Tasker v. Moore

• Decision Date: 30 March 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2:86-0823,2:86-0962.
• Citation: 738 F. Supp. 1005
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Paul David TASKER, Plaintiff, v. Arch A. MOORE, Jr., A.V. Dodrill, and Clarence M. White, Defendants. Michael ENGLAND, Darwin Barnes, and James Adkins, Plaintiffs, v. A.V. DODRILL, Arch A. Moore, Jr., and Clarence White, Defendants.

738 F. Supp. 1005

Paul David TASKER, Plaintiff, v. Arch A. MOORE, Jr., A.V. Dodrill, and Clarence M. White, Defendants.

Michael ENGLAND, Darwin Barnes, and James Adkins, Plaintiffs, v. A.V. DODRILL, Arch A. Moore, Jr., and Clarence White, Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 2:86-0823, 2:86-0962.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, at Charleston.

March 30, 1990.

William F. Byrne, Morgantown, W.Va., Larry Harless, Charleston, W.Va., for plaintiffs.

James A. Swart, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, W.Va., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

COPENHAVER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on various trial and post-trial motions made by the defendants Arch A. Moore, Jr., former Governor of the State of West Virginia, A.V. Dodrill, former Commissioner of the West Virginia Department of Corrections, and Clarence M. White, former Warden of the Huttonsville Correctional Center.

I. Background

The Honorable Larry V. Starcher, sitting by special assignment as judge of the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, in a suit against Clarence White as warden of the Huttonsville Correctional Center and A.V. Dodrill as the commissioner of the West Virginia Department of Corrections, decreed on February 22, 1985, that the Huttonsville Correctional Center was unconstitutionally overcrowded. Nobles v. Gregory, Civil Action No. 83-C-249 (Cir.Ct. Randolph County, W.Va.1985). The Department of Corrections was given one year to reduce the inmate population to constitutionally acceptable limits, which the court set at no more than 500. At the conclusion of the year, the inmate population at Huttonsville had increased.

Judge Starcher conducted investigatory hearings on March 17 through 20, 1986. As a result of these hearings, Judge Starcher entered a total of 56 dispositional orders releasing 56 inmates from Huttonsville. Included in these dispositional orders were two orders dated April 1, 1986, and April 11, 1986, directing the release from Huttonsville of plaintiffs James Adkins and Paul Tasker, respectively. Adkins was ordered to be released immediately and Tasker was ordered to be released within 20 days from the date of the order.

On April 4, 1986, defendants White and Dodrill filed with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals a motion seeking a stay of Judge Starcher's release orders,¹ pending appeal of the underlying Nobles decision. Stay was granted until May 9, 1986. On May 7, 1986, the West Virginia Supreme Court refused the appeal of the underlying Nobles decision, and on May 8, 1986, the court refused to enter a further stay of the dispositional orders.²

As a result of the termination of the stay and the continued failure of defendants Dodrill and White to comply with the dispositional orders and release plaintiffs Tasker and Adkins as well as other inmates, Judge Starcher set for hearing on May 27, 1986, a petition for contempt and motion for compliance. The order specifically directed defendants Dodrill and White to appear before the court and bring the bodies of plaintiffs Tasker and Adkins, as well as other named inmates, to the hearing on May 27, 1986. Governor Moore, in response to Judge Starcher's attempts to effect compliance with the dispositional orders, dispatched a letter to Justice Thomas B. Miller, Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. In the letter, Governor Moore expressed his concern about recent decisions by the judiciary as interfering with the efforts of the executive branch to bring about an equitable solution to the problem of overcrowded prisons.³ Governor Moore made reference to the hearing set by Judge Starcher and stated, "I have, furthermore, ordered the Commissioner and the Warden not to appear at the hearing on Tuesday, but rather to stay at their posts."⁴

Defendants Dodrill and White, obeying the command of Governor Moore, refused to appear at any time before Judge Starcher or bring to the court any of the named inmates. On May 29, 1986, the court issued an order detailing the continued refusal of defendants Dodrill and White to obey the court's orders. Although the wording of the order is conciliatory in the sense of acknowledging the difficult position of the Governor, the order is firm in requiring compliance with the previously entered dispositional orders.⁵ In this regard, the court made it quite clear, in the last paragraph of the order, that its previous orders releasing prisoners, including plaintiffs Tasker and Adkins, remained in effect and would not be stayed.⁶

