Taylor v. Briggs, 13455.
Decision Date | 29 June 1936 |
Docket Number | 13455. |
Parties | TAYLOR et al. v. BRIGGS et al. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1936.
Error to District Court, Weld County; Claude C. Coffin, Judge.
Suit by May Taylor and others against Frank N. Briggs and others. To review a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs bring error, and Harold A. Briggs, administrator of the estate of Frank N Briggs, deceased, was substituted as defendant.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Floyd E. Pendell, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Warwick M. Downing, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Edgar McComb and Milton D. Green, both of Denver, Alter & Upton, of Denver, for defendants in error, on petition for rehearing.
A suit filed June 1, 1931, by Taylor and wife to have an instrument absolute in terms, under which Briggs and Land Investment Company claim to hold, adjudged to be a mortgage, with privilege to redeem. Lefferdink holds an interest dependent on title to Briggs and the land company. Continental Oil Company holds an oil lease under Briggs and land company cancellation of which the Taylors prayed, but during trial it was agreed that the lease should be recognized and follow the title. Redman, public trustee, has no interest. Judgment of dismissal of the Taylor complaint entered. We refer to plaintiffs in error as Taylor and defendants in error as Briggs.
The parties are Briggs, an experienced and extensive money lender on farm security, and Taylor, a trusting and industrious farmer. Late in 1920, after an interview with Briggs and learning from him that he had a first deed of trust of $2,500, and of the existence of a second trust deed of $1,400, on the land in controversy, Taylor purchased the equity for $2,000, making payment in liberty bonds. Briggs advised Taylor of the then owners' default in interest on his loan and payment of taxes. Taylor relied wholly on Briggs as to title and liens, important as indicating his confidence in Briggs' fairness then and consistent with his continued dependence thereon.
After purchase Taylor made improvements on the place and invested in equipment and livestock reasonably required in the conduct thereof, all at an additional outlay of $2,500. It is unquestioned that in an earnest endeavor to wring a living from parched, hail and drought stricken land, and secure a sufficient income to discharge interest and tax obligations, both Taylor and his wife worked long hours and hard; she frequently doing the work of a man. Through it all Briggs was sympathetic, encouraged Taylor to persevere, and was lenient in his exactions. In this, as clearly appears, Briggs was pursuing not only what may be said to be a considerate course toward the hapless farmer-debtor, but one consistent with business judgment as well, for he knew that Taylor, of proven industry and honor, was his chief reliance in the matter of realizing on the loan, and that the only alternative was to procure through foreclosure title to land then practically marketless--a situation which Briggs always decried.
The crop failures of 1921 and 1922 so reduced Taylor's resources that he had to seek employment for hire that his family might exist, and he came to Denver and served as a tramway conductor. Throughout 1921 and 1922, when he farmed the land, and 1923, when he worked in Denver, Taylor and Briggs kept in friendly business communication, and from time to time Taylor paid something on the Briggs claim--seemingly to the extent that Briggs credited him with doing his utmost in that regard. The sum of the payments Taylor made, as stated by Briggs, was $545, itemized by him as follows: 1921, January 10, $100; February 4, $100; March 4, $50; March 22, $50; April 11, $50; May 14, $50; 1922, March 11, $100; 1923, February 3, $15; March 15, $15; April 30, $15. Taylor claimed to have paid some $630, but the difference is important to no issue in the case. It is mentioned to free Taylor from the imputation of indifference to his obligations.
In September, 1923, the Briggs trust deed matured, and in January, 1924, Taylor and Briggs then, as theretofore and thereafter, enjoying friendly business relations, discussed foreclosure and the effect it would have on Taylor and the second mortgage. Briggs said foreclosure would clear up the subsequent mortgage for Taylor's 'benefit as well as my own.' Remarking on the situation at the conclusion of the trial, the court said: The court further said: 'There is no question here of the substance and the reality of the transactions between Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and Mr. Briggs, I don't care what you call it, a mortgage, or option, or a right to redeem.' The evidence clearly disclosed, to which the quoted remarks of the court lend emphasis, that as between Briggs and Taylor the foreclosure was a friendly proceeding, calculated on the part of Briggs to eliminate the Simonson mortgage, upon which Taylor was not personally liable, so that Taylor--not previously so obligated--would be encouraged to undertake to pay Briggs the principal of his mortgage, interest, taxes and expense of foreclosure, which, as often said by him, was 'all he wanted.' And to that end their minds met. Simultaneously, and as a detail of the new agreement, Taylor made Briggs a down payment of $2,000, evidenced by a promissory note, secured by chattel mortgage due May 24, 1925, the date it was expected trustee's deed pursuant to foreclosure would issue to Briggs. At the same time Briggs took an oil lease from Taylor on the land, to run for five years.
It appears, regardless of what had gone Before, that in January 1924, Taylor became definitely indebted to Briggs in the aggregate of principal, interest, advanced taxes, and expense of agreed foreclosure, growing out of Briggs' first deed, in an amount shown to be $4,379.93, to secure payment of which Briggs took title to the land involved pursuant to foreclosure. In short, the transaction was intended by the parties as a security. There is further correspondence, occurring subsequent to completed foreclosure, or shortly Before, consistent only with the theory that Taylor was Briggs' debtor as the result of the agreement of January, 1924, for which Briggs was secured by his foreclosure deed, with chattel security in addition as to $2,000 of the agreed sum. We quote from some of the letters. March 13, 1924, Briggs wrote Taylor, saying: April 21, 1924, Taylor who had returned to the ranch, wrote to Briggs: April 25, 1924, Briggs to Taylor: November 20, 1924, Briggs to Taylor: May 4, 1925, Taylor to Briggs: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Houghton v. Thompson
...491; 6 R. C. L. Sec. 240, p. 852; 13 C. J. 529. Courts will endeavor to construe contracts in favor of mutuality and validity. Taylor v. Briggs, 60 P.2d 1081. The case of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock, 13 Wyo. 37, cited by appellant, has no bearing upon the present case. A contract will gener......
-
Neves v. Potter
...131 P.2d 417 (1942) (whether chattel property brought to land becomes a fixture is dependent upon the party's intent); Taylor v. Briggs, 99 Colo. 89, 60 P.2d 1081 (1936) (whether conveyance was absolute or for security purposes only depends upon party's intent); Farmers Reservoir & Irr. Co.......
-
In re Martin
...17 Colo. 80, 28 P. 391 (1891) (standard of proof); Baird v. Baird, 48 Colo. 506, 111 P. 79 (1910) (intent of parties); Taylor v. Briggs, 99 Colo. 89, 60 P.2d 1081 (1936) (spirit of the transaction); Pullara v. Hed, 121 Colo. 234, 215 P.2d 321 (1950) (joint venture not The court will enter s......
-
Woznicki v. Musick
...it. The form of the transaction and the circumstances attending it are the means of finding out the intention." Taylor v. Briggs, 99 Colo. 89, 98-99, 60 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1936) (quoting 1 Jones on Mortgages § 314, at 380-81 (8th Whatever the form of the contract, if the parties intend to cre......
-
Chapter 11 - § 11.3 • MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST
...270 P. 650 (Colo. 1928); Wilson v. Giem, 5 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1931); Oppegard v. Oppegard, 10 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1932); Taylor v. Briggs, 60 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1936); Reid v. Pyle, 51 P.3d 1064 (Colo. App. 2002); Fetta v. Vandevier, 34 P. 168 (Colo. App. 1893), aff'd, 38 P. 466 (Colo. 1894); Quinn ......