Taylor v. Commonwealth

• Citation: 796 S.E.2d 859,67 Va.App. 448
• Decision Date: 14 March 2017
• Docket Number: Record No. 0543-16-3
• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Parties: Amanda Barbara Nichole TAYLOR v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

67 Va.App. 448

796 S.E.2d 859

Amanda Barbara Nichole TAYLOR

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 0543-16-3

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Lexington.

MARCH 14, 2017

Ryan D. Hamrick (Daniel D. Hamrick, P.C., Christiansburg on briefs), for appellant.

Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges Humphreys, Petty and Chafin

OPINION BY JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY

Amanda Barbara Nichole Taylor appeals her conviction of first-degree murder, arguing the trial court erred by failing to strike a juror for cause. We disagree and affirm the conviction.

BACKGROUND

"Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court." Porter v. Commonwealth , 276 Va. 203, 215-16, 661 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2008).

During group voir dire ,¹ the trial judge asked the group of potential jurors if any of them had expressed or formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if any were sensible of any bias or prejudice against the parties, and if any knew any reason he or she could not give a fair and impartial trial to the parties based solely on the law and the evidence. The group answered "no" to each question. The judge asked the group if they understood that the defendant is presumed to be innocent, if they understood that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if they understood that the defendant is not required to produce evidence. The group answered "yes" to each question.

The Commonwealth's Attorney then asked the group a series of questions, including, "[I]s there anyone that believes that they already know something about this case?" When Juror K. responded that he did, the Commonwealth's Attorney asked Juror K. if he would be willing to put aside prior knowledge and listen to what was heard in the courtroom and base his decision just on the evidence presented. Juror K. replied, "Yes."

Subsequently, during individual voir dire , the following conversation took place involving Juror K.:

[Commonwealth's Attorney]: [Juror K.], I think you had indicated that you thought maybe you had seen or heard something about this case prior to coming here today; is that right?

Juror [K.]: Yes.

....

[Commonwealth's Attorney]: Okay. And as sort of right now, based on what you heard outside of the courtroom, do you feel like you have an opinion one way or another whether the defendant would be guilty or not guilty?

Juror [K.]: Probably more leaning towards guilty, I would imagine.

[Commonwealth's Attorney]: Okay. And—

Juror [K.]: But I, I don't know enough to, you know—

[Commonwealth's Attorney]: Okay. You don't know enough to—

Juror [K.]: To really say for sure, but—

[Commonwealth's Attorney]: And you understand that whatever you may have heard outside of the courtroom would not be evidence—

Juror [K.]: Correct.

[Commonwealth's Attorney]: —in the case? Do you feel that your opinion is so firmly rooted that you could not put that aside and listen just to what was presented in the courtroom?

Juror [K.]: No, I don't think so.

When asked if he felt he could render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on what was said in the courtroom, Juror K. stated, "Yes."

When questioned by the defense attorney, Juror K. admitted that he had come into the courtroom thinking the defendant was more likely than not to be guilty "[j]ust based on what, you know, things that I heard or read." Defense counsel then asked Juror K., "Sitting right here, right now, do you still feel that way?" Juror K. answered, "Probably yes, I would imagine."

Defense counsel then moved to strike for cause. The trial judge then asked Juror K.,

Judge: I want to ask you one more question. Sir, before you answered my question that any information you had would not affect your impartiality in this case.... Is that still the same?"

Juror [K.]: Yes, that's still the same.... The way he phrased it it was just like are you, would you be leaning more.

Judge: But you could still be impartial?

Juror [K.]: Yes, I believe so.

Judge: Okay. And you're not so entrenched in your feelings that—

Juror [K.]: No.

Judge: —you can't be fair and impartial?

Juror [K.]: No.

The defense argued that even though Juror K. stated he believed he could be impartial, Juror K. had stated that sitting there before hearing any evidence, he was leaning towards guilty. The trial judge concluded that the "standard is whether he can be impartial and whether he can render a fair verdict based on the law and the evidence, and he has answered that affirmatively each time, and so I deny your motion."

The defense used a peremptory strike to remove the juror. The jury subsequently found Taylor guilty of first-degree murder. Taylor now appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to strike Juror K. for cause.

ANALYSIS

It is well-established that "the right of an accused to trial by ‘an impartial jury’ is a constitutional right, reinforced by legislative mandate and by the Rules of this court." Justus v. Commonwealth , 220 Va. 971, 975, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1980). " Code § 8.01-357 assures a defendant a right to an impartial jury drawn from ‘a panel [of not less than twenty] free from exceptions.’ " Id. (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth , 217 Va. 297, 300, 227 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1976) ). "In the criminal context, it is well-settled that a trial court commits ‘prejudicial error’ if it ‘force[s] a defendant to use peremptory strikes to exclude a venire[person] from the jury panel if that person is not free from exception.’ " Roberts v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 279 Va. 111, 117, 688 S.E.2d 178, 181 (2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Townsend v. Commonwealth , 270 Va. 325, 329, 619 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2005) ). Furthermore, "a defendant's use of a peremptory strike to remove a juror who is not free from exception [is] not harmless error because a defendant ‘has a right to an impartial jury drawn from "a panel [of not less than twenty] free from exceptions." ’ " Id. (quoting Breeden , 217 Va. at 300, 227 S.E.2d at 736-37 ). "It is the duty of the trial court through the legal machinery provided for that purpose to procure an impartial jury to try every case." Justus , 220 Va. at 976, 266 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Slade v. Commonwealth , 155 Va. 1099, 1106, 156 S.E. 388, 391 (1931) ).

If a prospective juror "does not stand indifferent to the cause, he is not competent. If he has any interest in the cause, or is related to either party, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, he is excluded by the law." Spangler v. Ashwell , 116 Va. 992, 996-97, 83 S.E. 930, 931 (1914). However, "jurors are not required to be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case on which they sit." Justus , 220 Va. at 977, 266 S.E.2d at 91. "The opinion entertained by a juror, which disqualifies him, is an opinion of that fixed character which repels the presumption of innocence in a criminal case, and in whose mind the accused stands condemned already." Id. at 976, 266 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Slade , 155 Va. at 1106, 156 S.E. at 391 ); Teleguz v. Commonwealth , 273 Va. 458, 477, 643 S.E.2d 708, 720 (2007) ("A potential juror who has knowledge of the case, even if such person has formed an opinion about the case, is entitled to sit on the jury if that opinion can be set aside." (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth , 263 Va. 216, 231, 559 S.E.2d 652, 660 (2002) )).

In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.

Irvin v. Dowd , 366 U.S. 717, 722-23, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Potential jurors may be confused regarding what "impartiality" requires in relation to feelings and opinions gained prior to voir dire . "With random jury selection this will often occur and presents a situation with which trial judges will have to deal as intelligently and patiently as possible." Justus , 220 Va. at 977, 266 S.E.2d at 91 ("It will obviously require a greater effort on the part of trial courts to rehabilitate prospective jurors who become confused during their voir dire examination.").

"Juror impartiality is a question of fact." Huguely v. Commonwealth , 63 Va.App. 92, 121, 754 S.E.2d 557, 571 (2014) (quoting Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth , 58 Va.App. 55, 61, 707 S.E.2d 27, 30 (2011) ). "Whether a prospective juror can lay aside a preconceived opinion and render a verdict solely on the evidence is a mixed question of law and fact. Resolution of the question rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." Calhoun v. Commonwealth , 226 Va. 256, 258, 307 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983). "[T]he trial court must weigh the meaning of the answers given in light of the phrasing of the questions posed, the inflections, tone, and tenor of the dialogue, and the general demeanor of the prospective juror." Smith v. Commonwealth , 219 Va. 455, 464-65, 248 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1978).

[B]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which we lack, to observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors first hand, the trial court's exercise of judicial discretion in deciding challenges for cause will be not disturbed on appeal, unless manifest error appears in the record.

Jackson v. Commonwealth , 267 Va....