Taylor on Behalf of Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist.
| Decision Date | 15 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 940450,940450 |
| Citation | 927 P.2d 159 |
| Parties | 114 Ed. Law Rep. 641, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 Susan TAYLOR on Behalf of Her Minor Son Zachary TAYLOR, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OGDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Petitioner. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
James R. Hasenyager, Ogden, for plaintiff.
Jan Graham, Attorney Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Attorney Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.
Susan Taylor brought this action on behalf of her minor son Zachary Taylor, seeking monetary relief for injuries he suffered after he was pushed into an allegedly unsafe window at Highland Middle School in Ogden City, Utah. The trial court granted the Ogden City School District's motion for summary judgment, holding that Taylor's claims were barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, , Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1989). We affirm.
This action arises out of an accident that occurred at Highland Middle School, which is in the Ogden City School District (the District). The parties agree that the District is a governmental entity and that the maintenance of the middle school is a governmental function.
The accident happened on May 18, 1989. Zachary Taylor and Trenton Leo, students at the middle school, were involved in a scuffle in a restroom. At one point, Trenton pushed Zachary into a glass window. Zachary's hand was forced through the glass, resulting in nerve and tendon damage. Although the glass cut Zachary's hand, the window was not in violation of building codes or safety regulations, and the parties agree that it did not present a blatant design defect.
Trenton was charged with assault and tried in juvenile court on October 17, 1989. The juvenile court found the allegations of assault to be true and ordered Trenton to pay a fine and restitution.
On January 12, 1990, Susan Taylor filed this lawsuit on behalf of her son. She asserted a claim against the District for negligent failure to install safety glass in the window of the bathroom or institute some other safety measure that would have prevented her son's accident. 1 Taylor's action against the District was predicated on section 63-30-9 of the Utah Code before its 1991 amendments. The statute provided:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions.[ 2
Subsequently, the District moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was governmentally immune from liability. The District argued that it was immune from Taylor's suit under section 63-30-10(1)(b) of the Utah Code, which provided at the time of the accident:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury:
...;
(b) arises out of assault ... [.]3
The District argued that Zachary's injury was caused by Trenton's assault upon him and it was therefore immune from liability for Zachary's injuries.
The District's motion was ultimately granted. 4 The trial court based its ruling on two grounds. First, it held that the District was immune from suit because Zachary's injuries arose out of an assault committed upon him by Trenton. Second, the trial court found that the District was immune from liability under section 63-30-10(1)(a) of the Utah Code, which provided at the time of the accident:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused[.][ 5
The court ruled that the District's decision regarding the type of glass to use was discretionary because there was no building code regulation mandating the use of safety glass for the bathroom window. Thus, the trial court held that under the assault and discretionary function exceptions to governmental waiver of immunity enumerated in section 63-30-10, the District was immune from Taylor's suit predicated on section 63-30-9.
Taylor appealed to this court, which transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to section 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that the retentions of immunity under section 63-30-10 were inapplicable to the waiver of immunity set forth in section 63-30-9. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 881 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah.Ct.App.1994). The court of appeals explained that the exceptions in section 63-30-10 were intended to apply only to injuries proximately caused by negligence, not injuries caused by dangerous conditions in public buildings under section 63-30-9. Id. at 911-12. Thus, the court of appeals held that "[t]he trial court ... erred by granting summary judgment to the ... District on the basis that the assault and the discretionary function exceptions applied to section 63-30-9 prior to 1991." Id. at 913.
The District petitioned for certiorari, which this court granted on November 27, 1994. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994). After the petition was granted, this court decided Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995). There we held that "the discretionary function exception set forth in section 63-30-10 does apply to cases brought under section 63-30-8," which waives immunity for injuries caused by dangerous or defective conditions on roadways. Id. at 623. On the basis of this ruling, this court summarily reversed the court of appeals' ruling in Taylor that the exceptions in section 63-30-10 did not apply to the waiver in section 63-30-9. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 902 P.2d 1234, 1234 (Utah 1995) (per curiam).
This holding left undecided the issues of whether the discretionary function exception or the assault exception applied to the facts of this case. Rather than remanding the case to the court of appeals to resolve these issues, this court retained jurisdiction and directed the parties to brief the following issues:
(1) Whether the injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff "arose out of" the assault and battery exception to the waiver of immunity in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) or whether those injuries arose out of the alleged negligence of defendant's having failed to install safety plate glass.
(2) Whether, assuming that the alleged injuries suffered by plaintiff arose out of defendant's negligence, in whole or in part, rather than out of an assault and battery, defendant's failure to install safety plate glass was a ministerial or a discretionary function under § 63-30-10(1).
Id. Having been fully briefed by the parties, we now proceed to review the basis for the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the District.
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because we resolve only legal issues on appeal from a summary judgment, we do not defer to the trial court's conclusions of law but review them for correctness. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); accord Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235. On appeal, "[w]e determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151; Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
To determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), three questions must be answered:
(1) Was the activity undertaken by the entity a governmental function and therefore immunized from suit under the general grant of immunity contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3?
(2) If the activity undertaken was a governmental function, has another section of the Act waived that blanket immunity?
(3) If immunity has been waived, does the Act contain an exception to that waiver resulting in a retention of immunity against the claim asserted?
Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618, 619-20 (Utah 1995) (citing Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993)).
In this case, the first two questions are not in dispute. Both parties agree that the District is a governmental entity and that maintenance of a school is a governmental function. In addition, the parties agree that a section of the Act, section 63-30-9, has waived the District's blanket immunity.
However, the parties disagree as to whether the Act provides an exception to the waiver provisions of section 63-30-9 that results in the District's retaining immunity from Taylor's claims. The District contends that both the assault and the discretionary function exceptions of section 63-30-10 apply to the facts of this case. Taylor argues that they do not.
With regard to the assault exception of section 63-30-10(1)(b), Taylor maintains that this exception should not apply where, as in this case, the injuries have a greater link to a dangerous and defective condition in a public building than to the assault and where the assault was unrelated to the conduct of a government employee. The District responds that the exception should apply because Zachary was injured as a direct result of Trenton's assault upon him and, therefore, Zachary's injuries must be said to have "ar[isen] out of [an] assault." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(b) (1989).
In analyzing the parties' positions, we must keep in mind that "the legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to the protection of the state in rendering the many and ever...
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