque Verde Coalition, Inc., an Arizona not-for-profit corporation; Timothy Miles and Laura Miles, husband and wife; James Jones and Penelope Jones, husband and wife; Gary W. Stone and Pamela J. Provost-Stone, husband and wife; Allan H. Bowermaster and Barbara L. Bowermaster, husband and wife; Robert G. Brown and Virginia L. Brown, husband and wife; James Bartuska and Bonnie Bartuska, husband and wife; Carol Rentschler Rhodes, an unmarried woman; David S. Moser and Carolyn R. Moser, husband and wife; and Joseph G. Klinger and Virginia A. Klinger, husband and wife, Real Parties in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy P.C., By Denise M. Bainton, Wayne E. Yehling, and Lisa Anne Smith, Tucson, for Petitioner.
Lewis & Roca LLP, By John N. Iurino, John Hinderaker, and Erin O. Simpson, Tucson, for Real Parties in Interest.
Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General, By Susan P. Segal, Dena Epstein, and Judith Darknall, Phoenix, for Amicus Curiae Arizona School Facilities Board.
Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, By Timothy M. Hogan, Phoenix, for Amicus Curiae School Finance Reform Group.
Christopher P. Thomas, Phoenix, for Amicus Curiae Arizona School Boards Association, Inc.
¶ 1 In this special action, Tanque Verde Unified School District No. 13 of Pima County challenges the respondent judge's rulings that the District's board violated Arizona's open meeting laws in selecting a site on which to build a high school and that the District may not use funds from the Arizona School Facilities Board (SFB) to pay severance damages in a condemnation action.1 The rulings culminated in a judgment entered June 30, 2003, in favor of real parties in interest, Tanque Verde Coalition and various persons who live adjacent to or near the proposed high school site (collectively, the Coalition). The petition for special action was filed two days later. Because we find the respondent judge erred in several respects, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.
¶ 2 The respondent's judgment recited the prior ruling invalidating all actions the District had taken in selecting a site to build a high school and in directing its attorneys to file a lawsuit to obtain the property by eminent domain. The judge also ruled that the District's condemnation action, then pending before another judge, was void ab initio and that the transfer, pursuant to that lawsuit, of the property's title to the District is void. In addition, the judge concluded that the May 2001 election the District had conducted did not authorize it to purchase a site for the high school. Based on those rulings, the judge enjoined the District from physically altering the property or initiating another condemnation action without first obtaining approval from the SFB in each of the last two steps of its three-step process for funding new schools. And the judge permanently enjoined the District from using SFB funds to pay severance damages in a condemnation action to obtain any site it selects.
¶ 3 Ordinarily, this court does not accept special action jurisdiction in a case in which a final judgment has been entered. See Ariz. R.P. Special Actions 1(a), 17B A.R.S. (). However, our "[s]pecial action jurisdiction is highly discretionary." Blake v. Schwartz, 202 Ariz. 120, ¶ 7, 42 P.3d 6, ¶ 7 (App.2002); see also A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4) (). We appropriately accept jurisdiction when the issues raised are ones of first impression, involve purely legal questions, are of statewide importance, and are likely to recur. Piner v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182, 962 P.2d 909 (1998); Blake.
¶ 4 All of those elements are present in this case. The issues are legal ones, as evidenced by the parties having filed cross-motions for summary judgment below in which they asserted the essential facts were undisputed. Both the specific open meeting law issue and the question about SFB funds are issues of first impression and of statewide importance. Moreover, although the District may appeal the judgment, even an accelerated appeal would be inadequate in light of the respondent judge's injunction prohibiting the District from beginning construction of its planned high school until its board conducts another site selection process and again obtains funding approval from the SFB. Finally, the appendices to the petition and response contain all the pertinent documents from the trial court proceedings, enabling us to fully review the issues.
¶ 5 For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretion and accept jurisdiction of the special action. And, because we conclude that the respondent judge abused her discretion by committing errors of law in several of her rulings, we grant relief. See Ariz. R.P. Special Actions 3(c); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 63 P.3d 282 (2003).
¶ 6 The District's board voted on May 15, 2002, to build a high school at the intersection of Catalina Highway and Snyder Road in Tucson (the Snyder site), the second time it had chosen the site. On June 13, the board voted to initiate a condemnation action to acquire the Snyder site. Several months later, on October 24, the board voted to pay necessary attorney's fees for the condemnation action, and on October 28, the District filed a lawsuit in Pima County Superior Court to obtain the site.
¶ 7 On November 25, the Coalition filed a lawsuit against the District and the SFB. The complaint alleged that (1) the defendants had violated the open meeting laws by choosing the Snyder site in improperly held executive sessions; (2) the District's election in May 2001 asking voters for authority to acquire a site and construct a high school had been conducted in violation of A.R.S. § 15-341(A); (3) SFB funds cannot properly be used to pay for severance damages in condemnation actions; and (4) the SFB's approval of the District's high school construction plan had expired before the SFB had voted to extend its approval for an additional year. In a fifth count, the Coalition sought a declaratory judgment on each of its assertions. After the SFB demanded and was granted a change of venue to Maricopa County, the Coalition dismissed it from the lawsuit, thus eliminating count four of the complaint.
¶ 8 In late February, the Coalition moved for partial summary judgment on its claims that the District had violated the open meeting laws and that it could not use SFB funds to pay severance damages in the condemnation action. The District responded to the motion and then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the four remaining counts. In its response to the District's motion, the Coalition also asked for summary judgment on the claim that the District lacks voter approval to spend its own funds to build the high school. The respondent judge denied the District's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the Coalition on all four counts. The judge later denied the District's motion for reconsideration and rejected its objections to the proposed judgment.
¶ 9 The core provision of Arizona's open meeting laws, A.R.S. §§ 38-431 through 38-431.09, states:
All meetings of any public body shall be public meetings and all persons so desiring shall be permitted to attend and listen to the deliberations and proceedings. All legal action of public bodies shall occur during a public meeting.
§ 38-431.01(A). The legislature included the following provision in which it expressly declared the policy behind and intent of those laws:
It is the public policy of this state that meetings of public bodies be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for such meetings which contain such information as is reasonably necessary to inform the public of the matters to be discussed or decided. Toward this end, any person or entity charged with the interpretations of this article shall construe any provision of this article in favor of open and public meetings.
¶ 10 The respondent judge ruled that the District's board had violated § 38-431.01(A) in meetings held between February 8 and May 15, 2002, by improperly conducting its site selection process in executive sessions. The judge also found that the board had violated the open meeting law in meetings conducted between June 13 and September 12, 2002. The District contends the judge abused her discretion in so ruling, noting that she did not explain the basis for it and asserting that the Coalition's interpretation of the statute is erroneous.
¶ 11 The parties do not dispute that the District meets the definition of "public body" in § 38-431(6) and that its board's legal actions are required to take place in public meetings. Their dispute centers instead around the statutory exceptions to the open meeting law that permit a public body to conduct executive sessions to discuss, consult on, or consider certain subjects, including various personnel matters, information in sealed records, and legal advice. § 38-431.03(A)(1), (2), and (3). The exception at issue here, § 38-431.03(A)(7), provides:
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