Taylor v. Briggs, 13455.

Decision Date29 June 1936
Docket Number13455.
PartiesTAYLOR et al. v. BRIGGS et al.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1936.

Error to District Court, Weld County; Claude C. Coffin, Judge.

Suit by May Taylor and others against Frank N. Briggs and others. To review a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs bring error, and Harold A. Briggs, administrator of the estate of Frank N Briggs, deceased, was substituted as defendant.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

HOLLAND J., dissenting.

Floyd E. Pendell, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Warwick M. Downing, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

Edgar McComb and Milton D. Green, both of Denver, Alter & Upton, of Denver, for defendants in error, on petition for rehearing.

HILLIARD Justice.

A suit filed June 1, 1931, by Taylor and wife to have an instrument absolute in terms, under which Briggs and Land Investment Company claim to hold, adjudged to be a mortgage, with privilege to redeem. Lefferdink holds an interest dependent on title to Briggs and the land company. Continental Oil Company holds an oil lease under Briggs and land company cancellation of which the Taylors prayed, but during trial it was agreed that the lease should be recognized and follow the title. Redman, public trustee, has no interest. Judgment of dismissal of the Taylor complaint entered. We refer to plaintiffs in error as Taylor and defendants in error as Briggs.

The parties are Briggs, an experienced and extensive money lender on farm security, and Taylor, a trusting and industrious farmer. Late in 1920, after an interview with Briggs and learning from him that he had a first deed of trust of $2,500, and of the existence of a second trust deed of $1,400, on the land in controversy, Taylor purchased the equity for $2,000, making payment in liberty bonds. Briggs advised Taylor of the then owners' default in interest on his loan and payment of taxes. Taylor relied wholly on Briggs as to title and liens, important as indicating his confidence in Briggs' fairness then and consistent with his continued dependence thereon.

After purchase Taylor made improvements on the place and invested in equipment and livestock reasonably required in the conduct thereof, all at an additional outlay of $2,500. It is unquestioned that in an earnest endeavor to wring a living from parched, hail and drought stricken land, and secure a sufficient income to discharge interest and tax obligations, both Taylor and his wife worked long hours and hard; she frequently doing the work of a man. Through it all Briggs was sympathetic, encouraged Taylor to persevere, and was lenient in his exactions. In this, as clearly appears, Briggs was pursuing not only what may be said to be a considerate course toward the hapless farmer-debtor, but one consistent with business judgment as well, for he knew that Taylor, of proven industry and honor, was his chief reliance in the matter of realizing on the loan, and that the only alternative was to procure through foreclosure title to land then practically marketless--a situation which Briggs always decried.

The crop failures of 1921 and 1922 so reduced Taylor's resources that he had to seek employment for hire that his family might exist, and he came to Denver and served as a tramway conductor. Throughout 1921 and 1922, when he farmed the land, and 1923, when he worked in Denver, Taylor and Briggs kept in friendly business communication, and from time to time Taylor paid something on the Briggs claim--seemingly to the extent that Briggs credited him with doing his utmost in that regard. The sum of the payments Taylor made, as stated by Briggs, was $545, itemized by him as follows: 1921, January 10, $100; February 4, $100; March 4, $50; March 22, $50; April 11, $50; May 14, $50; 1922, March 11, $100; 1923, February 3, $15; March 15, $15; April 30, $15. Taylor claimed to have paid some $630, but the difference is important to no issue in the case. It is mentioned to free Taylor from the imputation of indifference to his obligations.

In September, 1923, the Briggs trust deed matured, and in January, 1924, Taylor and Briggs then, as theretofore and thereafter, enjoying friendly business relations, discussed foreclosure and the effect it would have on Taylor and the second mortgage. Briggs said foreclosure would clear up the subsequent mortgage for Taylor's 'benefit as well as my own.' Remarking on the situation at the conclusion of the trial, the court said: 'That there had been a foreclosure and agreement to permit redemption after the statutory period had expired and that was carried forward something over a year after the statutory redemption time had expired. There is no indication, that I can find, that Mr. Briggs tried to take advantage of his foreclosure agreement.' The court further said: 'There is no question here of the substance and the reality of the transactions between Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and Mr. Briggs, I don't care what you call it, a mortgage, or option, or a right to redeem.' The evidence clearly disclosed, to which the quoted remarks of the court lend emphasis, that as between Briggs and Taylor the foreclosure was a friendly proceeding, calculated on the part of Briggs to eliminate the Simonson mortgage, upon which Taylor was not personally liable, so that Taylor--not previously so obligated--would be encouraged to undertake to pay Briggs the principal of his mortgage, interest, taxes and expense of foreclosure, which, as often said by him, was 'all he wanted.' And to that end their minds met. Simultaneously, and as a detail of the new agreement, Taylor made Briggs a down payment of $2,000, evidenced by a promissory note, secured by chattel mortgage due May 24, 1925, the date it was expected trustee's deed pursuant to foreclosure would issue to Briggs. At the same time Briggs took an oil lease from Taylor on the land, to run for five years.

