Tarantola v. William B. Henghold, M.D, P.A.

• Decision Date: 07 March 2017
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1D16–3718
• Citation: 214 So.3d 726
• Parties: Cristina TARANTOLA, M.D., (Incorrectly Set Forth as Christina Tarantola, M.D.), Appellant, v. WILLIAM B. HENGHOLD, M.D, P.A., Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

214 So.3d 726

Cristina TARANTOLA, M.D., (Incorrectly Set Forth as Christina Tarantola, M.D.), Appellant,

v.WILLIAM B. HENGHOLD, M.D, P.A., Appellee.

CASE NO. 1D16–3718

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed March 7, 2017.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 2017

Todd M. Ladouceur, Jessica L. Scholl, and Chris K. Ritchie of Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, P.L.C., Pensacola, for Appellant.

Jeremy C. Branning, Daniel E. Harrell, and Andrew M. Spencer of Clark Partington, Pensacola, for Appellee.

JAY, J.

In this appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction pursuant to a covenant not to compete, we affirm in all respects except as to appellant's claim that the trial court misconstrued the covenant as prohibiting appellant from "practicing dermatological medicine including Mohs surgery." We conclude that the injunction is overly broad insofar as it can be construed as prohibiting appellant from practicing general dermatology unrelated to Mohs surgery.

Appellant entered into an employment contract containing a covenant not to compete that restricted her from "[d]irectly or indirectly rendering medical services that include performing Mohs surgery in any capacity for Employee's own account or for others." After appellant left her employment, her employer filed a complaint for injunctive relief and breach of contract alleging that appellant violated the covenant not to compete. In its order granting a temporary injunction, the trial court interpreted "medical services" to "encompass all dermatological services including Mohs surgery." This appeal followed.

In evaluating "employment agreements, as with all contracts, courts must apply the ‘most commonly understood meaning with regard to the subject matter and circumstances of the contract.’ " DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Waxman , 95 So.3d 928, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citation omitted). This requires construing the pertinent language "in accordance with the plain meaning of the words contained" in the agreement. Ferreira v. Home Depot/Sedgwick CMS , 12 So.3d 866, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Here, the contractual term "medical services" is modified by the restrictive clause "that include performing Mohs surgery." Barnhart v. Thomas , 540 U.S. 20, 26, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) ("[A] limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows."). Based on this language, appellant is clearly restricted from providing...