Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. System

• Decision Date: 13 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 34462.,34462.
• Citation: 25 P.3d 175,117 Nev. 444
• Parties: Angel TARANGO, Appellant, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM, an Agency of the State of Nevada, N/K/A Employers Insurance Company of Nevada; and Champion Drywall, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

25 P.3d 175

117 Nev. 444

Angel TARANGO, Appellant, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM, an Agency of the State of Nevada, N/K/A Employers Insurance Company of Nevada; and Champion Drywall, Respondents.

No. 34462.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

June 13, 2001.

Greenman, Goldberg, Raby & Martinez and Esther Rodriguez and Lisa M. Anderson, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Kimberly A. Wanker, Ltd., Henderson, for Respondent Champion Drywall.

Javier A. Arguello, Associate General Counsel, Las Vegas, for Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada.

Gugino & Schwartz and John P. Lavery, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Contractor's Network Self-Insured Group.

Before the Court en Banc.

OPINION

LEAVITT, J.

This appeal is from an order of the district court denying a petition for judicial review. Appellant Angel Tarango is an undocumented worker who was injured during the course of his employment with a Nevada employer. Although Tarango received workers' compensation benefits under Nevada's Industrial Insurance Act, he was denied vocational rehabilitation benefits. The primary question presented on appeal is whether an undocumented alien is precluded from receiving vocational training under Nevada's workers' compensation scheme if those benefits would be in violation of federal law, state law, or the Equal Protection Clause. We conclude that although compensation can be paid to an injured undocumented worker pursuant to the state's workers' compensation scheme, formal vocational training must be denied if that training is required solely because of immigration status. Therefore, we affirm the district court's order awarding Tarango permanent partial disability payments, but denying him vocational rehabilitation benefits.

FACTS

Appellant Tarango suffered an industrial injury in January 1996 after he fell from an eight-foot ladder while putting up drywall. Tarango was taken to a University Medical Center Quick Care facility, and there he was diagnosed with a lumbosacral sprain. By early 1997, Tarango's physician stated that Tarango had received maximum medical treatment, and Tarango was cleared to return to the workforce. However, because of the injury, Tarango was limited to permanent medium duty work in which he was to lift no more than fifty pounds. Since Tarango's position with Champion Drywall required more vigorous activity than Tarango's medical clearance would allow, Tarango's physician recommended vocational rehabilitation.

In June 1997, insurer State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS) awarded Tarango permanent partial disability (PPD) based upon a ten percent whole person impairment. Additionally, because of the permanent work restrictions placed upon him, Tarango also applied for vocational rehabilitation benefits, pursuant to NRS 616C.530.

Commensurate with federal law, however, SIIS issued a written determination stating that before Tarango could receive vocational rehabilitation benefits, he was required to submit Immigration and Naturalization Form I-9. The form is required as proof of an alien's legal right to work in the United States. When Tarango failed to satisfy the verification requirement, SIIS suspended his benefits until such proof could be presented.

In two separate proceedings in August and October, 1997, a hearing officer affirmed both the SIIS decisions to award Tarango ten percent PPD, and to deny Tarango vocational rehabilitation benefits absent proof of a legal right to work.

On appeal of the hearing officer's determination, the appeals officer held that the ten percent PPD award was supported by the totality of the documentary evidence. Further, the appeals officer determined that federal law supported SIIS's denial of vocational rehabilitation benefits. Specifically, the appeals officer stated that the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act¹ (IRCA)—which prohibits individuals, entities, or state agencies from providing employment opportunities for illegal aliens—preempted SIIS's duties to provide Tarango with vocational rehabilitation benefits under NRS 616C.530.

Tarango's subsequent petition for judicial review was denied by the Honorable James C. Mahan on May 26, 1999. The district court held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the appeals officer's decision. Tarango now appeals.

DISCUSSION

This is a case of first impression. The Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA) states that an employee or worker includes "every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed."² Therefore, Nevada's workers' compensation laws apply to all injured workers within the state, regardless of immigration status. However, the issue before this court is not whether Tarango can receive workers' compensation under our laws; rather, we must determine whether an injured undocumented worker's access extends to the full depths of the workers' compensation scheme.

Unlike compensatory benefits which award monetary relief, vocational rehabilitation benefits are designed to return the injured worker to the workforce by helping him obtain employment within his physical abilities. We conclude that if Champion Drywall provided Tarango with modified employment, Champion Drywall would be circumventing the IRCA. Further, if SIIS provided Tarango with vocational rehabilitation benefits to obtain further training, SIIS would be violating state law and the Equal Protection Clause.

It is well settled that Congress has the power to impose alienage legislation on the states.³ Moreover, it is well established that immigration legislation "is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."⁴ Although the states do have some authority to deal with aliens in a manner that "mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal," state interests must ultimately give way to the federal government's broad power to regulate matters of alienage.⁵

Congressional power to oversee immigration stems from a variety of sources. Primarily, the United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."⁶ Further, Congress has plenary power with respect to both foreign relations and global commerce.⁷ These powers, coupled with the inherent authority of the sovereign to close its borders, have created an intricate scheme governing the admission and status of aliens within the United States.⁸

The United States Supreme Court has expanded this authority further by recognizing the power as plenary, or "largely immune from judicial inquiry and interference."⁹ Specifically, the Court has stated that the "obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this field."¹⁰ Similarly, the Court has held that "it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens."¹¹ This power not only extends to the admission and naturalization of aliens, but also to the "regulation of their conduct before naturalization."¹² As a result, we must conclude that because of the federal government's plenary power in the area of alienage, any legislation created by Congress—such as the IRCA—preempts Nevada's workers' compensation laws as those laws have an effect on aliens in this state.

The IRCA was designed by Congress to establish procedures that make it more arduous to employ unauthorized aliens, and to punish those employers who knowingly offer jobs to unauthorized aliens.¹³ The Act defines an "unauthorized alien" as an individual who is not "lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or ... authorized to be so employed" in the United States.¹⁴

Specifically, the Act precludes employers not only from hiring unauthorized aliens, but also from continuing to employ those workers once the employer becomes aware of the employee's illegal status.¹⁵ Violators are punished with substantial fines as well as possible imprisonment.¹⁶

We conclude that because Tarango could not substantiate his legal right to work with an Immigration and Naturalization Form I-9, he squarely fell into Congress' definition of an "unauthorized alien." As a result, Champion Drywall could no longer continue to employ Tarango—once Tarango's undocumented status was determined—without violating the IRCA and incurring federal penalties.

We note, however, that although the language of the IRCA focuses on punishing the employer of unauthorized aliens, or those agencies that refer unauthorized aliens for a fee, the Act does not provide a reference point for the insurer's role. SIIS is not employing Tarango or referring him for a fee. Thus, it is our view that although SIIS would be facilitating future employment for an unauthorized alien by providing vocational rehabilitation benefits, there is no indication that SIIS is prohibited or would be punished under the IRCA for its involvement. Further, we do not consider it outside the realm of possibility that appellant's future employment lies outside the boundaries of the United States, and such vocational training could be put to use elsewhere.

Nonetheless, we conclude that SIIS is precluded from providing vocational training pursuant to state law. The state law in question is NRS 616C.530. The statute provides:

An insurer shall adhere to the following priorities in returning an injured employee to work:

1. Return the injured employee to the job he had before his injury.

2. Return the injured employee to a job with the employer he worked for before his accident that accommodates any limitation imposed by his injury.

3. Return the injured employee to employment with another employer in a job that uses his existing skills.

4. Provide training for the injured employee while he is working in another vocation.

5. Provide formal training or education for

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