Tattnall County v. Newton

• Decision Date: 26 February 1901
• Citation: 38 S.E. 47,112 Ga. 779
• Parties: TATTNALL COUNTY v. NEWTON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

38 S.E. 47

112 Ga. 779

TATTNALL COUNTY v. NEWTON.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 26, 1901

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A bridge spanning a stream, which is crossed by a public road and constituting a portion of such road, is a "county bridge," though the work of constructing the same be done by private citizens, and a portion of the materials therefor be supplied by them, when the doing of such work and the furnishing of such materials, is in pursuance of an agreement between them and the proper county authorities who, under the terms thereof, supply the remaining materials needed for the structure. Semble, that it would be a "county bridge," though the citizens supplied all of the materials and built it with the permission of such authorities, or without such permission, where the latter, in behalf of the public, accepted the bridge, and allowed it to remain in place.

2. A county wherein such a bridge has been erected under such an agreement since December 29, 1888, is liable for injuries resulting from the defective construction thereof, or from a failure by the county authorities to keep the same in repair.

3. The evidence in the present case warranted the verdict.

Error from superior court, Tattnal county; B. D. Evans, Judge.

Action by D. C. Newton against the county of Tattnall. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Garrard & Meldrim, for plaintiff in error.

John P. Moore and Jas. K. Hines, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN P.J.

A mule was injured by reason of a decayed plank in a bridge spanning a stream in Tattnall county, and constituting a portion of a public road of the county which crossed this stream. Newton, the owner of the mule, brought an action against the county, and had a recovery. The case comes to this court upon three questions, two of law and one of fact.

1. The first legal question may be thus stated: Where an ordinary in charge of the county roads agrees with the citizens of a given community, who desire the erection of a bridge over a stream at a place crossed by a public road that, if they will furnish a portion of the needed materials and do the work, he will, furnish the remaining materials, and where a bridge is actually built at such a place and under an agreement of this kind, does it become a "county bridge"? We entertain no doubt that this question should be answered in the affirmative. Section 509 of the Political Code declares "All roads laid out for public use by an act of the general assembly, if not otherwise provided, or by an order of the ordinary, are declared to be public roads." A bridge which constitutes a portion of a public road is necessarily a public bridge. It is in no sense a private structure. If a public bridge, and not within the limits of an incorporated municipality, it seems inevitable that it must be regarded as a county bridge. No matter how the bridge comes into being, if it does so, or remains in place with the assent of the proper county authority or authorities, its character as a public concern becomes established. The law bearing upon this subject does not stop with the general provisions embraced in section 509. "The ordinaries of the several counties have authority (1) to appoint the places for the erection of public bridges, county ferries, turnpikes and causeways, and to make suitable provision for their erection and repairs by letting them out to the lowest bidder, hiring hands, or in any other way that may be for the public good and agreeable to law." Pol. Code, § 602, par. 1. What broader authority for obtaining and keeping in repair public or county bridges could possibly be conferred? The ordinaries are given power to make suitable provision for erecting and repairing such bridges in two specified ways, "or in any other way that may be for the public good and agreeable to law." The method of having county bridges constructed indicated in the statement of our present question, and which counsel in the argument referred to as the "Tattnall Plan," affords an apt illustration of one of the "other" ways in which these needed public...