Taylor v. Butler

Decision Date31 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. W2002-01275-SC-R11-CV.,W2002-01275-SC-R11-CV.
Citation142 S.W.3d 277
PartiesSharon TAYLOR v. Douglas BUTLER and City Auto Sales.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from the Court of Appeals, Holly Kirby Lillard, J Joseph D. Barton, Millington, Tennessee, for the appellant, City Auto Sales.

Sam F. Cole, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Sharon Taylor.


WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and E. RILEY ANDERSON and ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JJ. joined. JANICE M. HOLDER, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a claim for fraudulent inducement to a contract must be submitted to arbitration when the contract's arbitration clause covers "all claims, demands, disputes or controversies" and states that it is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). We hold that parties may agree to arbitrate claims of fraudulent inducement despite prohibition of arbitration of such claims under Tennessee law, and because the parties in this case specifically agreed that the FAA governs the arbitration clause, they agreed to arbitrate the claim for fraudulent inducement of the contract. However, we also find that the arbitration clause in this case is unconscionable and therefore void because it reserves the right to a judicial forum for the defendants while requiring the plaintiff to submit all claims to arbitration. For these reasons, the trial court's dismissal of the complaint is overruled, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.


On June 4, 1998, Sharon Taylor ("Taylor") purchased a car from City Auto Sales ("City Auto").1 The parties signed a contract entitled "As Is Used Vehicle Retail Buyers Order" ("Buyers Order"). The Buyers Order provided that the total cost of the vehicle was $10,058.00. Taylor was to make a cash down payment to City Auto in the amount of $1,310.00 and finance the remainder. The Buyers Order contained an arbitration provision which stated that "all claims, demands, disputes or controversies of every kind or nature between [the parties] arising from the [sale of the vehicle] shall be settled by binding arbitration conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 12 et seq."

Taylor sold her car for $1,000.00 and used the proceeds therefrom as part of her down payment; she then signed a short-term promissory note agreeing to pay the remainder of the down payment over the following three months. City Auto delivered the vehicle to Taylor on the day the Buyers Order was signed. Taylor claims that City Auto told her at the time of delivery that her long-term financing had been approved. It is undisputed, however, that at the time of delivery, Taylor signed a separate "Spot Delivery Agreement." This agreement stated that City Auto was giving Taylor immediate possession of the car "pending the purchase of the installment sale agreement by a financing institution." The agreement also provided that, if proper financing could not be obtained within three days, City Auto would have the option to "immediately rescind the sale." Additionally, in the event that Taylor did not immediately return the vehicle, City Auto would "have the right to take immediate possession of the vehicle."

Approximately one week after the sale, City Auto notified Taylor that her application for financing had not been approved. When Taylor did not return the vehicle, City Auto repossessed the car along with personal items belonging to Taylor that were inside the vehicle at that time. City Auto retained possession of Taylor's personal belongings along with the $1,000.00 down payment.

Taylor filed suit against City Auto alleging a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), arguing that City Auto improperly obtained her $1,000.00 down payment and her personal property that was in the car by using deceptive tactics in violation of the TCPA. Taylor also alleged that she was told that the Spot Delivery Agreement was "simply a formality and did not change the fact that she had already been approved for financing" on the sale of the car. City Auto responded by filing a motion to dismiss.

The trial court granted City Auto's motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that Taylor was bound by the arbitration provision in the Buyers Order. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate a claim pursuant to an arbitration provision that was fraudulently induced.

We granted City Auto's application to appeal to determine whether parties can be bound to arbitrate a claim for fraudulent inducement when the arbitration clause specifically states that it is governed by the FAA. On appeal, Taylor also raises the issue of whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because it reserves for City Auto the right to pursue judicial remedies while limiting Taylor to arbitration.


I. Arbitration of Claim for Fraudulent Inducement

The FAA applies to "a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The purpose of the FAA is "to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate." Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995) (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989)). Generally, arbitration "should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

As the United States Supreme Court has stated,

Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.

Volt Info. Sci., Inc., 489 U.S. at 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (citations omitted). Therefore, the question becomes "what the contract has to say about the arbitrability of petitioner's claim." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58, 115 S.Ct. 1212; see also Frizzell Const. Co. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tenn.1999).

In this case, the arbitration clause governs "all claims, demands, disputes or controversies of every kind or nature between [the parties] arising from the [sale of the vehicle]." The arbitration clause also states that arbitration shall be "conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 12 et seq." Furthermore, it contains the provision that the parties "agree that any question regarding whether a particular controversy is subject to arbitration shall be decided by the arbitrator."

When a contract is controlled by the FAA and contains a broad arbitration clause, claims of fraudulent inducement are subject to arbitration. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). Specifically, the United States Supreme Court held that the language of the FAA "does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement generally." Id. at 404, 87 S.Ct. 1801. Instead, the court may address allegations of fraud only if they are directed to the arbitration clause itself. Id. at 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801.

