Tartt v. Wilson Cnty.
| Decision Date | 03 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-6603 |
| Parties | KARL TARTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
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BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Appellant Karl Tartt sued Wilson County, Tennessee for refusing to hire him under alleged discriminatory policies prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. In December 2008, Tartt submitted a job application to the Wilson County Animal Control department, indicating he was interested in "Animal Control/open position." When the co-located Solid Waste Disposal department hired white applicants the following year, Tartt filed a Charge of Discrimination against the County with the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission in August 2009. He filed this suit in federal court soon thereafter. Wilson County moved for summary judgment, arguing that Tartt had not established a prima facie case under either the disparate-treatment or disparate-impact theories of discrimination under Title VII. The district court agreed, and granted the County summary judgment on all of Tartt's claims. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
Appellant Karl Tartt1 lives in Rutherford County, Tennessee. Appellee Wilson County, located just north of Rutherford County, operates a landfill. Two of Wilson County's departments have offices at the landfill site: Animal Control and Solid Waste Disposal. According to a signed charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Tartt went to the landfill offices in December 2008 "to apply for the job of animal control officer." Heather Christian, the receptionist, greeted him. Tartt secretly recorded his conversation with Christian as well as conversations he had with other employees at the site thereafter. (R.49-1, Page ID #609.) Tartt requested a job application, and Christian asked him, "What do you want, Animal Control or. . ." and Tartt replied,"Yes." (Id. at Page ID #611 (omission in original)). The office has separate applications for Animal Control positions and for Solid Waste positions. Tartt filled out an application for Animal Control, writing at the top, "Animal Control/open position." (Id.) He asked if his application would be kept on file if he did not get the position, and Christian responded that it would. (R.53-1, Page ID #641.) Tartt returned his completed application and left.2
The following month, Tartt called three times to ask about the status of his application. (R.53-1, Page ID #643-47.) He recorded each call. On two of these calls, Tartt reiterated he was interested in a job in Animal Control. (Id. at Page ID #643, 646.) During his final call, he was connected with Cindy Lynch, who manages hiring for both Animal Control and Solid Waste Disposal. She asked what position he was interested in, and he responded that he had applied for Animal Control. (Id. at 646.) Lynch told him that while they would accept applications any time, they did not presently have any positions open. (Id.) Tartt told Lynch there had been an open position when he applied. (Id.) She responded that the last open position had been open six or seven months prior. (Id. at Page ID#646-47.) Tartt asked if the Department still had his application on file; Lynch replied that the applications were kept at another location, and assured him she would check. (Id. at Page ID #647.)
Before Tartt submitted his application in December 2008, the most recent open position in Animal Control had been in July 2008. (R.26, Page ID #250.) That position was advertised in a local newspaper in August 2008. (Id.) In September 2008, the Department hired Nick Forbes on a part-time basis and promoted him to full-time status the following month. (Id. at Page ID # 251.) Forbes continued in this capacity as late as May 2012, and the department has not hired another Animal Control Officer since his hiring. (Id.)
Tartt filed a Charge of Discrimination against Wilson County with the EEOC in August 2009. (R.110-2, Page ID #1614.) In December 2009, Tartt and another plaintiff3 filed this action against the county in federal court, alleging claims of race discrimination under both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. (R.1, Page ID #15-17.) Plaintiffs also sought class certification regarding their disparate-impact claims, which the court ultimately denied. Wilson County soughtsummary judgment on the remaining individual claims, which the district court granted. Tartt now appeals.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Loyd v. St. Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2012)). Summary judgment is properly granted if the record, construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Jones v. Sandusky Cnty., 541 F. App'x 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Material facts for summary judgment purposes are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Jones, 541 F. App'x at 659 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists regarding a material fact. Harvey v. Campbell Cnty., 453 F. App'x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The nonmoving party must then set forth specific facts to show that a material fact is in dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonablejury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Jones, 541 F. App'x at 659 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the fact in question must be essential to the cause of action at bar; "[t]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Flones v. Beaumont Health Sys., 567 F. App'x 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).
Wilson County is entitled to summary judgment on Tartt's disparate-treatment claim under Title VII because he fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Title VII prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire any individual "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Courts have recognized two types of claims under Title VII: disparate-treatment claims and disparate-impact claims. Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 892 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Huguley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 52 F.3d 1364, 1370 (6th Cir. 1995)). Disparate-treatment claims involve intentionally discriminatory employment practices. Id.Accordingly, a plaintiff asserting a disparate-treatment claim must prove an employer's discriminatory motive and connect that motive to a particular adverse employment decision. Id. (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)). A plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002); Foster v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 973504, 1998 WL 57481, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 1998)).
Where a plaintiff seeks to prove discriminatory intent based solely on circumstantial evidence, we apply the three-step, burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If he is successful, then the employer must respond with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action in question. Id. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. The elements of a prima facie case will depend on the particular facts underlying a plaintiff's claim, id. at 802 n.13, and "the key question is always whether . . . the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that he or she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances which give rise to an inferenceof unlawful discrimination," Thompson v. UHHS Richmond Heights Hosp., Inc., 372 F. App'x 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 703 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination here, Tartt must show "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which [Wilson County] was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and [Wilson County] continued to seek applicants from persons of [Tartt's] qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Tartt meets the first prong of the test. As an African-American, he is a member of a racial minority. However, Tartt does not show that he "applied and was qualified for a position for which [Wilson County] was...
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