Pursuant to an inter-office memorandum from Governor Moore to the Board of Probation and Parole urging expedited parole interviews of the inmates who had received dispositional orders from Judge Starcher, plaintiff Adkins had a parole interview on August 7, 1986, and was released on September 4, 1986. Defendants Dodrill and White were ordered to appear and bring the body of plaintiff Tasker before Judge Starcher at a hearing to be held on September 19, 1986, to show cause why defendants Dodrill and White should not be held in civil contempt of court. At the scheduled hearing, defendants Dodrill and White appeared with plaintiff Tasker and relinquished control of Tasker to the jurisdiction of the court, whereupon Judge Starcher released Tasker on that same day.

Thereafter, plaintiffs Adkins and Tasker⁷ brought suit under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, for deprivation of their constitutionally protected liberty interests and for false imprisonment under state law. At trial, both defendants White and Dodrill testified that they were aware of the existing release orders as well as the dissolution of the stay of the orders as of May 9, 1986. Further, defendants White and Dodrill testified that their sole reason for not releasing Adkins and Tasker was that they were following the orders of Governor Moore. Finally, they both stated that without the order of the Governor to not release the inmates, they would have complied with Judge Starcher's orders.

Defendant Moore testified that he was likewise aware of the release orders and the dissolution of the stay, but did not allow the inmates to be released because he believed Judge Starcher's orders were invalid under the separation of powers doctrine and that since he was not a named party to the proceedings, he was under no duty to comply with the orders. Finally, Judge Starcher testified that although he attempted to work out a solution with the executive branch, at no time did he stay his orders.

At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the defendants moved for a directed verdict as to the validity of Judge Starcher's orders and their binding effect on Governor Moore and as to the qualified immunity of all three defendants. At the close of all the evidence, plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on the issue of the liability of the three defendants. Defendants renewed their previous motion for directed verdict and defendant Moore also moved for a directed verdict on the theory of absolute immunity. While deferring ruling on the defendants' motions, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion as to liability and allowed the issue of damages to go to the jury. The court limited all damages to that occurring after the lapse of thirty days following the West Virginia Supreme Court's dissolution of the stay as of May 9, 1986, and allowed punitive damages to be assessed only as to defendant Moore inasmuch as the plaintiffs waived their claim of punitive damages as to the other two defendants. After being so instructed as to damages, the jury returned a verdict of $19,000 in compensatory damages as to plaintiff Tasker against all three defendants and $13,500 in compensatory damages as to plaintiff Adkins against all three defendants. The jury returned two verdicts of $100,000 each in punitive damages against defendant Moore, one for Adkins and one for Tasker.

Pending before the court are the motions of the three defendants for a new trial and related relief styled Motion to Set Aside Damage Assessment and Partial Directed Verdict, and their motion made at the close of plaintiffs' evidence for a directed verdict with respect to the validity of Judge Starcher's orders and as to the defendants' qualified immunity defense, as well as the alternative motion made by Governor Moore at the close of all the evidence for a directed verdict with respect to the application of absolute immunity as to him.

II. Discussion

A. Qualified Immunity

Under certain circumstances, public officials performing discretionary duties may be immune from liability for suits brought under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983. While defendant Moore argues that he, as governor, is entitled to an absolute immunity, the case cited by him in support of this proposition, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-56, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2701-05, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), merely holds that the President of the United States, by virtue of his unique office, enjoys absolute immunity for acts performed by him pursuant to authority committed to him by the constitution and by statute and for acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibility. The immunity afforded to other executive officials, including governors of the several states, is not absolute, rather it is qualified. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (executive officials including governor enjoy only a qualified immunity not an absolute immunity).

The qualified immunity so conferred is an affirmative defense which, in order to be successfully asserted, must be pled by the official who must also carry the burden of its proof. See Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1984).

Before 1982, in order to successfully assert a qualified immunity, executive officials had to satisfy both an objective reasonableness standard as well as a subjective good faith component. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (...