Huguley v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-2617,93-2617
• Citation: 52 F.3d 1364
• Parties: Dennis H. HUGULEY; Ruth E. Dunn, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1364

52 F.3d 1364

Dennis H. HUGULEY; Ruth E. Dunn, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-2617.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 31, 1995.

Decided May 1, 1995.

Cheryl D. Bloom (argued and briefed), Bloom & Bloom, Farmington Hills, MI, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Maurice G. Jenkins, Bowman & Brooke, Detroit, MI, Barbara B. Brown (briefed), Dennis L. Casey, Neal D. Mollen (argued), Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee.

Before: WELLFORD, BOGGS, and SILER, Circuit Judges.

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.

This is the third appeal arising from a consent decree entered in a large class action, employment discrimination suit brought in federal district court against the defendant, General Motors Corporation (GM). The decree purported to settle all past claims of discrimination as well as all claims arising from the future effects of past discrimination. However, distinguishing between past acts of discrimination, the future effects of past discrimination and new acts of alleged discrimination has proved quite challenging. In fact, several members of the class, including the plaintiff, Ruth E. Dunn, have brought subsequent state discrimination actions, alleging that GM has engaged in certain discriminatory conduct that is not subject to, or controlled by, the settlement embodied in the decree. In the two previous appeals involving Abbie Perry, we sought to distinguish between the type of discrimination claims that are barred by the decree and those claims that survived the settlement because they are clearly based on post-decree discriminatory conduct. We now attempt to identify with greater clarity the type of allegations required to state an employment discrimination claim that survives the decree.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dunn is an African-American female who has been employed by GM since June of 1969. In the hopes of gaining a promotion, Dunn alleges that she attained both bachelor's and master's degrees in business administration. She asserts, however, that no promotion was forthcoming. In July of 1983, Dunn, along with other similarly situated GM employees, filed a class action law suit against GM, alleging racial discrimination with respect to promotions, demotions, layoffs, recalls, pay, transfers and other subjective personnel decisions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-7. The central target of the class-wide claims was GM's employee appraisal system. This appraisal system established grade levels which corresponded to an employee's experience and supervisory responsibility. This system was GM's principal method for evaluating employee performance.

On July 21, 1986, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan

certified the class as all African-American, salaried GM employees residing in Michigan, Ohio and Indiana who alleged employment discrimination on the basis of race. Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 638 F.Supp. 1301, 1305 (E.D.Mich.1986). Prior to trial, the parties settled the dispute and submitted to the district court an elaborate consent decree. The decree provided extensive equitable relief because a substantial portion of the plaintiffs' proof rested on statistical evidence that black employees fared poorly, relative to white employees, under GM's appraisal system. This relief included a computer monitoring system for statistical tracking of GM's subjective employment decisions. The monitoring system was to remain in effect for the five year life of the decree. It provided detailed record keeping and reporting requirements as well as the establishment of a grievance process for individual class members to ventilate disagreements with GM over the appraisal system.

The consent decree purported to resolve

all claims which were asserted by named plaintiffs, or the members of the class .... that relate to compliance with Title VII, Sec. 1981, the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act ... or any other federal, state or local statute, order or ordinance governing equal employment opportunity, based on acts, omissions, policies, procedures, decisions, and practices of the Company relating to alleged race discrimination in the appraisal systems at issue in this case ... occurring prior to the date of this Decree and any future effect of such prior occurrences.

In addition, the decree stated that

[a]s to matters covered in this Decree, compliance with the Decree shall be deemed to constitute compliance with the provisions of Title VII, Sec. 1981, the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and any other federal, state or local statute.... To the extent permitted by law, the final entry of this Decree shall be fully binding and effective for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel upon the Company and all persons raising claims in this case, either individually or as a class ... resulting from the General Motors appraisal systems or the personnel decisions at issue in this case.

The district court tentatively approved the decree in February of 1989, subject to notice of the proposed settlement to the individual class members. In March of 1989, several class members, including Dunn, filed objections to the proposed settlement. After a fairness hearing, the district court overruled the objections and approved the decree; a decision which this court subsequently affirmed. See 128 F.R.D. 81, 89 (E.D.Mich.1989), aff'd, 925 F.2d 1464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 304, 116 L.Ed.2d 247 (1991).

One of Dunn's fellow class members, Abbie Perry, filed a subsequent action in Michigan state court, alleging a violation of state discrimination laws. Huguley v. General Motors Corp. (Perry I), 999 F.2d 142 (6th Cir.1995). In response, GM sought to enjoin the suit on the grounds that the state claims were estopped under the terms of the consent decree and were res judicata. The district court noted that the Anti-Injunction Act, see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2283, normally prohibits a federal court from enjoining an ongoing state court proceeding but that the Act contained an exception that allowed a district court to stay a state action in order to protect or effectuate its judgments. Perry's state claims were barred by res judicata and by virtue of the consent decree, the court enjoined the Michigan action. Perry I, 999 F.2d at 145. We affirmed the district court, concluding that the decree barred all state discrimination claims arising out of GM's conduct before October 15, 1991, the effective date of the decree. Id. at 148-49 & 148 n. 4.

In Perry I, plaintiff also argued that GM engaged in new acts of discrimination after the effective date of the decree. We refused to address the merits of Perry's claim because the allegations in her complaint were insufficient to state a cause of action. Id. at 149. We reserved for another day the question of how the decree would affect a state law claim based on discriminatory conduct that occurred after October 15, 1991.

In Perry II, we resolved that question. See 35 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir.1994). There, Perry alleged specific acts of new discrimination in a second state court action. Perry asserted that, after October 15, 1991, GM transferred her to an undesirable post in its benefits administration department. Id. at 1054. Allegedly, the post was undesirable because GM was in the process of contracting out much of the department's work. Id. Plaintiff alleged further that many white employees successfully attained transfers to more career advancing jobs or departments, while she was denied numerous requests for a transfer. Id. at 1055. The district court held the state claims were barred by res judicata, finding that the discriminatory acts alleged by Perry were not new acts of discrimination but rather "continuing effects" from the old patterns of discrimination addressed by the consent decree. Id. at 1055-56. On appeal, we affirmed much of the district court's order but reversed, in part, on "the continuing effects" question. Id. at 1056. We noted that " '[t]he emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists.' " Id. (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977)) (emphasis in original). We explained that if similarly situated white workers were able to obtain transfers while Perry remained in the allegedly undesirable post despite requests for a transfer, this might indicate a new act of race discrimination post October 15, 1991. Id. Thus, we remanded to the district court with instructions to lift the stay with respect to any of Perry's state law claims in that category. Id.

Like Perry, Ruth Dunn filed a state discrimination action, on February 5, 1993, seeking damages for GM's discriminatory conduct both before and after October 15, 1991. GM filed a motion in federal district court to enforce the consent decree and to enjoin Dunn from pursuing her state discrimination claims. At a hearing before the district court, Dunn conceded that allegations of pre-decree discrimination were precluded by the settlement. She argued, however, that GM engaged in discriminatory conduct after October 15, 1991. At the court's suggestion, Dunn submitted a supplemental memorandum alleging that GM committed the following acts of post-decree discrimination: ¹

(1) In November of 1991, GM placed the plaintiff in the Service Administration Department as a level five employee. A white employee, Janine Pouget, worked with the plaintiff in the same department. Ms. Pouget had only a high school education and began working for GM in July of 1982. In February of 1992, Ms. Pouget received computer training from GM that had been denied the plaintiff. Moreover, GM provided Ms. Pouget a private office while the plaintiff was relegated to a desk in a common area. GM also gave Ms. Pouget supervisory...