In the case under submission, the Court of Appeals found that the claim of fraud in the inducement was not subject to arbitration despite the holding in Prima Paint. The Court of Appeals relied upon City of Blaine v. John Coleman Hayes & Assoc., Inc., 818 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) and Frizzell, 9 S.W.3d at 85, as well as two unreported cases.

In City of Blaine, the Court of Appeals rejected the majority opinion in Prima Paint and held that the issue of fraudulent inducement could not be submitted to arbitration under the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act. 818 S.W.2d 33, 37-38 (Tenn. Ct.App.1991). While recognizing that the FAA provides for arbitration of claims of fraud, the Court of Appeals interpreted the Tennessee arbitration statute as requiring judicial determination on the issues of rescission of the contract including fraud in the inducement. Id. Specifically, the Court found that there was no contract to arbitrate if the contract were procured by fraud. Id. at 37.

This Court has also held that claims of fraud in the inducement are to be resolved by the courts and not by an arbitrator when the contract is governed by Tennessee law. Frizzell Constr. Co., 9 S.W.3d at 84. In Frizzell, the arbitration clause purported to govern "[a]ll claims, disputes and or other matters in questions arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement." Id. at 81. In addition to this arbitration clause, the contract contained a clause stating that Tennessee law would form the basis for deciding questions concerning the contract's scope and interpretations. We held that:

By stating that the contract is to be governed by Tennessee law, the parties have indicated their intention to arbitrate all disputes "arising out of, or relating to" their agreement — but only to the extent allowed by Tennessee law.... Therefore, because Tennessee law contemplates judicial resolution of contract formation issues, we conclude that the parties have indicated their intention not to submit such issues to arbitration.

Id. at 85.

The case under submission differs from City of Blaine and Frizzell in that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
111 cases
  • Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 5, 2015
    ...filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel. In reliance on this Court's decision in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn.2004), the trial court held that the non-mutuality of remedies in the arbitration provision rendered it unconscionable and invali......
  • Patterson v. Nine Energy Serv., LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • November 29, 2018
    ...unfairly one-sided contract provisions are unconscionable and non-severable. See Reconsideration Reply at 3-4 (citing Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tenn. 2004) ; Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 456 F.Supp.2d 1137 (D. Ariz. 2006) ). Patterson next addresses Nine Energy's distinction......
  • Wofford v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home Inc.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • November 23, 2015
    ...any opportunity for meaningful choice. Id.Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc. , 466 S.W.3d 740, 746–47 (Tenn.2015) (quoting Taylor v. Butler , 142 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Tenn.2004) ); see also Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp. , 263 S.W.3d 876, 889 (Tenn.2007) (“A contract may be unconscionable if the provisions......
  • Covenant Health of Picayune v. Moulds
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • August 6, 2009
    ...agreement is an adhesion contract, may result in a finding of unconscionability. Hill, 2008 WL 1901198, at *12 (citing Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 286 (Tenn. 2004); Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 321 ¶ 29. Other state courts have invalidated arbitration agreements in various t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 21 - § 21.2 • ARBITRATION - GENERALLY
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Practitioner's Guide to Colorado Construction Law (CBA) Chapter 21 Arbitration and Mediation of Construction Disputes
    • Invalid date
    ...v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 458 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2006).[30] Id. at 1177.[31] Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. 468.[32] Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn. 2004).[33] 1745 Wazee LLC v. Castle Builders, Inc., 89 P.3d 422 (Colo. App. 2003).[34] Byerly v. Kirkpatrick Pettis Smith Polia......
  • Adhesion contracts don't stick in Michigan: why Rory got it right.
    • United States
    • Ave Maria Law Review Vol. 5 No. 1, January 2007
    • January 1, 2007
    ...enforced against the weaker party); Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 123 P.3d 237, 241 (Mont. 2005) (same); Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 286 (Tenn. 2004) (same). (14.) See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 2......
  • Application of the Federal Arbitration Act in State Court Proceedings
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 43-12, December 2014
    • Invalid date
    ...§ 19.3.1. [9] Benson, §§ 3.7 and 4.3. [10] AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 P.3d 507 (Colo. 2007). [11] See Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn. 2004). Compare CRS § 13-22-203(2), with and discussion of "Applicability of the FAA to Arbitration Issues," infra. See Benson §......
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado and Federal Arbitration Law and Practice (CBA) Chapter 4 Does State Law, Federal Law, or the Contract Govern the Arbitration or Judicial Proceedings?
    • Invalid date
    ...Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). See Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp, 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008).[111] See Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn. 2004).[112] E.g., Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1218.[113] In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006).[114] SourceGas Distrib.......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT