Tate v. Dart

• Docket Number: 21-2752
• Decision Date: 25 October 2022
• Citation: 51 F.4th 789
• Parties: Larry TATE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. DART, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

51 F.4th 789

Larry TATE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Thomas J. DART, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-2752

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 9, 2022

Decided October 25, 2022

Cass T. Casper, Attorney, Disparti Law Group, P.A., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kristina M. Gregory, Attorney, Office of the Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, Defendants-Appellees.

Before Rovner, Hamilton, and Scudder, Circuit Judges.

Hamilton, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Larry Tate has worked for the Sheriff of Cook County in the Department of Corrections since 2007. In his third year as a correctional officer, Tate suffered a back injury. He returned to work under medical restrictions that required him to "avoid situations in which there is a significant chance of violence or conflict." After Tate was promoted to sergeant, the Sheriff's Office agreed to accommodate this medical restriction by allowing him to work in the Classification Unit, where the possibility of violence or physical conflict was relatively remote.

But when Tate sought a promotion to lieutenant, he was told that the Sheriff could not accommodate him in that position. Correctional lieutenants had to be "able to manage and [defuse] regular, violent situations involving inmates." Since Tate's medical restrictions would prevent him from performing this essential function, the Sheriff's Department said, he would remain a sergeant. Tate sued for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the undisputed facts show that responding to inmate violence in emergencies is an essential function for lieutenants, so Tate was unable to perform the essential functions of the job he sought. Tate v. Dart , 2021 WL 3737728 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2021). Although the district court's opinion was too deferential to the employer's views about which job functions are essential, we agree with the court's bottom line and affirm.

I. Facts for Summary Judgment

These facts are undisputed or reflect the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to Tate, against whom summary judgment was granted. The Cook County Sheriff's Office hired Tate as a correctional officer in October 2007. Three years later, after lifting some trays at work, Tate felt some pain in his back. He had to take time off, and when he returned to work, healthcare providers had placed him on several medical restrictions. He could not lift more than 60 pounds and could not stand or walk for prolonged periods, and he needed to change his position frequently and was to "avoid situations in which there is a significant chance of violence or conflict." Tate continued to work under these medical restrictions after he was promoted to sergeant in 2012. But in 2014, Tate sued the Sheriff's Office under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging discrimination and failure to accommodate. The parties settled. The settlement agreement provided that Tate would remain a sergeant and continue working in the Classification Unit. The settlement addressed the possibility of a future promotion to lieutenant. Tate could apply for another assignment or seek promotion to lieutenant in the future if he could "perform the essential functions of the assignment or position."

In 2015 Tate sought promotion to lieutenant. He passed the promotional exam and was certified as eligible for promotion. On December 9, 2016, Tate was provisionally promoted to lieutenant. Like all newly promoted lieutenants, Tate was to be subject to a one-year probationary period.

That same day, however, Tate met with Human Resources Officer Rebecca Reierson and ADA Compliance Officer Sabrina Rivero-Canchola, who told him that "his promotion was contingent on him obtaining medical clearance from his physician." They told Tate that lieutenants had to be able to handle disruptive behavior and respond to emergency situations. These were "essential functions," a critical concept under the ADA. When Tate's doctor declined to modify his medical restrictions, Reierson told Tate that it would not be possible to accommodate him as a lieutenant. Lieutenants play an "important and crucial role ... in maintaining the safety and security of [the] jail," she said, and they "frequently respond to incidents that require use of force." Lieutenants must be "able to manage situations that involve both conflict and violence." Although Tate was encouraged to suggest accommodations that might "enable [him] to perform the essential functions" of a lieutenant, Reierson cautioned him that "avoidance of situations involving violence or conflict is not a reasonable accommodation."

About two weeks later, Tate submitted his written ADA accommodation request. He described his lifting, standing, and walking restrictions and noted that he was to "avoid situations involving significant chance of violence." To accommodate these restrictions, Tate suggested "avoid[ing] frequent inmate contact" through assignment to "minimum inmate areas," including classification, laundry, external operations, warehouse, and kitchen. Reierson denied this request: "Violent situations involving inmates arise on a daily basis," and lieutenants must be "able to respond to emergency situations and [defuse] disruptive behavior with de-escalation or use of force." Even in areas like "the kitchen, laundry, or external operations," lieutenants "interact[ ] with inmates who are assigned to work in those areas" and are "still required to respond to emergency situations and incidents involving inmates that arise ... anywhere within the Division ... no matter how frequent or infrequent they occur." Because Tate's medical restrictions meant he would be unable to handle that essential function as a lieutenant, the Sheriff's Office returned Tate to the rank of sergeant.

II. Procedural History

Tate filed charges of discrimination with both the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter, and Tate filed this lawsuit alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Tate appeals the denial of his claims under the ADA and the IHRA. Because Illinois courts analyze IHRA claims under a framework that is practically indistinguishable from the ADA framework, we focus on the federal ADA claims. See Fox v. Adams & Assocs., Inc. , 2020 IL App (1st) 182470, 445 Ill. Dec. 342, 166 N.E.3d 772, 783–88 (2020).

III. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, without deference to the district court, giving the non-moving party the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. Majors v. General Electric Co. , 714 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2013). When a motion for summary judgment asserts that the opposing party cannot meet his burden of proof on a decisive issue, the opposing party must come forward with evidence sufficient to permit a finding in his favor that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Id.

B. "Essential Functions" under the ADA

The central issue in this appeal is whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether being able to respond in emergencies to inmate violence is an "essential function" of the correctional lieutenant position at the Cook County Department of Corrections.

The ADA prohibits discrimination, including denial of promotions, against a "qualified individual on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual is someone who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). An employer must therefore make reasonable accommodations that will allow a qualified individual to perform the essential functions of his or her job. Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Transp. , 643 F.3d 190, 197 (7th Cir. 2011) ; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

The Sheriff's Office argues, and the district court agreed, that the ability to respond physically to emergencies involving inmate violence is an "essential function" for all lieutenants in the department, and that Tate's medical restrictions prevent him from performing that essential function. Tate's principal argument is that the ability to respond physically is not, as a matter of fact, a truly essential function of all lieutenant jobs. We focus first on that issue. Tate also contends that his medical restrictions do not actually mean that he could not respond physically to inmate violence in an emergency. We conclude by addressing that contention.

Whether responding to violent emergencies is an essential function of the lieutenant position "is a factual question, not a question of law." Brown v. Smith , 827 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). As the district court correctly observed, to answer that question, "we consider the employer's judgment, including written job descriptions, as evidence." Tonyan v. Dunham's Athleisure Corp. , 966 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2020). We also "examine the impact of not requiring the employee to perform the function." Vargas v. DeJoy , 980 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 2020).

The statutory text of the ADA provides little guidance on how to determine whether a particular job function is essential or not, but regulations implementing the ADA identify seven non-exclusive categories of evidence to consider:

(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential;

(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job;

(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;

(iv) The

...