Nieves v. Office of the Pub. Defender

• Decision Date: 15 April 2020
• Docket Number: A-69 September Term 2018,082262
• Citation: 241 N.J. 567,230 A.3d 227
• Parties: Antonio Chaparro NIEVES, a/k/a Anthony Chaparro, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER and Peter S. Adolf, Esq., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

241 N.J. 567

230 A.3d 227

Antonio Chaparro NIEVES, a/k/a Anthony Chaparro, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER and Peter S. Adolf, Esq., Defendants-Respondents.

A-69 September Term 2018

082262

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued January 6, 2020

Decided April 15, 2020

Thomas D. Flinn, East Hanover, argued the cause for appellant (Garrity, Graham, Murphy, Garofalo & Flinn, attorneys; Thomas D. Flinn, of counsel and on the briefs, and Francis X. Garrity, East Hanover, on the briefs).

Daniel M. Vannella, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Daniel M. Vannella, on the briefs).

George Conk, South Orange, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Evelyn Padin, President, of counsel, and George Conk, on the brief).

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case arises out of the representation of plaintiff Antonio Chaparro Nieves by a state public defender, Peter Adolf, Esq., for criminal charges related to sexual assault. After his conviction, Nieves was granted post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. DNA evidence later confirmed that Nieves was not the perpetrator, and the underlying indictment against him was dismissed. Nieves subsequently recovered $608,333.33 in damages from the State under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-2, a section of the Mistaken Imprisonment Act, N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -7, for the time he spent wrongfully imprisoned. He then filed the present legal malpractice action seeking damages against the Office of the Public Defender and Adolf.

In this appeal Nieves argues that the Tort Claims Act (TCA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, which governs tort actions filed against public entities and public employees in this state, should not apply to a criminal defendant's legal malpractice claim filed against his public defender. If the Act applies, Nieves then contends that the Act's limitations concerning pain and suffering awards should not apply to the loss of liberty damages he seeks in this malpractice action.

The appellate judgment under review held that the TCA applied to Nieves's legal malpractice action and that his claim for loss of liberty damages had to satisfy the Act's requirements for a pain and suffering award. We affirm the Appellate Division's judgment on both issues.

I.

In 2015, Nieves served the State with a notice of tort claim, pursuant to the TCA, and filed the instant complaint against Adolf and the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) (collectively, defendants) asserting legal malpractice in the defense of the criminal charges that had been filed against him. Nieves alleged that defendants' deficient representation was the proximate cause of his wrongful conviction and twelve-year incarceration. He also claimed that Adolf violated Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.7.

At the close of discovery, defendants sought dismissal of the complaint by filing a motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that a violation of the RPCs does not give rise to a cause of action in tort and that the TCA barred the damages sought because Nieves failed to vault the Act's requirements for a pain and suffering award, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) (the "verbal threshold" requirements for a pain and suffering award). Nieves sought only noneconomic damages, and defendants argued that his subjective emotional injuries could not be recovered because he had not demonstrated permanent psychological injury accompanied by physical symptoms and had failed to produce evidence of $3600 in medical expenses.

The motion court agreed that a violation of the RPCs does not provide a basis for a cause of action in tort and dismissed that count. However, with respect to the remainder of Nieves's complaint, the court concluded that the TCA and its verbal threshold were inapplicable to Nieves's claims. Accordingly, the court brushed aside defendants' arguments, rooted in the Act's requirements, that they were entitled to dismissal where Nieves made no claim for economic damages, did not provide an expert report from a psychologist or psychiatrist, and did not certify that he had any medical expenses.

In its denial of a subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by defendants, the court further explained that,

whether an individual is represented by private counsel or counsel appointed from a publicly funded institution, he is entitled to the same level of competency. And, if that level of competency falls below the standard, then he should also be entitled to the same level of recovery, whether he is represented by private counsel or counsel appointed from a publicly funded institution.

Defendants sought interlocutory appellate review. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The Appellate Division reviewed the Act's definitions, which address its scope, as well as pertinent case law, and concluded that "the OPD is a public entity and public defenders are public employees that come within the TCA's immunities and defenses." The Appellate Division relied on Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender, in which this Court, in focusing on a question of compliance with a TCA procedural requirement, stated that "[c]laims for damages against defendants -- a public entity and a public employee -- are subject to the provisions of the Tort Claims Act." (quoting 208 N.J. 414, 420, 31 A.3d 934 (2011) ). Finding that precedent applicable to Nieves's claim of legal malpractice against defendants, the appellate court concluded that the claim fell squarely within the Act -- and that Nieves had failed to meet the Act's requirements.

Further, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff's claim for loss of liberty damages based on his wrongful imprisonment fell within the TCA's limitation on recovery for pain and suffering in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). The court relied on DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, 183 N.J. 149, 164-65, 870 A.2d 259 (2005), in which the Court applied the TCA to a claim for false imprisonment filed against arresting police officers and required that claim to "vault the verbal threshold in order to be cognizable." Concluding that Nieves failed both to satisfy N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)'s requirements to demonstrate medical expenses of at least $3600 and to establish through objective evidence that he had suffered a permanent injury and a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial, the Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment.

We granted Nieves's petition for certification "limited to the issues of whether legal malpractice claims are exempt from the [TCA] and whether plaintiff's ‘loss of liberty’ damages claim is subject to the verbal threshold of the TCA." 237 N.J. 428, 205 A.3d 1125 (2019). We also granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey State Bar Association.

II.

The parties advance essentially the same arguments put forward before the Appellate Division.

Nieves acknowledges that the OPD may be a public agency and public defenders may be public employees in many settings, but he argues that when they are engaged in the representation of a criminal defendant, public defenders are not engaged in government action. Therefore, he claims the TCA does not apply. Even if the TCA did apply, Nieves contends that the verbal threshold is inapplicable because the "quality of life" damages he seeks have been, according to him, recognized to be qualitatively different from subjective damages for pain and suffering. (citing Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987) ).

Defendants, on the other hand, in claiming the protections of the TCA apply, assert that the TCA protects a broad swath of public entities and public employees, and includes "any employee of a public entity, including the State and its many departments, offices, and other agencies." Defendants argue that the definitions setting forth the TCA's scope encompass the OPD and its employees. Further, defendants argue that plaintiff's claim for "loss of liberty" damages amounts to the same as a claim for emotional distress damages and is thus subject to N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) and its threshold, which Nieves has not vaulted. According to defendants, of the two types of damages recognized in a legal malpractice action -- economic loss and, under certain circumstances, emotional distress -- Nieves already recovered economic damages and is not seeking them in this matter, and he is ineligible under the verbal threshold for pain and suffering damages.

The New Jersey State Bar Association fully supports defendants' position that the TCA applies to claims of legal malpractice filed against public defenders in connection with representation of indigent individuals in criminal proceedings.

III.

A.

The background to and development of the TCA have been addressed many times before. See, e.g., Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284, 289-91, 850 A.2d 1238 (2004). "The overall purpose of the [TCA] was to reestablish the immunity of public entities while coherently ameliorating the harsh results of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity]." Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 115, 751 A.2d 1047 (2000).

N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 and 2-1 set forth the essential immunity of public entities. N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 declares that "public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established herein." N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(a) states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this act, a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." Subsection (b), in turn, subjects liability to any immunities the Act provides for public entities, as well as any...