Taplin v. Town of Chatham

• Decision Date: 18 August 1983
• Citation: 453 N.E.2d 421,390 Mass. 1
• Parties: David B. TAPLIN, administrator, v. TOWN OF CHATHAM et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 421

453 N.E.2d 421

390 Mass. 1

David B. TAPLIN, administrator, v. TOWN OF CHATHAM et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Barnstable.

Argued April 7, 1983.

Decided Aug. 18, 1983.

Michael D. Ford, Harwich, for plaintiff.

Sidney W. Adler, Boston, for defendants.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

This personal injury action against the town of Chatham and two town employees is based on a claim that the negligence of the individual defendants caused the conscious suffering and death of Richard J. Taplin, the plaintiff's intestate. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss. Because the judge received affidavits in connection with that motion, the motion properly should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment. Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). See White v. Peabody Constr. Co., 386 Mass. 121, 126-127, 434 N.E.2d 1015 (1982). We conclude that the action was properly dismissed as to the individual defendants but not as to the town.

The individual defendants were emergency medical technicians certified under G.L. c. 111C and were members of the Chatham rescue squad on duty on July 8, 1979. As part of their duties as town employees, they responded that night to an emergency call involving Richard Taplin. They took Taplin from the scene of his injury to a private home in Chatham. The complaint alleges that the individual defendants were negligent in not taking Taplin to a hospital and that, on the following day, Taplin was admitted to a hospital where he underwent emergency brain surgery and died on July 12, 1979.

The uncontroverted affidavit of each individual defendant states that he was acting at all times in his capacity as an emergency medical technician for the town rescue squad. Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (G.L. c. 258, § 2, as appearing in St.1978, c. 512, § 15), a public employee is not liable for "personal injury or death caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission while acting within the scope of his office or employment." The public employer, however, is liable for such an injury or death as if it were a private individual, subject to certain limitations. G.L. c. 258, § 2. Consequently, judgment was properly entered dismissing the action against the municipal employee defendants. ²

The town argues that it, as employer, is entitled to the immunity from liability granted to emergency medical technicians by G.L. c. 111C, § 14. ³ Section 14 provides that an emergency medical technician certified under G.L. c. 111C, who in the performance of his duties and in good faith, renders emergency first aid or transportation to an injured person shall not be personally liable as a result of rendering aid or transporting such person to a safe place. We assume without deciding that, on the facts set forth in the affidavits of the individual defendants they would be immune from liability under § 14 as well as under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. The question is whether § 14 not only provides immunity to these agents but also grants immunity to the principal, the town.

We conclude that neither § 14 nor common law principles extend immunity from liability to the employer of an emergency medical technician who is immune from liability. The language of § 14 suggests this result by focusing on the employee who shall not "be personally in any way liable." The statutory language does not, however, clearly resolve the issue. Two circumstances strongly support our conclusion.

First, the rule in this Commonwealth and the rule more commonly adopted across the country is that an agent's immunity does not extend to a principal against whom liability is sought under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See O'Connor v. Benson Coal Co., 301 Mass. 145, 147, 16 N.E.2d 636 (1938) (intrafamily immunity did not protect negligent family member's employer from liability); Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 553, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937) (same); Raynor v. Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 121, 77 P.2d 1054 (1938) (statutory immunity of municipal employee did not free city from liability); Maynard v. Madison, 101 Wis.2d 273, 283, 304 N.W.2d 163 (1981) (same); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217(b) (1958). A statute which is silent on the subject of the principal's immunity but grants immunity to the agent would be expected to have no effect on the established common law.

Second, the legislative history of § 14 shows that the Legislature did not intend to extend immunity to an employer whose employee had been granted § 14 immunity. On September 27, 1977, the Governor returned to the General Court with comments House Bill No. 6143 (1977), which contained a proposed § 14 for G.L. c. 111C. 1977 House Doc. No. 6602. ⁴ The Governor stated that "the bill should clearly indicate that the exemption from liability applies only to the individual policeman, fireman, or technician, and not to his employer, so that injured persons will not be denied any recourse against any other party that would otherwise be available." The Governor recommended in this regard that the words "civilly or criminally" in House No. 6143 be deleted and the words "personally in any way" be substituted. The House and Senate made the suggested changes and the bill was enacted as thus amended. J. House of Rep. 1957-1958 (1977); id. 2011-2012; J. Senate 1550, 1559-1560 (1977). See St.1977, c. 649. It is appropriate in construing an...