Tasker v. Stanley

• Citation: 153 Mass. 148,26 N.E. 417
• Parties: TASKER v. STANLEY et al. SAME v. TASKER et al.
• Decision Date: 12 January 1891
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

153 Mass. 148

26 N.E. 417

TASKER

v.STANLEY et al.

SAME

v.TASKER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Jan. 12, 1891.

Exceptions from superior court, Norfolk county; HAMMOND, Judge.

At the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that the acts of the defendants towards the plaintiff, and their statements and acts towards the plaintiff's wife, and statements to her against and concerning the plaintiff, did alienate her affections from the plaintiff. Defendants denied this, and introduced evidence in support of their denial. During the trial the counsel for the defendants, against the objection of the plaintiff, asked of each of the defendants the question: “In doing whatever you did, or saying whatever you said, relative to this husband and wife, what was your purpose?” To which the defendants each answered, in substance: “To befriend both of them, what I thought was for their best interest.” The defendants called John W. Prescott, a brother of Mrs. Eli B. Tasker, one of the defendants, who testified, against the objection of the plaintiff, that a week before the trial he had a conversation with the plaintiff relative to these suits, in which the plaintiff said that “he was going to make as dirty a case of it as he could for Mr. and Mrs. Eli B. Tasker; that he didn't care for himself; that they cared more for themselves than he did for himself.” To all of which evidence plaintiff excepted.

Lund, Jewell & Welch, for plaintiff.

James E. Cotter and Charles F. Jenney, for defendants.

HOLMES, J.

These are actions for procuring and enticing the plaintiff's wife to live separately from him. They are not actions of the type of Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.Cas. 577, brought for a slander in consequence of which his wife left him, but they are brought for persuasions which may have been based wholly upon the truth. That is all that is alleged in the declaration; and, so far as appears from the bill of exceptions, there was no evidence offered that the defendants spoke any falsehoods, or that their conduct was unlawful for any other reason than its tendency to produce a separation. Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583.

The statements and honest advice would have done no harm but for the subsequent act of the wife, an independent and responsible person. The defendants had a right to deny their intent to bring about that act. See Com. v. Damon, 136 Mass. 441, 449;Snow v. Paine, 114 Mass. 520;Robbins v. Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115, 116. And probably they would not be liable for it unless they intended it. See Hastings v. Stetson, 126 Mass. 331;Clifford v. Cotton Mills, 146 Mass. 47, 49, 15 N.E.Rep. 84; Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Mass. 359, 362, 24 N.E.Rep. 208; Tutein v. Hurley, 98 Mass. 211;Jones v. Goodwillie, 143 Mass. 281, 9 N.E.Rep. 639; Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1, 3; Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing.N.C. 211, 215; Radley v. Railway Co., L.R. 1 App.Cas. 754, 759; Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475; Cuff v. Railroad Co., 35 N.J.Law, 17, 30 et seq.

If the defendants did intend to induce a separation, they had a right to show that their advice was given honestly, with a view to the welfare of both parties. For a married woman to leave her husband without cause is not a great crime. It is legal if with his consent, and if against his will it is only illegal in the sense that if she keeps away from him for three years he may get a divorce. A married woman must be supposed to be capable of receiving advice to separate from her husband without losing her reason...