Tarr v. Ciasulli

• Decision Date: 09 August 2004
• Citation: 181 N.J. 70,853 A.2d 921
• Parties: Carol TARR, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Bob CIASULLI and Bob Ciasulli's Mack Auto Mall, Inc., Defendants-Appellants, and Bob Ciasulli Auto Group, Inc., Monmouth Honda Jeep Eagle, Patrick Grimaldi, John Desantis, Steven Fuentas, Joseph Angelini and John Doe One Through Ten, Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

853 A.2d 921

181 N.J. 70

Carol TARR, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Bob CIASULLI and Bob Ciasulli's Mack Auto Mall, Inc., Defendants-Appellants, and Bob Ciasulli Auto Group, Inc., Monmouth Honda Jeep Eagle, Patrick Grimaldi, John Desantis, Steven Fuentas, Joseph Angelini and John Doe One Through Ten, Defendants.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 2, 2004.

Decided August 9, 2004.

Resa T. Drasin and Bradley M. Wilson, West Orange, argued the cause for appellants (Woehling & Freeman and Nowell Amoroso Klein Bierman, attorneys).

Ronald L. Lueddeke, Spring Lake, argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Lueddeke and Lynda Lee, attorneys).

Kathleen A. Dunnigan submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (Dwyer & Dunnigan, attorneys; Ms. Dunnigan, Frederic J. Gross and Nancy E. Griffin, on the brief).

Justice WALLACE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves claims of hostile work environment and sexual harassment under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bob Ciasulli (Ciasulli) and various of his wholly-owned corporations and their employees. Prior to trial, all defendants were dismissed except for Ciasulli, Bob Ciasulli Auto Group (Auto Group), and Bob Ciasulli's Mack Auto Mall, Inc. (Mack Auto Mall). At trial, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages and the claim against Ciasulli individually. The jury found Mack Auto Mall liable for sexual harassment in the workplace, but did not find that plaintiff suffered any damages. Despite her failure to prove damages, the court awarded attorney fees to plaintiff as a prevailing party. The Appellate Division reversed in part, and affirmed in part. Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli's Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 360 N.J.Super. 265, 822 A.2d 647 (2003).

We granted certification, 178 N.J. 29, 834 A.2d 403 (2003), and granted amicus curiae status to the National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (amicus). We now affirm in part, and reverse in part. We hold that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of emotional distress damages to submit that issue to the jury, that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint against Ciasulli, and that to be considered a prevailing party under the LAD for purposes of entitlement to counsel fees, a party must receive some affirmative relief in the form of damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

I.

Plaintiff began working for Mack Auto Mall in late July 1994 as a finance and insurance manager. Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Kelly Bragg, reported to Patrick Grimaldi, the general manager of Mack Auto Mall. Plaintiff and Bragg shared office space located near the sales floor. Plaintiff worked at Mack Auto Mall until July 1995, when she left, allegedly because of sexual harassment in the workplace. Nevertheless, plaintiff returned to the job in August 1995 and remained until April 1996 when she again resigned because of the asserted sexual harassment.

At trial, plaintiff described the extensive and pervasive sexual harassment that she endured from a group of particularly offensive male employees. At various times, those employees would refer to women in demeaning gutter slang that we need not repeat here. Plaintiff testified that one employee would leave pornographic material on his desk, draw sexually explicit pictures on deal envelopes, open his legs and describe his sexual organ in detail, and discuss his sexual escapades with various women, some of whom were very young. Another employee regularly commented to her about his wishes to have a sexual encounter with her, and propositioned her to have sex in a "broom closet." Plaintiff also had to deal with another employee who regularly made offensive sexual comments to her in the presence of strangers, intimating that his presence would sexually stimulate her.

Plaintiff stated that Grimaldi heard much of the abusive conduct, but made no effort to stop it. On one occasion he made a sexual comment when plaintiff dropped something in front of him. Also, Grimaldi once told plaintiff that she should loosen her blouse to help sell a warranty to a customer.

Plaintiff testified that the constant abuse made her feel extremely uncomfortable and led her to quit in July 1995. However, she returned a short time later because she needed the job and because Bragg, who was also subjected to sexual harassment, assured her that the situation would improve. Plaintiff's testimony of sexual harassment was corroborated by various witnesses, including Bragg and two other coworkers.

Plaintiff stated that she was constantly embarrassed by the disgusting comments and conduct of the male employees. She explained that she often wanted to crawl under her desk. Her frustration with the abusive work environment reached a point where she regularly cried on her way home from work. Plaintiff eventually quit in April 1996. Plaintiff presented limited evidence of Ciasulli's direct involvement with the management of Mack Auto Mall. She testified that Ciasulli held monthly meetings attended by all sales personnel. Bragg testified that she considered Ciasulli her supervisor, and that she called him directly when her immediate supervisor could not resolve a problem. A former manager at Mack Auto Mall also testified that Ciasulli once told him to fire a salesperson following allegations of sexual harassment because the victim had threatened to file a complaint with the Attorney General's office.

At the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's emotional distress claim. The court ruled that the elements of emotional distress are the same in both discrimination cases and in tort cases, and that the evidence that plaintiff was temporarily upset was insufficient to establish her claim.

Ciasulli also testified. He stated that he was the sole owner of the Auto Group dealerships and that there was a direct employee hotline through which employees could call his office. He added that if a corporate officer could not resolve a problem, an employee could come to him for a final resolution. He remarked that other female employees had filed sexual harassment claims, noting that their embellished complaints were suitable for a Hollywood script.

At the close of all the evidence, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Ciasulli, individually, and Auto Group. The case was submitted to the jury solely against plaintiff's employer, Mack Auto Mall. In answer to special interrogatories, the jury found that plaintiff was the victim of sexual harassment in the workplace, but that she suffered no economic loss. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees as a prevailing party because the jury found in plaintiff's favor on the sexual harassment and hostile workplace claims.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissals of her emotional distress damages claim and of her complaint against Auto Group. All three defendants cross-appealed from the order awarding counsel fees. The Appellate Division reversed the order dismissing the emotional distress damages and the complaint against Ciasulli individually. Tarr, supra, 360 N.J.Super. at 280-81, 822 A.2d 647. The Appellate panel remanded for a determination of Ciasulli's individual liability, ordered a new trial on damages, both compensatory and punitive, and affirmed the orders dismissing the complaint against Auto Group and awarding counsel fees to plaintiff. Ibid.

II.

The resolution of the emotional distress damages claim requires us to consider whether the LAD permits a lower evidentiary threshold for recovery of such damages than is necessary to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

A.

We begin by reviewing the elements of a common law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To prevail on such a claim "[t]he plaintiff must establish intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe." Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 366, 544 A.2d 857 (1988). Generally, for the conduct to be actionable, "the emotional distress ... must be `so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.'" Id. at 366-67, 544 A.2d 857 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment j at 77 (1965)). Because the severity of the emotional distress raises questions both of law and fact, the court "decides whether as a matter of law such emotional distress can be found, and the jury decides whether it has in fact been proved." Id. at 367, 544 A.2d 857.

Beyond a cause of action for emotional distress, our courts have long recognized emotional distress damages as a component of various intentional torts and breach of contract claims. See, e.g., Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 416, 301 A.2d 754 (1973) (awarding compensatory damages for pain and suffering inflicted upon plaintiff in denial of apartment rental because of her sex and marital status); Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 280, 135 A.2d 657 (1957) (permitting recovery for wife's "shame, humiliation and mental anguish" caused by the defendant's fraudulent inducement into bigamous marriage); Harris v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R., 82 N.J.L. 456, 458, 82 A. 881 (E. & A.1912) (holding conductor liable in trespass for "humiliation and indignity" caused by wrongful conversion of railroad ticket); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers Union Local No. 24, 27 N.J.Super. 579, 592, 99 A.2d 833 (App.Div.1953) (permitting recovery for mental anguish and emotional distress supported by tort of malicious interference with employment); Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 96-97, 186 A. 585 (Sup.Ct.1936) (approving damages for mental anguish caused by cemetery's breach of contract resulting in unnecessary exhumations); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J.Super. 297, 315-18, 265 A.2d 404 (Ch...