Tappan v. Knox
| Decision Date | 09 August 1932 |
| Citation | 115 Conn. 508,162 A. 7 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | TAPPAN v. KNOX et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.
Action by Robert Tappan against Homer Knox and another to recover damages for injuries claimed to have been caused by defendants' negligence. From a judgment on a jury's verdict for plaintiff against defendant Knox, the latter appeals.
No error.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and CORNELL JJ.
Richardson Bronson, of Waterbury, for appellant Knox.
Lazarus S. Heyman, of Danbury, for appellee.
The plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed that he had proved that about 7 o'clock in the evening of October 21, 1928, he was returning to his home in Danbury from a farm where he was employed by the appellant, and was sitting on a seat back of the driver's seat in a Ford truck being driven by the appellant; the plaintiff facing toward the rear; the car entered the intersection of West and Division streets, and at that point made a U-turn to the left, heading west, and parallel to the curb upon the right about six feet therefrom, when the appellant turned the car to the right to go to the curb in front of the plaintiff's home; in doing so, the car came into collision with a car driven by the defendant Abbott, pitching the plaintiff out of the truck and causing a concussion of the brain by striking on the hard pavement, as well as multiple other injuries, and rendering him unconscious; that he was removed to the first floor of the house and placed upon a sofa, where he remained entirely unconscious for about twenty minutes, when he was helped to his own home on the third floor; that he there showed no sign of recognition of any one and did not respond to any questions or conversation; that he was irrational during the night which followed, and it was necessary to hold him in bed; that he vomited blood and suffered great pain and was thereafter confined to his bed and his home for a long period, and has been permanently injured both mentally and physically. The jury placed the blame for the collision and resulting injuries upon the appellant, and acquitted the defendant Abbott of negligence. The verdict was for $5,900 as damages, and was accepted by the court, the appellant making no motion to set it aside as excessive.
The appellant offered evidence in support of his plea that he was not in fact negligent, and further that some days after the accident the plaintiff, upon receipt of $25, executed and delivered a release in full of all claims and agreed not to sue the appellant because of the accident. The plaintiff in turn claimed the release was voidable by reason of circumstances disclosed by the evidence. Reference will be made to other portions of the finding.
One of the assignments of error in the charge, relates to negligence and burden of proof. After explaining the law of burden of proof, the court added that so far as the various affirmative allegations of negligence were concerned, the plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict if he proved one or more of them as a substantial factor or proximate cause of the injuries. The appellant's objection to this is that the court did not refer to contributory negligence which would defeat this right of recovery. If this isolated paragraph was the only source of information for the jury as to the law of contributory negligence, the objection would be well taken, but it was not, and, as is so often the case where errors are assigned in particular sentences of a charge, it appears from reading the charge as a whole that the objection is unwarranted. After thus considering the burden of proof, the court logically and clearly defined negligence and contributory negligence, saying, among other things: " A plaintiff may not recover in an action for negligence against a defendant without that plaintiff satisfies the tribunal before which his action is tried, that he himself was free from contributory negligence." No fair criticism can be made of his presentation of the subject, and we fail to see how the jury could have been in any way misled.
Errors are assigned in that portion of the charge dealing with the claimed prior written settlement and release, containing a covenant not to sue. The appellant's evidence was that, accompanied by an adjuster for the insurance company which had issued the liability policy carried by him, he went to the plaintiff's house ten days after the accident, and, believing that the guest statute was in force at the time of the accident, offered him $25 in full settlement of his claim, and seven days later, while he was still confined to his home, the plaintiff's signature was obtained by the appellant and a representative of the insurance company to the written release which was offered in evidence, and that they left with the plaintiff a draft for $25, but several days afterward were informed by the plaintiff that the claimed settlement was not acceptable and that the draft for $25 would be returned. The plaintiff's evidence, however, was that the $25 was represented by the appellant and the adjuster at the first interview to be a gift to him to apply on preliminary medical expenses; that it was further represented to the plaintiff and his family that the plaintiff at the time of the accident was a " guest" of the appellant, and that, as the latter had not been guilty of heedless or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, the appellant was not liable; that the plaintiff's signature to this paper was procured by the appellant and the representative of the insurance company while the plaintiff's wife and daughter were out of the room; that they were not consulted or asked to witness it, one of the witnesses whose name appears on the paper being a party who in fact was not present at all; that at this time the plaintiff was still suffering from concussion of the brain caused by the accident, was feeble in body, and mentally incapable of understanding the purport of the matter; that the plaintiff did not read the paper, and his signature was obtained while he was under the domination of the appellant, who had been his friend for a long time, and by " pressure, importunities, misrepresentations and threats which the plaintiff had not the courage, strength or mentality to resist" ; and that he had in fact no intention to release his claim and would not have done so if he had had mental understanding of the purpose of the paper, and that at the time of the trial plaintiff had no recollection of either interview or of signing the paper in question. The matter of the release thus became an important feature of the case, and the charge of the court thereon is the basis for the assignments of error now considered.
The charge deals at length and in considerable detail with this alleged settlement. Here again the true meaning and intent of the charge is not to be found in the particular sentences which are culled therefrom, but the entire statement of the court must be considered. The court said the real issue was whether a fraud was perpetrated upon the plaintiff, either with or without design on the part of the appellant and the adjuster. Then follows a definition of what was meant by fraud, misrepresentation by word or deed of material facts, either knowingly or innocently made, or a suppression of facts accomplishing an unconscionable advantage, especially where obtained by imposition circumvention, surprise, or undue influence over one unable by reason of age, infirmity, idiocy, mental or other incapacity, to take due care of and protect their rights and interest. Such bargains the court characterized as unconscionable, particularly where the consideration was entirely inadequate. The jury were told that, if in their opinion this settlement and release was so secured, it was unconscionable and voidable. In a careful study of the entire statement we can find no warrant for any claim of unfairness in the charge upon this subject. The questions of...
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State v. John F.M.
...altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 357-58, 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); see also Tappan v. Knox, 115 Conn. 508, 517, 162 A. 7 (1932) ("[a]n admission by a party of a material fact, whether made in court or elsewhere, is admissible against him"); Conn.Code......
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Grievance Committee of Bar of Fairfield County v. Dacey
...upon or weakened in the cross-examination. So to do is to allow the redirect to amplify or repeat the direct testimony. Tappan v. Knox, 115 Conn. 508, 518, 162 A. 7. But the court has discretion, even on redirect examination, to permit explanation or clarification of evidence given on the d......
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Pluhowsky v. City of New Haven
...as an admission against Alex in Anna's case against him. Guarnaccia v. Wiecenski, 130 Conn. 20, 25, 31 A.2d 464; Tappan v. Knox, 115 Conn. 508, 517, 162 A. 7; Whiteman v. Al's Tire & Service Garage, Inc., 115 Conn. 379, 384, 161 A. 519. It was not, as against a proper objection, admissible ......
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Cicero v. E. B. K., Inc.
...party's credibility. Culetsu v. Dix, 149 Conn. 456, 460, 181 A.2d 116; Bucchi v. Gleason, 137 Conn. 25, 31, 74 A.2d 212; Tappin v. Knox, 115 Conn. 508, 517, 162 A. 7; see 3 Wignore, Evidence (3d Ed.) §§ 1018, 1041, 4 id. § 1048. As noted, the statement of November 4, 1966, is replete with a......