It appears, regardless of what had gone Before, that in January 1924, Taylor became definitely indebted to Briggs in the aggregate of principal, interest, advanced taxes, and expense of agreed foreclosure, growing out of Briggs' first deed, in an amount shown to be $4,379.93, to secure payment of which Briggs took title to the land involved pursuant to foreclosure. In short, the transaction was intended by the parties as a security. There is further correspondence, occurring subsequent to completed foreclosure, or shortly Before, consistent only with the theory that Taylor was Briggs' debtor as the result of the agreement of January, 1924, for which Briggs was secured by his foreclosure deed, with chattel security in addition as to $2,000 of the agreed sum. We quote from some of the letters. March 13, 1924, Briggs wrote Taylor, saying: 'Kindly let me hear from you as to how things look in the neighborhood and if you have moved to the ranch. Prospects should be pretty good as we are having so much snow.' April 21, 1924, Taylor who had returned to the ranch, wrote to Briggs: 'Your letter and foreclosure notice at hand. Everything is fine and I am glad you are clearing up the title as it looks pretty good here now. A large crew of men are working right here on the structure. Have been here nearly a month. I regret that we failed to pay the taxes, but am putting out 50 acres of beans, and crop prospects are good. I will insure them so have hope of making a little cash by this fall. Trust that you will not be over bid on the place, and take it that I have nothing to fear on May 5.' April 25, 1924, Briggs to Taylor: 'I am in receipt of your letter of the 21st inst. and was glad to hear from you. Put in every acre you possibly can on this place as it looks like this is going to be a good crop year. I am glad to hear they are prospecting for oil and I hope that our one-half section will come within the boundaries of the structure. I have commenced foreclosure proceedings and will close out all subsequent liens and anyone calling on you relative to this place in any particular may be referred to me. Please keep me posted from time to time of the oil developments in that locality. When your crop is all in and things looking good, I wish you would let me know as I would like to come up and go over the place with you. I have a number of other places to look at in and around that county.' November 20, 1924, Briggs to Taylor: 'Have you marketed any crops and when can I expect a remittance? Are you planning to farm the place for another year? Please let me hear from you right away.' May 4, 1925, Taylor to Briggs: 'Referring to your letter just at hand in regard to Mr. Behring wishing to rent part of the west half of 13-6-61 wish to say it seems from your letter there seems to be some misunderstanding in regard to the title to this land. Of course we understand fully you have lawful title to same through the courts which becomes final almost immediately, but we were given to understand this was only a matter of form and in accordance with such an understanding gave you a $2000.00 chattel mortgage due in March 1926, to protect you on account of taxes, interest, fees & so forth, and therefore theoretically, we remain in full possession and could do with as regards crops and so forth as we wished without any accounting to you or anyone else. We do not understand you collecting any rent from this land and still hold the mortgage against us. Of course in regard to rent from Mr. Behring or some one like that we can see why you would consider it no more than reasonable that the rent should be paid to you but not necessarily. And as for you having our chattels heavily encumbered to protect you and then to be also bound by a lease seems to be entirely too much. We would appreciate knowing just what your understanding is of this matter.' ...

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8 cases
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    ...491; 6 R. C. L. Sec. 240, p. 852; 13 C. J. 529. Courts will endeavor to construe contracts in favor of mutuality and validity. Taylor v. Briggs, 60 P.2d 1081. The case of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock, 13 Wyo. 37, cited by appellant, has no bearing upon the present case. A contract will gener......
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1 books & journal articles
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