Tarantino v. Citrus Cnty. Gov't

• Decision Date: 04 September 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:12-cv-434-Oc-32PRL
• Parties: LEILA TARANTINO, Plaintiff, v. CITRUS COUNTY GOVERNMENT, SHERIFF JEFFREY J. DAWSEY, in his individual and Official capacity as an agent for Citrus County Government, SERGEANT STEPHEN CONLEY, DEPUTY ANDRA CANFIELD, DEPUTY THOMAS INDORADO, DEPUTY NICK HESSE in their individual and Official capacities as agents for Citrus County Government, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

LEILA TARANTINO, Plaintiff, v. CITRUS COUNTY GOVERNMENT,SHERIFF JEFFREY J. DAWSEY, in hisindividual and Official capacity as an agentfor Citrus County Government, SERGEANTSTEPHEN CONLEY, DEPUTY ANDRACANFIELD, DEPUTY THOMAS INDORADO,DEPUTY NICK HESSE in their individual andOfficial capacities as agents for Citrus County Government, Defendants.

Case No. 5:12-cv-434-Oc-32PRL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

September 4, 2014

ORDER

Defendant Citrus County Sheriff's Deputy Thomas Indorado pulled over plaintiff Leila Tarantino in a residential neighborhood in the early evening of Sunday, July 17, 2011. Indorado recognized Tarantino as the same person he had recently stopped for driving under the influence and he suspected her license was still suspended. While Indorado was back in his patrol car checking the paperwork Tarantino had handed him, another officer, defendant Sergeant Stephen Conley, had arrived at the scene and, observing Tarantino's hand reach into her shirt, ordered her at gunpoint to raise her hands and get out of her vehicle. One of the officers removed Tarantino from the car and handcuffed her. Tarantino states she was placed in the back of Indorado's patrol car where she remained handcuffed for a lengthy period during which she was denied access to her two small children (ages oneand four at the time) who were in her vehicle. Additional law enforcement officers, including defendant Deputy Nick Hesse, arrived and remained on the scene, including, eventually, defendant Deputy Andra Canfield, who was summoned upon Indorado's request that a female officer be dispatched to execute a patdown search of Tarantino. When Canfield arrived, Tarantino says Canfield ordered Tarantino to get out of Indorado's patrol car after which Canfield performed a patdown search, and, according to Tarantino, ordered Tarantino to remove all of her clothing in public view while motorists drove by and deputies looked on. Then, after permitting her to get dressed, Canfield ordered her to remove all of her clothing once again, whereupon Canfield forcibly removed a tampon from Tarantino's vagina. No contraband was found on Tarantino or in her vehicle; she received a citation for violating the restrictions on her suspended license before being released approximately two hours after the traffic stop began.

After two rounds of pleadings,¹ Tarantino is now suing four law enforcement officers (Deputy Indorado, Sergeant Conley, Deputy Hesse and Deputy Canfield) for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful search and seizure (Count I), for battery (Count III), and for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV). The four each seeksummary judgment in whole or in part. As discussed below, Tarantino concedes that some of the officers are not liable as to some of her claims. The parties filed briefs, supplemental authority, depositions and affidavits in support of their respective positions (see Docs. 54, 55, 56, 57, 64, 81, 88), and the Court heard oral argument on the motions on May 9, 2014, the transcript of which (Doc. 84) is incorporated by reference.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "An issue of fact is 'material' if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case. An issue of fact is 'genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation and citation omitted). The Court "must view all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable" to the non-moving party; however "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [that party's] position will be insufficient." Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

II. Discussion

A. Count I: Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claim

All four officers argue they are protected by qualified immunity as to Count I in at least some respect. The Supreme Court recently vacated a decision in a section 1983 action based on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, because the district court failed to view the evidence at summary judgment in the light most favorable to the non-moving partywhen holding that police actions did not violate clearly established law. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861 ( 2014):

In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks whether the facts, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer's conduct violated a [federal] right [.]" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). When a plaintiff alleges excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The inquiry into whether this right was violated requires a balancing of " 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' " Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); seeGraham, supra, at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Governmental actors are "shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Ibid. "[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law" at the time of an incident provided "fair warning" to the defendants "that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional." Id., at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508.

Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to engage these two prongs. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). But under either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. SeeBrosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195, n. 2, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) ( per curiam); Saucier, supra, at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151; Hope, supra, at 733, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 2508. This is not a rule specific to qualified immunity; it is simply an application of the more general rule that a "judge's function" at summary judgment is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson [v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.], 477 U.S. [242], at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). In making that determination, a court must

view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the opposing party." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see alsoAnderson, supra, at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1865-66.

In Count I of her amended complaint, Tarantino claims that her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful frisk, restraint, detention, assault with a deadly weapon, and strip search were violated by the four officers. See Doc. 19 at ¶ 26. Although charged together in this single count, Tarantino acknowledges that the officers were not all present for the duration of the stop and are not all liable for each aspect of her section 1983 claim. In a case such as this, it is appropriate (and consistent with the parties' presentations) to discretely examine each progressive stage of the stop and search to determine whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Tarantino, establish that a constitutional violation was committed by any of these officers. See Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that facts of case, which involved several stages, should be examined as a series of discrete occurrences for purposes of determining whether a constitutional violation has been demonstrated). If the answer to that question is yes, then the Court will consider whether the right was "clearly established at the time of the violation" such that the officers' shield of qualified immunity should be lifted.² Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1866 (quotations and citations omitted).

1. Detention following the initial traffic stop/ Detention and assault with a deadly weapon

Tarantino alleges that Indorado and Conley (but not Canfield or Hesse) unlawfully restrained her beyond the initial stop³ when they removed her from her vehicle "without . . . having a reasonable belief or probable cause that [Tarantino] possessed drugs, weapons, or contraband," and that Sergeant Conley "assault[ed her] with a deadly weapon." Doc. 19 (Amended Complaint) at ¶ 26.⁴ Tarantino testified at her deposition that when Conley drew his gun, she was not attempting to conceal anything and had nothing in her hands. Doc. 545 (Tarantino Depo) at Transcript ("Tr.") 63-68. Tarantino does, however, admit that her hand was in her shirt as she was adjusting her bra strap. Id. at Tr. 66. Conley likewise stated that Tarantino put her hand inside the front of her shirt, which prompted him to draw his firearm and direct her to raise her hands where he could see them. Doc. 54-2 (Conley Affidavit) at ¶¶ 8-10.⁵ Conley's appearance at the passenger side of Tarantino's vehicle apparentlysurprised her and Conley stated (without dispute) that she did not immediately comply with his...