Taylor Morrison of Tex., Inc. v. Skufca
Decision Date | 30 December 2021 |
Docket Number | 01-20-00638-CV |
Citation | 650 S.W.3d 660 |
Parties | TAYLOR MORRISON OF TEXAS, INC. and Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd., Appellants v. Jack Richard SKUFCA, Jr. and Erin Skufca, Appellees |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Carl J. Wilkerson, Bush Rudnicki Shelton, P.C., Arlington, for Appellant.
A. Craig Eiland, Patrick Gurski, Law Office of A. Craig Eiland, Galveston, Shaun Hodge, Hodge Law Firm, PLLC, Galveston, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Farris.
Related to the construction of their new home, Jack and Erin Skufca signed an arbitration agreement. The agreement contained a provision delegating to the arbitrator the authority to determine gateway issues of arbitrability, including enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the arbitration agreement's delegation provision, homebuilders Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. and Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. filed a motion to compel arbitration, seeking to arbitrate gateway questions of arbitrability.
After signing and vacating a series of orders, the trial court ultimately signed an order severing the language of the delegation provision requiring gateway issues of arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator and modifying the provision to give the trial court, rather than the arbitrator, the right to determine those issues. Concomitantly, the trial court considered questions of the arbitration agreement's enforceability raised by the Skufcas. They argued that certain provisions in the arbitration agreement were unconscionable, including the delegation provision, rendering the arbitration agreement unenforceable. Based on the Skufcas’ arguments, the trial court severed additional provisions of the arbitration agreement, including a provision requiring arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Rather than with the AAA, the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate with an arbitrator selected by the court.
Given its function when viewed in the context of the record, the trial court's order effectively denied Taylor Morrison's and Taylor Woodrow's motion to compel arbitration of gateway issues of arbitrability. Taylor Morrison and Taylor Woodrow (referred to hereafter as Appellants) appeal the order. Because, as discussed below, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration, we reverse the order and remand to the trial court.
On September 27, 2016, Jack and Erin Skufca signed a purchase agreement, agreeing to purchase a new home in the Mar Bella subdivision to be constructed by Taylor Woodrow. The Skufcas closed on the home in April 2017 and moved in with their two minor children.
In August 2019, the Skufcas sued Taylor Woodrow. They also sued Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., which the record reflects had an ownership interest in Taylor Woodrow. Jack filed suit individually, and Erin filed suit individually and as next friend of their two children. In their petition, the Skufcas alleged that, after living in their new home for less than a year, they developed concerns that mold growth in the home was making their children ill. Testing revealed elevated levels of mold and mold-related toxins in the home. They claimed that their home was defectively constructed, causing moisture problems, which led to mold growth. The Skufcas also alleged that Appellants were aware of mold issues in other Mar Bella homes constructed by Taylor Woodrow but had failed to disclose the issues to them.
Paragraph 11 of the purchase agreement contained an arbitration agreement, which provided in relevant part as follows:
Appellants filed a motion to abate the proceedings and to compel arbitration, seeking "to compel [the Skufcas] to arbitration and, specifically, to submit the determination of the arbitrability of their claims against [Appellants] to arbitration" pursuant to the FAA. Appellants’ motion specifically sought to arbitrate "the gateway determination of arbitrability." They asserted that the trial court "must compel [the Skufcas] to arbitration for the determination of any gateway or threshold issues of arbitrability." Appellants stated that the motion was based on subparagraph (a), which contained a delegation provision, delegating to the arbitrator, among other things, the authority to determine threshold issues of arbitrability, including enforceability of the arbitration agreement and defenses to enforcement.
The Skufcas responded to the motion to compel, opposing it. They claimed that the children were not required to arbitrate their claims because they were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. They alleged that the children's "injuries [were] brought on by negligence and a breach of duty by the Defendants, not from a contract provision that the children are seeking to enforce."
The Skufcas claimed that the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it deprived them "of any available remedies afforded to them under applicable Texas Law including statutory laws that would likely not...
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