Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple, A06A0446.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. A06A0446.,A06A0446. |
| Citation | 279 Ga. App. 71,630 S.E.2d 604 |
| Parties | TAYLOR v. CALVARY BAPTIST TEMPLE et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Don Smart, Smart & Harris, Savannah, for appellant.
Richard C. Metz, Charles D. Gatch, Savannah, for appellees.
David Taylor brought suit against Calvary Baptist Temple d/b/a Calvary Baptist Day School and its principal Joe Hulsey alleging breach of his employment contract, tortious interference with business relations, and slander. His claims arise out of termination of his employment with the school. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school. Because Taylor has failed to present evidence to support each element of his claims, we affirm.
In April 2003, Taylor entered into an employment contract with Calvary for the upcoming school year as an 11th-grade English teacher. Pursuant to the contract terms requiring three weeks notice, Calvary terminated Taylor on November 25, 2003 with an effective date of December 19, 2003.
Three weeks prior to his termination, Taylor had begun the second of a multi-part series of instruction, in which the second part was an SAT review unit for 11th-grade students. After Taylor's dismissal, several students asked him to continue teaching the course. Taylor said he would, and he began by offering a free session so that, in his own words, "they would see what it's like to take a course outside of school." He later emailed the students who came to the first class and told them the cost, but no one came to any subsequent classes. Taylor claims students declined to come to his class because of statements school officials made about him.
Finally, Taylor claims that school officials slandered him to a potential employer, Savannah Technical College, and to students and parents at Calvary.
1. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Taylor's claim of breach of contract. The contract specifically provides that all employees are hired "At Will," and that "[s]hould employment be terminated prior to the end of the school year, the termination pay will be prorated on the number of days worked. . . ." It also provides that he may be terminated on three weeks notice. Taylor's claim that the term "at will" is ambiguous because it is not defined in the agreement is without merit. The terms of the contract unambiguously create an at-will agreement, and therefore the school was authorized to terminate him with or without cause. See Fortenberry v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 176 Ga.App. 360, 361(1), 335 S.E.2d 460 (1985).
Taylor argues that by operation of OCGA § 34-7-1, his contract had a one-year term. That Code section states, "If a contract of employment provides that wages are payable at a stipulated period, the presumption shall arise that the hiring is for such period. . . ." The contract provides that although there are 187 working days, But in this case, the statement only refers to the "pay system," and any presumption is rebutted by the very next sentence of the contract, which states, "Should employment be terminated prior to the end of the school year, the termination pay will be prorated on the number of days worked. . . ." Fortenberry, 176 Ga.App. at 361, 335 S.E.2d 460. ("written agreement merely established the total amount of his salary during a 12-month period and did not establish a pay period requiring application of the presumption").
"Where no matter of fact is involved, the construction of a plain and definite contract, if needed, is a matter of law for the court." Lay Bros., Inc. v. Golden Pantry Food Stores, 273 Ga.App. 870, 872, 616 S.E.2d 160 (2005). The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim.
2. Taylor claims that the defendants tortiously interfered with his private SAT course. To support such a claim, Taylor must prove that by acting improperly and without privilege, purposely with malice and the intent to injure, the defendant induced a third party or parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the plaintiff that thereby caused financial injury. Cox v. City of Atlanta, 266 Ga.App. 329, 332(1), 596 S.E.2d 785 (2004). The trial court found that Taylor had failed to put forth evidence to support any of the four elements. We may affirm if evidence to support any one essential element is missing. Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co., 236 Ga.App. 116, 117(3), 511 S.E.2d 232 (1999).
With regard to the first element of the claim, Taylor must provide evidence to show that the defendants were third parties to the alleged business relationship, that is, that they were intermeddlers acting improperly and without privilege. Cox, 266 Ga.App. at 332-333, 596 S.E.2d 785. See also Renden, Inc. v. Liberty Real Ltd. Estate Partnership III, 213 Ga.App. 333, 336(2)(b), 444 S.E.2d 814 (1994) (). On this element, there is no factual issue even though Taylor's employment with Calvary had ended prior to the SAT course.
The SAT course began at the school while Taylor was still employed, and Calvary paid for the books for the course. Taylor taught the course as a part of his duties as a teacher under his contractual agreement with the school. And there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the course was not fully sanctioned and approved by the school. Whether Taylor has a claim turns on whether Calvary can be seen as a stranger to the business relationship. In Disaster Svcs. v. ERC Partnership, 228 Ga.App. 739, 741, 492 S.E.2d 526 (1997), the Court stated that the defendant must have a bona fide economic interest to not be a stranger to the relationship. Id.
Here, the students have an agreement with Calvary in that Calvary provides them educational services, illustrating Calvary's bona fide economic interest. Calvary further confirmed its "legitimate economic interest" when Calvary bought the books for the SAT course. Because of the interwoven nature of Calvary, the SAT course, and the students, Calvary was not a stranger to the relationship. Atlanta Market Center Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 609-610, 503 S.E.2d 278 (1998) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Triple Eagle Associates Inc. v. Pbk Inc.
...Golden Pantry Food Stores, 273 Ga.App. 870, 872(1), 616 S.E.2d 160 (2005) (footnote omitted); see also Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple, 279 Ga.App. 71, 71–72(1), 630 S.E.2d 604 (2006) (same). 27. Kreimer v. Kreimer, 274 Ga. 359, 361(1), 552 S.E.2d 826 (2001) (footnote omitted); see also La......
-
Cottrell v. Smith
...cannot reasonably conclude from what is said that the comments are imputing a crime to the plaintiff. Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple , 279 Ga.App. 71, 73–74, 630 S.E.2d 604 (2006). As for defamation in regard to a trade, profession, or office,[t]he kind of aspersion necessary to come unde......
-
H&r Block Eastern Enter.S Inc v. Morris
...under Georgia law a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own business relationships. See Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple, 279 Ga.App. 71, 630 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2006).4. Title VII Morris contends her Title VII claim is not time-barred because she filed her charge of discrimination with......
-
Cae Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
...all "parties to an interwoven set of contracts or relations." Ford , 2014 WL 4311275, at *9 ; see also Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple , 279 Ga.App. 71, 630 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2006) (finding that school was not stranger to contract between teacher and student because school had facilitated t......
-
Labor and Employment Law - W. Melvin Haas, Iii, William M. Clifton, Iii, and W. Jonathan Martin, Ii
...Wimberly, supra note 68, at 20-21. 86. Id. at 20 (quoting Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 44344 (1978)). 87. 279 Ga. App. 71, 630 S.E.2d 604 (2006). 88. Id. at 71, 630 S.E.2d at 605. 89. Id. at 72, 630 S.E.2d at 605. 90. Id. at 71, 630 S.E.2d at 605 (quoting O.C.G......