Tausik v. Tausik

• Citation: 187 N.Y.S.2d 86,19 Misc.2d 825
• Parties: Adolph TAUSIK, Landlord, v. Helen Tuck TAUSIK, Licensee.
• Decision Date: 01 June 1959
• Court: New York City Municipal Court

Page 86

187 N.Y.S.2d 86

19 Misc.2d 825

Adolph TAUSIK, Landlord, v. Helen Tuck TAUSIK, Licensee.

Municipal Court of City of New York, Borough of Manhattan Ninth District.

June 1, 1959.

Bonom & Wolfson, Brooklyn, for landlord.

Goldstone & Wolff, New York City, for licensee.

GUY GILBERT RIBAUDO, Justice.

This is a summary proceeding grounded upon Section 1411, subd. 8, Civil Practice Act. The petitioner and respondent are husband and wife living apart from each other. The premises is apartment 3E in the cooperated building 110 East 57th Street, New York City.

The petitioner husband entered into a proprietary lease for this apartment in his own name on August 28, 1958. His right to possession is based upon his ownership as reflected by this lease. Although respondent wife sought to establish an equitable interest in the lease by an alleged vague statement purported to have been made at the time of the acquisition thereof to the effect that she could live in this apartment for the rest of her life, and also that she loaned her husband money to pay for this apartment, the evidence fell far short of establishing such interest. Actually it is respondent's testimony that she only loaned the petitioner some money for the purchase of the apartment. Hence, she did not have a direct interest therein.

Although the Court may entertain equitable matters asserted as affirmative defenses, the proof adduced by the respondent in support of her equitable defenses was meager and wholly failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to establish them. Stripped of these collateral issues the testimony shows that respondent had decided to live apart from the petitioner. She wrote a letter on January 4, 1959 (Landlord's Exhibit 3), wherein she plainly set forth her decision not to live with petitioner and her appreciation for her husband allowing her to remain in apartment 3E until she found a permanent place to which to move; but, in any event she wrote she would 'not stay any longer than two months.'

Respondent sought to vitiate the effect of the letter by claiming that it constituted an agreement to separate and, therefore, was void and illegal. The Court, however, has not considered it as an agreement but merely as written evidence of the relationship between the parties and the basis for respondent remaining in apartment 3E despite her decision to live apart from petitioner. Respondent also sought to establish some element of duress as being the stimulus for her...