Taylor, In re
| Decision Date | 20 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 48893,48893 |
| Citation | 66 Ill.2d 567,6 Ill.Dec. 898,363 N.E.2d 845 |
| Parties | , 6 Ill.Dec. 898 In re Earl J. TAYLOR, Attorney, Respondent. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Sidney S. Altman, Chicago, for respondent.
Mary M. Conrad, Chicago, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 751 (58 Ill.2d R. 751) and upon the filing of a complaint by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, the Hearing Board of the Commission unanimously recommended a three-year suspension of the respondent, Earl J. Taylor. Its findings were unanimously approved by the Review Board. Taylor has been a member of the Illinois bar since 1958.
The Administrator filed a four-count complaint with the Hearing Board. The facts in count I are that on September 10, 1973, Taylor agreed to represent Charles Powers, who had been charged with aggravated battery in a shooting incident. Powers paid Taylor $200 and testified that he told Taylor at that time that the hearing was scheduled for October 15, 1973, at the criminal court at 26th Street and California Avenue in Chicago. Powers said he reminded Taylor of the scheduled hearing in a phone call just four days before. Taylor never appeared, and he denied that Powers had fully informed him of the circumstances of the charge and the location of the hearing. Although admitting he accepted the $200 and did not appear at 26th and California, Taylor maintains Powers did not tell him Powers shot someone and so Taylor assumed it was a 'gun case,' which cases, he said, are normally heard at the court located at 11th and State streets. Taylor said he went there. Taylor never returned the $200, even upon Powers' request, although Taylor offered to do so at the disciplinary hearings. (Powers was discharged at the October 15, 1973, hearing.)
The second set of facts finds the respondent having accepted $75 to represent Mrs. Madeline Moon in initiating divorce proceedings. Taylor did not institute the action and failed to return the money even after repeated requests. Respondent apparently offered to return the money on the day of the hearing, but arrangements were never made. Mrs. Moon eventually won a divorce with the help of another attorney.
The Hearing Board found insufficient evidence against Taylor on the third count.
Count IV is based on charges by Lazora Corbin, whom Taylor successfully defended on a murder charge in 1967. She retained respondent in a wrongful death action, arising from the same occurrence and in which she was the defendant, on November 24, 1968, and paid him $50. On December 9, 1968, Taylor entered an appearance on her behalf and never withdrew his appearance. However, no answer or other pleading was ever filed by him. Mrs. Corbin paid Taylor $100 on February 9, 1969, and was told by Taylor, she testified, that he would 'take care of everything.' There was no further contact between them, although she testified she attempted several times to reach Taylor. In May 1972, Mrs. Corbin was served with a citation to discover assets which was based on a default judgment of $30,000, entered May 14, 1971. After several attempts to reach Taylor, she went to another attorney, who negotiated a settlement of the judgment. She had to pay $3,500 plus a $300 fee for the attorney. Taylor never refunded the money he received. Taylor claims that he turned Mrs. Corbin's case over to an associated attorney who was more experienced in wrongful death actions and that he informed Mrs. Corbin of this. Yet Taylor admitted both that there is no writing evidencing this turnover and that he did not inform Mrs. Corbin, at the time she paid him $100 on February 9, 1969, that he had given the case to another attorney. Other facts in the record fail to support the respondent's views, and the Hearing Board found that Taylor had never turned the case over to the older, associated attorney, who is now deceased.
The Hearing Board found the charges in counts I, II and IV proved by the Commission, although it found no conversion of funds; it found that the money Taylor received constituted fees for his services. The Hearing Board determined that the respondent's actions were in violation of Canons 6 and 7 of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (1970) (hereinafter Code): 'A lawyer shall not * * * (n)eglect a legal matter entrusted to him' (Code, DR 6--101(A)(3) (1970)); 'A lawyer shall not intentionally * * * (f)ail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services, but he may withdraw as permitted under DR 2--110, DR 5--102, and DR 5--105' (Dode, DR 7--101(A)(2)). (Those provisions, DR 2--110, 5--102 and 5--105, provide for the proper withdrawal of an attorney from employment.) The Hearing Board recommended that respondent be suspended for three years and until further order of the court. The Review Board unanimously approved and affirmed the findings of the Hearing Board and the respondent filed exceptions with this court. 58 Ill.2d R. 753.
The respondent's exceptions and brief raise several points, all of which can be briefly answered. Initially, he charges that the specific provisions of Canons 6 and 7 quoted above are unconstitutional and in violation of the attorney's oath. He adds nothing more specific than a general label of unconstitutionality. The Code, it is true, is not binding on the court. However, such canons of ethics have been found to 'constitute a safe guide for professional conduct and an attorney may be disciplined for not observing them.' In re Krasner (1965), 32 Ill.2d 121, 129, 204 N.E.2d 10, 14. See also In re Broverman (1968), 40 Ill.2d 302, 306, 239 N.E.2d 816.
Respondent next contends that only moral turpitude, and not neglectful conduct, can be the basis for disciplinary proceedings. However, we find that neglect in the performance of an attorney's duties to a client can be sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Suspension is a proper punishment 'where a corrupt motive and moral turpitude are not clearly shown'. (In re Ahern (1961), 23...
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... ... 43, 535 N.E.2d 808 (one-year suspension for chronic neglect, misrepresentations and prejudice to clients); In re Johnson, 93 Ill.2d 441, 67 Ill.Dec. 114, 444 N.E.2d 153 (1982) (one year); In re Levinson, 71 Ill.2d 486, 17 Ill.Dec. 669, 376 N.E.2d 998 (1978) (six months); In re Taylor, 66 Ill.2d 567, 6 Ill.Dec. 898, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977) (one year)). Further, neglect of criminal cases warrants a more severe sanction because in such matters a client's 721 N.E.2d 1136 very liberty is at stake. Bell, 147 Ill.2d at 39, 167 Ill.Dec. 963, 588 N.E.2d 1093 ; Fox, 122 Ill.2d ... ...