Tate v. City of Greensborough

• Decision Date: 22 May 1894
• Citation: 19 S.E. 767,114 N.C. 392
• Parties: TATE v. CITY OF GREENSBOROUGH et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

19 S.E. 767

114 N.C. 392

TATE v. CITY OF GREENSBOROUGH et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 22, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Guilford county; H. G. Connor, Judge.

Action by Mattie M. Tate against the city of Greensborough and John L. King and Hugh L. Scott to recover damages for removing trees standing on the outer edge of the sidewalk in front of plaintiff's residence. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Where a city is authorized to repair the streets as its officers deem best, such officers are the exclusive judges of what repairs are necessary, and how they shall be made; and if damage results therefrom to an abutting owner from the cutting down of his trees, without negligence or wantonness on the part of the city, it is not liable therefor.

R. M Douglas, L. M. Scott, and J. A. Barringer, for appellant.

Dillard & King and James E. Boyd, for appellees.

BURWELL J.

It is contended by the plaintiff, first, that, even admitting that the act of which she complains (the destruction of shade trees standing on the outer edge of the sidewalk in front of her residence, in the city of Greensborough) was done by the duly-authorized agents of that municipal corporation, she is still entitled to recover for the damage done to her property by the cutting down of these trees, because his honor has found that they did not obstruct the passage of persons on the sidewalk, that the public convenience did not require their destruction, and that the mudhole in the street, for the removing of which this act seems to have been done, could have been remedied without cutting them down. This phase of the case presents for our consideration this question: Can the courts review the exercise by the city of Greensborough of its power to repair and improve its streets, and remove what it considers obstructions therein, and find and declare that certain trees in the streets of that city, which the municipal authorities honestly believed were injurious and obstructive to the public, were in fact not so, and upon such findings, there being no allegation of negligence or of any want of good faith on the part of the city, award damages to an abutting proprietor, the comfort of whose home has been lessened by the removal of the trees?

The street in which these trees stood was dedicated to public use as a street by those under whom the plaintiff claims title. Holding control of this street by reason of its dedication only, the city nevertheless has exactly the same rights therein, and responsibilities therefor, as if it had been, by deed of the owner, conveyed to the corporation for use for street purposes, or had been condemned and taken for those purposes according to the provisions of the charter and the rights of the plaintiff therein are no greater than if it had been so conveyed, or so condemned and taken. Now the responsibilities that counties and townships assume, or are put under by the law, in relation to their highways, is very different from those of cities and towns in relation to their streets. It is required that roads shall be kept in repair, and certain individuals, upon whom is cast, in one way or another, the burden of seeing that these repairs are made, can be indicted for failing to perform this duty; but the municipality (county or township) is not held liable for damages that may result from the road's being out of order, or obstructed. Cities and towns, however, are held to strict pecuniary accountability for the condition of their streets. They are not political divisions of the state, made by it for convenience in its government of the whole, but are corporations chartered, presumably, at the request of the inhabitants, and granted privileges, and charged with corresponding responsibilities. Among the very gravest of the pecuniary responsibilities that the law imposes on cities and towns is liability for damages to persons and property, caused by a defective or improperly obstructed street. Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431; White v. Commissioners, Id. 437. Hence it is that the law gives to all such corporations an almost absolute discretion in the maintenance of their streets; considering, it seems, as is most reasonable, that wide discretion as to the manner of performance should be conferred where responsibility for improper performance is so heavily laid. An illustration of this is the provision of the Code (section 3803) that the commissioners of towns "shall provide for keeping in proper repair the streets and bridges of the town in the manner and to the extent they may deem best." We think that under its charter, and under the general law of the state (2 Code, c. 62), the city of Greensborough was clothed with such discretion in the control and improvement of its streets; and if damage come to the plaintiff by reason of acts done by it, neither negligently nor maliciously and wantonly, but in good faith, in the careful exercise of that discretion, it is damnum absque injuria. Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 20 How. 135; Brush v. City of Carbondale, 78 Ill. 74; City of Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164.

It is not to be denied that the abutting proprietor has rights as an individual in the street in his front, as contradistinguished from his rights therein as a member of the corporation, or one of the public. The trees standing in the street along the sidewalk are, in a restricted sense, his trees. If they are cut or injured by an individual who has no authority from the city to cut or remove them, he may recover damages of such individual. His property in them is such that the law will protect it from the act of such a wrongdoer, and trespasser. Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass. 597, and Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N.H. 257, are illustrations of this principle. In the former case, the court, speaking of the injury done by defendant to the trees in the street in front of plaintiff's lot, said: "If the defendant thought they were a nuisance, he might have complained to the selectmen, and it was for them to decide the question whether they should be removed. *** The defendant had no authority to remove them, nor were the jury authorized to decide the question whether they ought to remain." And thus that authority seems abundantly to sustain the position that it is not for a court and jury to review the conduct of the proper municipal authorities in such a matter as that now under consideration. In Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, it is said: "The authorities state, and our own knowledge is to the effect, that the care and superintendence of streets, alleys, and highways the regulation of grades, and the opening of new and the closing of old streets, are peculiarly municipal duties. No other power can so wisely and judiciously control this subject as the authority of the immediate locality where the work is to be done."

The wisdom of this rule is well illustrated by this action. Complaints were made, it seems, by citizens, that these trees were injurious to the public way, and in their effects perhaps, to the public health. The proper authorities of the city, clothed with the power to repair the streets and protect the public health, listened to these complaints, and in the exercise of their best judgment, so far as appears, decided that the interest of the community required their removal. The preposition of the plaintiff is that a jury shall judge of the correctness of this conclusion, and if they find that the officials committed what they think was an error, they and the city shall be mulcted in damages. "The maintenance of such an action would transfer to court and jury the discretion which the law vests in the municipality; but transfer them, not to be exercised directly and finally, but indirectly and partially, by the retroactive effect of punitive verdicts upon special complaints." Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) 255. Phifer v. Cox, 21 Ohio St. 248, which plaintiff's counsel cited in their brief, related to a county road, and the alleged wrongful cutting of plaintiff's hedge was done by a private citizen. So it has no application, we think, to this case, and belongs to the same class of decisions as Graves v. Shattuck and Bliss v. Ball, supra. Bills v. Belknap, 36 Iowa, 583 (also cited), relates to the cutting down of trees standing in a highway in the country, and the action was to restrain the supervisor of the road. In Everett v. City of Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, 66 (also relied on by plaintiff), which was a suit to enjoin the defendant from cutting down certain shade trees in front of plaintiff's lot, the petition alleged that the trees were "perfectly safe and sound, and afforded no obstruction to the free use of the street and sidewalk," and stated reasons why they should not be removed. The defendant made no answer, and, as the court said, the allegations of the petition were taken as true; and so it appeared, by the admission of the defendant, that its officers were about to do, under its orders, a wrong to the plaintiff, which, because it conceded that the public interest did not in any way require it to be done, would be wanton and unnecessary. We think that case is clearly distinguishable from the one now under consideration. The principles which govern in this matter are well stated in Chase v. City of Oshkosh, 81 Wis. 313, 51 N.W. 560,--an action for damages for cutting down shade trees, very similar to the one we are considering,--from which we make the following quotation: "The right of the public to the use of the street for the purposes of travel extends to the portion set apart and used for sidewalks, as well as to the way for carriages, wagons, etc., and, in short, to the entire width of the street upon which the land of the lot owner abuts. As against the lot owner,...