Taylor v. Bernstein, 174
| Decision Date | 07 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 174,1993,174 |
| Citation | 637 A.2d 829 |
| Parties | Moses B. TAYLOR, Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. Joseph M. BERNSTEIN, Defendant Below, Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, C.A. No. 93C-01-015.
Superior Court, Sussex County.
AFFIRMED.
Before VEASEY, C.J., and HORSEY and MOORE, JJ.
This 3rd day of January, 1994, it appearing that:
1) Appellant Moses Taylor appeals the decision of the Superior Court dismissing claims of legal malpractice against his court appointed counsel, Joseph M. Bernstein. Since his 1986 conviction of armed robbery, Taylor has petitioned this Court numerous times requesting reversal for alleged errors of law. Now that he has exhausted all of these avenues, he seeks to recover civil damages from his appellate lawyer, Bernstein.
2) The Superior Court dismissed plaintiff's claims under two alternative theories: (1) failure to state a claim overcoming Bernstein's "qualified immunity" as an employee of the state; and/or (2) that Taylor's claims are timed barred under the statute of limitations. Moses v. Taylor, Del.Super, C.A. No. 93C-01-015, Graves, J. (Transcript of Motion) (April 16, 1993). We affirm.
3) The doctrine of qualified immunity is set forth in 10 Del.C. § 4001 (1992). Its application to a court appointed lawyer representing an indigent defendant was specifically recognized in Browne v. Robb, Del.Supr., 583 A.2d 949, 951 (1990). Court appointed defense counsel promote public welfare by "fearlessly and independently" litigating claims of clients who might otherwise be unrepresented. See id.
4) As the name implies, this immunity is not absolute. It can be overcome by "proving the absence of one or more" immunity conditions. 10 Del.C. § 4001(3). As the trial court found, plaintiff fails to allege facts which meet this standard. Moses v. Taylor, Del.Super, C.A. No. 93C-01-015, Graves, J. (Transcript of Motion, at 15) (April 16, 1993).
5) While it is contended that Bernstein failed to argue a simple application of case law which may have resulted in the defendant's acquittal as to Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a Felony, 11 Del.C. § 1447 (1992), that conviction was subsequently set aside without prejudice to Taylor. State v. Moses B. Taylor, Del.Super., IS84-03-0018R1, Ridgely, P.J., order at 4 (February 26, 1991). Moreover, in addressing defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plaintiff's criminal appeal, the Superior Court specifically found that Taylor was unable to demonstrate that the "defense counsel's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards in a manner prejudicial to the defendant." Id. at 3.
6) Finally, the trial court found that even if qualified immunity is somehow inapplicable, the plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. It is well settled that a statute of limitations begins running, not necessarily from the date of injury, but from the moment a claimant knew or should have known of his or her injury. Dimedio v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 649 F.Supp. 1340 (D.Del.1986). Plaintiff claims that his action ripened only after his resentencing following the Superior Court's vacation of the weapon possession conviction on March 12, 1991.
7) The trial court, however, found that the plaintiff was clearly on...
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