Tart v. State, F-80-317

Decision Date21 September 1981
Docket NumberNo. F-80-317,F-80-317
Citation634 P.2d 750
PartiesTony Ray TART, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Tony Ray Tart, appellant, was convicted of Burglary in the First Degree, After Former Conviction of a Felony, in Tulsa County District Court, Case No. CRF-79-2080. He was sentenced to twenty (20) years' imprisonment. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Mark Barrett, Asst. Appellate Public Defender, Norman, for appellant.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Susan Talbot, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

CORNISH, Judge:

Tony Ray Tart was convicted of Burglary in the First Degree, After Former Conviction of a Felony.

The crucial issue raised by the appellant is alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The cornerstone of American jurisprudence is the right to be afforded a fair and impartial trial. This right becomes meaningless if the State is allowed to make inflammatory and prejudicial arguments. Prosecutorial comments should be confined to the evidence presented at trial and any reasonable inferences that can be fairly drawn therefrom. This standard allows the prosecutor wide latitude in presenting his case with force and vigor.

The closing argument, in this case, represents the epitome of prosecutorial misconduct. An objection and a request to admonish the jury to disregard the inflammatory and prejudicial language must be made at trial before this Court will review alleged improper comments. However, as in this case, where the defendant is denied a fair trial as a result of the prosecutor's argument it is our duty to afford him a new trial. Cobbs v. State, 629 P.2d 368 (Okl.Cr.1981).

The prosecutor is forbidden from giving his personal opinion of the defendant's guilt. Neal v. State, 597 P.2d 334 (Okl.Cr.1979). Personal opinions of a defendant's guilt may also be violative of the Oklahoma Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rule, 7-106(C) of the Oklahoma Code of Professional Responsibility, 5 O.S.1971, Ch. 1, App. 3, mandates:

(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:

(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein.

(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal.

(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence.

Tulsa County Assistant District Attorney Mr. Truster propounded several comments about the defendant's guilt. The following are examples:

"... And furthermore, Mr. Tony Ray Tart, you are guilty under the evidence and under the law ..." (Tr.365).

"... And, you know, the great danger in our society has been said not today or not as it used to be, that a danger would exist that an innocent person would be convicted, but, rather, Mr. Buckwald (sic) has put it that the real danger in our society today is not that situation would occur, but, rather, that a guilty man should be set free ..." (Tr.389)

The prosecutor also made several unconscienable misrepresentations of the law. We find the following most notable:

"... I'm tickled to death that this case did involve some physical evidence of fingerprints. That in and of itself alone, from what you have heard, would be sufficient for a conviction." (Tr.387).

"... The habitual offender who is before you today. And I submit to you that that's what this case is about. The amount of punishment. The amount of punishment, not the guilt of the defendant or the innocence of the defendant. The real issue, based on the law and the evidence: how much time for this man, for this intruder. (Tr.366 emphasis added).

When the question in a criminal proceeding is not...

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12 cases
  • Collier v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nevada
    • September 5, 1985
    ...him: "Gregory Alan Collier, you deserve to die." (Emphasis added.) These remarks were egregiously improper. In Tart v. State, 634 P.2d 750, 751-52, (Okla.Crim.App.1981), the court reversed a conviction achieved when a prosecutor similarly told a defendant: "[Y]ou are guilty under the eviden......
  • Cleary v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • June 24, 1997
    ...have recognized personal expression of guilt by the prosecutor impinges on a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. See Tart v. State, 634 P.2d 750, 751 (1981). As the right to a fair trial flows from the Due Process Clause of the state and federal constitutions, it forms the very foun......
  • Omalza v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • December 29, 1995
    ...thrust the sword". This assertion of personal opinion of guilt is error. Allen v. State, 761 P.2d 902, 903 (Okl.Cr.1988); Tart v. State, 634 P.2d 750, 751 (Okl.Cr.1981); McCarty, 765 P.2d at 1220. Prosecutor Stensaas informed the jury the State had more evidence of guilt than it could prese......
  • Bivens v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • October 11, 2018
    ...from giving an opinion as to guilt, Bryson v. State, 1994 OK CR 32, ¶ 45, 876 P.2d 240, 257 ; Tart v. State , 1981 OK CR 113, ¶¶ 5-6, 634 P.2d 750, 751. Generally the prosecutor's comments were proper statements of the law and based on the evidence before the jury. Any misstatements were mi......
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