Taylor v. Cain, Civil Action No. 06-2897.
| Decision Date | 09 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 06-2897. |
| Citation | 649 F.Supp.2d 460 |
| Parties | Troy TAYLOR v. Burl CAIN. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Troy Taylor, Angola, LA, pro se.
Rodney Antoine Brignac, St. John the Baptist Parish District Attorney's Office, Laplace, LA, for Defendant.
IVAN L.R. LEMELLE, District Judge.
The Court, having considered the petition, the record, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and the failure of any party to file an objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, hereby approves the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and adopts it as its opinion in this matter. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Troy Taylor for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, be, and the same is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct hearings, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Sections 636(b)(1)(B) and (C)and, as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases. Upon review of the entire record, the Court has determined that a federal evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. See Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254(e)(2).1 For the following reasons, it is recommended that the instant petition for habeas corpus relief be DENIED and the petition DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Petitioner, Troy Taylor, is presently incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Fortieth Judicial District Court, St. John the Baptist Parish, Case No. 01-90, on February 21, 2002, of one count of second degree kidnapping, a violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1, and one count of attempted second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and R.S. 14:30.1.2 On May 8, 2002, petitioner was sentenced to serve twenty-five years at hard labor for the second degree kidnapping conviction, with two years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Taylor was also sentenced to serve fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the attempted second degree murder conviction. Both sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.3
Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the convictions and sentences on February 25, 2003.4 Petitioner applied for a writ of certiorari and/or review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The writ application was denied on November 7, 2003.5 On August 27, 2004, petitioner filed a uniform application for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the state district court.6 The district court denied the application for PCR on March 16, 2005.7 Petitioner's application for supervisory writs was denied by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit on April 21, 2005.8 On May 18, 2005, petitioner mailed his application for Supervisory Writs to the Supreme Court of Louisiana which denied relief on March 17, 2006.9
On June 12, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief with this Court. Petitioner brings the following five claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (2) double jeopardy; (3) insufficient evidence to convict; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; and, (5) the trial court denied him the right to present a defense.10
The respondent filed his response on November 6, 2006, wherein he conceded that the petitioner had exhausted the federal claims in the Louisiana Supreme Court and that petitioner's federal application was timely filed.11
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") comprehensively overhauled federal habeas corpus legislation, including Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. Amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) contain revised standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Provided that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits, pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under Section 2254(d)(2). Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir.2000).
As to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, a federal court must defer to the state court's decision unless it "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court has noted:
Section 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have independent meaning. A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002).
As to questions of fact, factual findings are presumed to be correct and a federal court will give deference to the state court's decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254(d)(2); see also Hill, 210 F.3d at 485; Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254(e)(1).
The victim, Secondra Johnson, was twenty years old at the time of the incident in this case. At trial, she testified that she has known the defendant since she was a young girl. Her testimony revealed that on February 22, 2001, she was alone at her residence on 219 Spruce Street when she heard a door open. She remained in her bed sleeping until the defendant opened her bedroom door, jumped on her back and put a knife to her throat. Secondra testified that the defendant demanded to know where her purse was and she responded by telling him that it was in the car. She stated that they fought in her bed and then the defendant took her to the kitchen. She asked the defendant why he was behaving this way, and the defendant responded, "Don't say my name." The defendant then stated, "You say my name again I'm going to stab you." Secondra testified that she said the defendant's name again at which point he stabbed her under the chin. She fought with the defendant and he stabbed her under the chin again.
Secondra testified that the defendant brought her outside of the house and put her into her car. She was able to escape from the car and run toward her uncle's home, but the defendant pursued her and stabbed her once again underneath her chin and dragged her back to the car. She stated that the defendant then drove onto the interstate, while she continued to plead with him to stop and bring her to a hospital, but the defendant kept driving. The defendant stated, "I'm going to do away with your body and your car where nobody never find you." Secondra testified that the defendant made her strip naked in the vehicle and thereafter touched her vagina.
As they traveled along the interstate and approached Siegen Lane in Baton Rouge, Secondra opened the door and jumped out of the vehicle, which was traveling around 60 miles per hour. Secondra testified that, after jumping from the vehicle, she stopped a van and jumped inside. The driver of the van then exited onto Siegen Lane and dialed 911. When the ambulance and police arrived, Secondra stated that her attacker was the defendant, Troy Taylor.
Secondra testified that she remained in the hospital for several days. While in the hospital, an artificial artery was placed in her throat, she required a pint of blood, and she received 27 staples, as well as stitches in her hands. She testified that Detective Joseph showed her a photographic lineup while she was in the hospital, and she identified the defendant as her attacker.
On cross-examination, Secondra testified that she had known the defendant since she was a young child and that he had stayed at her residence for a brief period of time. She also testified that the defendant had never been violent in the past nor did he appear to have been sexually interested in her before.
Holly Kohan, an administrative assistant at Our Lady of the Lake Hospital in Baton Rouge, testified that on the morning of February 22, 2001, she was driving on Interstate-10 (I-10) near the Siegen Lane exit when she saw a woman "fly out" of a moving vehicle. She testified that she saw someone stop to assist the female, so she continued to drive to work where she called 911. Kohan also testified that the driver of the vehicle from which the woman exited did not attempt to assist the woman.
Steven French, a sales representative for Glaser Wholesale in Baton Rouge, testified that on February 22, 2001, he saw a red Mitsubishi Eclipse swerve, and a nude woman exited the vehicle. He then observed the car exit onto Siegen Lane, and he pursued the vehicle. French testified that the vehicle made a U-turn and got back on the interstate heading toward Baton Rouge. He was able to get the...
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