Taylor v. Buttrick

• Decision Date: 02 April 1896
• Citation: 43 N.E. 507,165 Mass. 547
• Parties: TAYLOR v. BUTTRICK.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

165 Mass. 547

43 N.E. 507

TAYLOR v. BUTTRICK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

April 2, 1896

COUNSEL

Boyd

B. Jones and John J. Winn, for plaintiff.

George F. Richardson and L.H. Kileski, for defendant.

OPINION

LATHROP J.

This is a bill in equity to set aside a deed to the defendant, in trust, executed by the plaintiff in 1893. The plaintiff was then nearly 22 years of age, and was about to be married. Her property consisted of about $115,000, $75,000 of which she conveyed to the defendant in trust to pay the net income of the same to her during her life, and upon her death without a will, leaving child or children, to pay the principal to them; and, in case she left no child surviving, then the principal was to be paid over to those entitled to take the same under the laws of this commonwealth. The ground upon which she seeks to set aside the deed is undue influence on the part of Frank P. Putnam, a stepfather of the plaintiff who had also been her guardian until she became of age, and upon the further ground of a mistake, both on his part and upon hers, as to the effect of the deed. The case was heard by a single justice of this court upon the pleadings and evidence. The question of undue influence was disposed of at the hearing, and is no longer insisted upon. It has been found as a fact that at the time the plaintiff executed the deed she was "a very intelligent and capable woman, but without other experience in business matters and in the management of her property than what she had learned from occasional reports of her guardian, and otherwise, by chance." She was advised by Mr. Putnam to put the property in trust, and she assented to it, and left it to him to have the deed prepared for her to sign. Putnam, in so advising, acted wholly and only with a view to the plaintiff's good, and his advice was wise and proper. Putnam, not being a lawyer, relied on a lawyer who was the confidential adviser of several members of the family including Putnam as guardian, and who also acted in good faith and to his best ability. The plaintiff now has a daughter living. The single justice also found as follows "I do not find precisely what the plaintiff understood as to the effect of the deed, deeming it immaterial, in view of the facts reported; but I find that the plaintiff, acting freely, intelligently, and wisely, was willing to execute whatever her stepfather should recommend, and to adopt his judgment as her own. I find further that he explained, and reasonably supposed, from what took place between her, the lawyer, and himself, that she understood, that the instrument irrevocably put the property out of her hands, and limited her to the receipt of income from a trustee. Putnam understood the operation of the deed as far as it went. His attention was not called by the lawyer to the absence of a restraint on anticipation and of a power of revocation, nor did he notice such absence. The lawyer simply did not think of them, as they are not very usual in our every-day conveyancing. If Putnam's attention had been called to the matter, I have no doubt he would have wanted a restraint on anticipation, if valid, but I doubt as to the power of revocation; and he would rather have the deed as it is, than no trust. Probably he assumed that the plaintiff's life estate was more inaccessible to herself and her creditors than it is in fact. But I do not find that he had any very definite thought on the matter. He did understand--I think rightly--that the corpus of the fund (the capital) could not be taken by her creditors, to the destruction of the remainder limited by the deed." The single justice was of opinion that under the law of this state the foregoing facts did not constitute a ground for setting aside a voluntary settlement, and ordered the bill to be dismissed, and, at the plaintiff's request, reported the case to the full court, such decree to be made as equity might require.

We are of opinion that the ruling was correct, and in accordance with our decisions. We do not assent to the argument for the plaintiff that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff understood the deed. While the point has not been directly adjudicated in this commonwealth, our cases proceed upon the theory that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove the allegations of the bill. Thus, in Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494, 496, it is said by Chief Justice Chapman, "After careful consideration of the proceedings, and all the evidence reported by the master and the character of the deed of trust, the court are of opinion that the allegations are not...