Taylor v. Commonwealth
Decision Date | 01 March 1948 |
Parties | TAYLOR . v. COMMONWEALTH. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Fairfax County; Paul E. Brown, Judge.
Lottie E. Taylor was convicted of disorderly conduct, and she brings error.
Reversed and final judgment.
Before HUDGINS, C. J., and GREGORY, EGGLESTON, SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, and MILLER, JJ.
James H. Raby, of Alexandria, for plaintiff in error.
Harvey B. Apperson, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
Martin A. Martin, Oliver W. Hill, and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, all of Richmond, amici curiae.
The plaintiff in error, Mrs. Lottie E. Taylor, a colored woman, upon an appeal from the judgment of a trial justice, was tried in the Circuit Court of Fairfax county on a warrant charging that on the 12th day of September, 1946, she "did unlawfully cause an unnecessary disturbance in an omnibus or public conveyance by failing to move to another seat when lawfully requested so to move by the operator thereof, said failure being in violation of section 4533a of the Code of Virginia." She pleaded not guilty and waived trial by jury. With the consent of the Commonwealth, the case was then heard by the trial judge. She was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of five dollars and costs.
The facts are without material dispute.
On September 12, 1946, Mrs. Taylor purchased a ticket from Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., a common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in operating a bus line from Washington, D. C, to points in Virginia. Her ticket entitled her to be transported from Washington, D. C, to Brightwood, in Madison county, Virginia. She boarded a bus of the carrier, and took the fifth seat from the front of the vehicle. The bus driver immediately requested her to move to a seat in the rear of the bus because, under the rules and regulations of his company, colored persons were required to sit in the rear and white persons in the front. She refused to move. He then told her that while the regulations were not enforced in Washington, D. C, she would have to move when she arrived in Virginia. After she arrived in Virginia, he several times requested her to move. He said he also read to her the regulations of the carrier and called her attention to a copy of them posted prominently at the inside front of the bus. She still refused to change her seat.
The rules and regulations of the carrier read as follows:
The bus had a seating capacity of thirty-seven passengers. On the trip in question, eight or nine seats were vacant, some in front of Mrs. Taylor and some behind her. Back of her there were seated several white persons. Upon her continued refusal to move her seat to the rear, the operator of the bus deviated from his regular scheduled route and drove to Fairfax County Court House, Virginia, where he obtained the warrant upon which she was tried. She was there removed from the bus. This occurrence caused a delay of about an hour and a half in the regular schedule of travel. There was no cursing, abusive language, or disturbance other than the delay and deviation mentioned. The remaining passengers on the bus were not otherwise disturbed, and only a few heard a part of the conversation between Mrs. Taylor and the bus driver.
The bus driver testified
It was admitted that the carrier did not apply a single, uniform rule as to seating arrangements for the different races in interstate motor travel. Its regulations as to such seating arrangements were sought to be applied subject to local rather than national requirements. When Mrs. Taylor got on the bus in Washington, D. C, its driver said:
The plaintiff in error contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that she was guilty of any disorderly conduct; that Virginia Code 1942, (Michie) section 4533a is vague and ambiguous; and that the statute as applied by the trial court is an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce and an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
On the part of the Commonwealth, it is contended that the carrier had the right to adopt and enforce regulations providing for racial segregation on its conveyances and that the operator of the bus thus had lawful authority to request Mrs. Taylor to move acordingly, and that her...
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