Tatman v. State

• Decision Date: 01 May 1974
• Parties: Allen TATMAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 750

320 A.2d 750

70 A.L.R.3d 214

Allen TATMAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

May 1, 1974.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Reversed.

Arlen B. Mekler, Asst. Public Defender, and James L. Jersild, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, of Counsel, for defendant below, appellant.

Norman A. Barron, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Before HERRMANN, Chief Justice, and CAREY and DUFFY, Associate Justices.

HERRMANN, Chief Justice:

The defendant appeals his conviction for possession of hypodermic needles and syringes (16 Del.C. § 4716(c) and (d)). He asserts that the police violated the 'knock-and-announce' rule, Dyton v. State, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 383 (1969), thus rendering illegal their search and seizure of the drug paraphernalia involved.

At 6:00 a.m., acting under a warrant to search Patricia Browning's apartment, police officers knocked on the street door of the multi-family building which housed her apartment; they waited about five seconds, then broke the door down with sledge hammers. The police immediately proceeded to Ms. Browning's apartment on the second floor. Without further knock or announcement of their presence or purpose, the police broke down the door leading into the apartment and entered, with guns drawn. The defendant and Mrs. Browning were found asleep in bed. A search of the apartment uncovered the illegal needles and syringes which were seized.

The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was denied. Upon this appeal, he asserts error under the knock-and-announce rule.

We agree. The no-knock search here was unreasonable and violative of Fourth Amendment requirements. Marvel v. State, DelSupr., 290 A.2d 641 (1972); Dyton v. State, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 383 (1969); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).

Prior to the entry of a residence, the police officer is required by the common law, in executing a warrant, 'to signify the cause of his coming, and to make a request to open the doors', Dyton v. State, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 383 (1969); and, by constitutional standards, the police are required to announce their presence, authority, and purpose in seeking entry. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). These requirements have the two-fold purpose of protecting the privacy of residents by preventing police entry of the home without reasonable warning; and it reduces the possibility of danger to officer and citizen alike which might result from misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the purpose of the entry. See Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 314, 82 Cal.Rptr. 348, 461 P.2d 628 (1969).

The knock at the street door in the instant case was manifestly ineffective for these purposes. The police were obliged to knock-and-announce at the apartment door as well as the building's outer door. Apartment dwellers are, of course, entitled to the full...