Tantleff v. Truscelli
Decision Date | 30 September 1985 |
Citation | 493 N.Y.S.2d 979,110 A.D.2d 240 |
Parties | Julius TANTLEFF, etc., et al., Respondents, v. Anthony TRUSCELLI, et al., Appellants. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Philip J. Fitzpatrick, P.C., Staten Island, for appellants.
Jacobi, D'Alessandro, Jacobi & Sieghardt, P.C., Staten Island, (Robert N. Glazer of counsel), for respondents.
Before GIBBONS, J.P., and BROWN, WEINSTEIN and NIEHOFF, JJ.
GIBBONS, Justice Presiding.
The question raised on this appeal is which of two purchase options set forth in a lease is to be given precedence where a tenant seeks to invoke his right to purchase the premises for a fixed price after the landlord has given him notice of a bona fide third-party offer in conformity with the tenant's contractual right of first refusal. Under the circumstances of this case, we believe that the right-of-first-refusal option must be given precedence, and that the proper rendition of the aforementioned notice extinguished the tenant's right to purchase the premises under the fixed price option. We therefore reverse.
On April 6, 1957, a lease covering some 30,000 square feet of vacant land adjacent to New Dorp Lane in Staten Island was executed between the Jules Construction Corporation on one had, and Lillian Robinson and Mary Truscelli, the title holders of the property on the other. Subsequent to that time, defendant Anthony Truscelli acquired ownership of the property and thereafter transferred ownership to his 11 children, who, for tax purposes, formed the defendant T-Eleven Partnership to hold title to the land. Sometime after November 2, 1981, the Jules Construction Corporation assigned the lease to its president, plaintiff Julius Tantleff.
With the exception of the two paragraphs containing the purchase options at issue here, the remainder of the lease contains only terms and conditions affecting the leasehold and are not relevant to this appeal. However, the options paragraphs, the priority of which is in issue, provide as follows: *
The Fixed-Price Option
(emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Jules Construction Corporation validly exercised both of the renewal options available to it under the lease, and that in 1976 the parties executed an agreement granting the lessee the options to extend the lease for three additional 10-year periods upon modified terms of the original lease. At the end of that extension agreement the parties stipulated that "All other terms of [the] lease above referred to [i.e., the lease of April 6, 1957] except as heretofore and herein modified, are to remain in full force and effect".
On December 5, 1981, the defendant owners, pursuant to the "right-of-first-refusal option" provisions of paragraph 20 of the lease, sent a "Notice and Information" to the plaintiffs, informing them of a bona fide offer from defendant Heil to purchase the property for $300,000. Shortly thereafter, the landlord and tenant executed a supplemental agreement extending plaintiff's time to respond to the December 5th Notice and Information to December 15, 1981, but on December 14, 1981, plaintiff attempted to invoke the "fixed-price option" by sending a letter containing the following notice to the defendant owners.
Significantly, plaintiffs' summons and complaint in this action are also dated December 14, 1981, and were apparently served upon the defendants on or about December 15, 1981, together with an order temporarily restraining the performance of the contract between T-Eleven Partnership and Heil, and ordering them to show cause on December 23, 1981, why a preliminary injunction should not be issued. This preliminary injunction was subsequently granted and extended at plaintiffs' request, and a notice of pendency was filed against the property.
By notice of motion dated April 6, 1983, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in their favor on the complaint, and for an order directing specific performance of the "fixed-price option". In summary form, it was plaintiffs' contention that they had the right to exercise the "fixed-price option" at any time until the property has actually been sold by the defendants and title transferred. By notice of cross motion dated May 17, 1983, defendants' cross-moved for summary judgment in their favor dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' receipt of the "Notice and Information", invoking defendants' rights under the "right-of-first-refusal option" terminated any right which plaintiffs may have had to exercise the "fixed-price option" and that plaintiffs' failure to exercise the former option in a timely fashion has terminated their rights thereunder as well.
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