Taylor v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 06 June 1868
• Citation: 66 Ky. 508
• Parties: Taylor v. Commonwealth.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

66 Ky. 508

Taylor v. Commonwealth.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 6, 1868

1. " The said Taylor, in said county of Jefferson, on the 11th day of January, 1868, and before the finding of this bill, with force and arms' feloniously did assault, beat and shake, and hold, and restrain Susan L. Rogers, with his hands and arms, and with a large knife and weapon, putting her, the said Susan, in great fear of some serious and immediate injury to her life and limb, with the felonious intent to rob her, the said Rogers, contrary to the form of the statute," & c. The foregoing facts, stated in the indictment as constituting the offense, are held to be sufficient; and, although the offense is not charged in the precise words used in the statute in defining it, it is alleged in words conveying the same meaning, and the variance is, therefore, unimportant. (Crim. Code, sec. 137.)

2. Section 2 of article 5, chapter 28, Revised Statutes (1 Stanton, 381), contains two distinct provisions which may be separately stated as follows:

First. " If any person, with an offensive weapon or instrument, shall unlawfully and maliciously assault any other person, with a felonious intent to rob or commit robbery upon such person; " or

Second. " If any person shall, by menace, or in or by any forcible or violent manner, demand any money, goods, or chattels, bond, bill, deed, or will, or other evidences of right, or any thing of value of or from any other person, he shall be confined," & c.

Under the first, the crime consists in the commission of an assault, with an offensive weapon or instrument, with a felonious intent to rob the person assaulted. Whilst, under the second, the gravamen of the offense is the act of demanding money or property with a felonious intent to rob, by menace, or in or by any forcible or violent manner.

3. Evidence in behalf of the Commonwealth of particular facts affecting the credibility of the witnesses for the defendant, that one of them " had been prosecuted for false swearing," and that all of the witnesses introduced by the defendant " belonged to a clique that were banded together to swear negroes out of any offense charged against them," is inadmissible.

4. In impeaching the credit of a witness, by general evidence, the examination must be confined to his general reputation, and not be permitted as to particular facts. (18 B. Mon., 792.)

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

L. A. WOOD, For Appellant,

CITED--

Rev. Stat., sec. 2, art. 5, chap. 28, 1 Stant., 381.

JOHN RODMAN, Attorney General, For Appellee,

CITED--

Criminal Code, secs. 271, 121.

3 Met., 18; Jane vs. Commonwealth.

OPINION

HARDIN JUDGE.

The appellant, William Taylor, was convicted, in the Jefferson circuit court, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for one year, upon an indictment charging him with the crime of committing an assault on Susan L. Rogers, with intent to rob her.

The facts stated in the indictment as constituting the offense, were, that " the said Taylor, in said county of Jefferson, on the 11th day of January, 1868, and before the finding of this bill, with force and arms, feloniously did assault, beat, and shake, and hold, and restrain, Susan L. Rogers, with his hands and arms, and with a large knife and weapon, putting her, the said Susan, in great fear of some serious and immediate injury to her life and limb, with the felonious intent to rob her, the said Rogers, contrary to the form of the statute," & c.

The appellant moved the court in arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial, and both motions were overruled. He seeks a reversal of the judgment in this court.

The first inquiry is, as to the sufficiency of the indictment.

The 2d section, of article 5, of chapter 28, of the Revised Statutes, declares, that " if any person, with an offensive weapon or instrument, shall unlawfully...