Taylor v. County Bancshares, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 July 2004
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:03 CV 0023.
• Citation: 325 F.Supp.2d 755
• Parties: Vinceann TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY BANCSHARES, INC. d/b/a First National Bank of Newton, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

325 F.Supp.2d 755

Vinceann TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY BANCSHARES, INC. d/b/a First National Bank of Newton, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:03 CV 0023.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

July 14, 2004.

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Joseph Y. Ahmad, Ahmad Zavitsanos & Anaipakos, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Mark William Frasher, Lamb Law Firm, Kip Kevin Lamb, Lamb Law Firm, Kenneth Leigh Parker, Lamb Law Firm, Beaumont, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, District Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendant County Bancshares, Inc. ("County Bancshares") d/b/a First National Bank of Newton's ("FNBN") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 16). County Bancshares seeks summary judgment on plaintiff VinceAnn Taylor's ("Taylor") claim of sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6. Having reviewed the motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that County Bancshares's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

1. Background

Until October 1, 2001, Newton Bancshares, Inc. ("Newton"), owned and operated FNBN under the direction of President and Chief Executive Officer Rexx Behring and Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Smith Thomasson ("Thomasson"). On January 1, 2001, Thomasson hired Taylor as Vice President of a new profit center called the Special Products Department at a salary of $60,000.00 per year plus benefits.

Thomasson hired Taylor in anticipation of the retirement of Bill McMillan ("McMillan"), who was then in charge of FNBN's Mortgage Department. Defendant disputes, however, that Thomasson ever conveyed that information to officials of County Bancshares. Thomasson created the Special Products Department in order to utilize Taylor's familiarity with federally-guaranteed loans prior to McMillan's retirement. Taylor was expected to sell "special product" loans, such as those provided through the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), the Federal Housing Authority ("FHA"), and the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), while assisting the Mortgage Department in processing consumer, commercial, and residential loans. The Special Products Department was comprised of only Taylor and her secretary, and there was significant overlap in the work done by the Special Products and Mortgage Departments.

On October 1, 2001, County Bancshares, a holding company, purchased FNBN from Newton. County Bancshares was incorporated to raise the capital needed to open a new bank, but when FNBN became available, County Bancshares seized the opportunity to purchase and manage a bank that was already established in the community. County Bancshares and FNBN operate under the direction of separate boards of directors, although every member of the County Bancshares Board serves on the FNBN Board. After the acquisition, Carlos Vacek ("Vacek") assumed the role of FNBN's President and Chief Executive Officer. Lin Bingham ("Bingham") became Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. While Vacek is the highest ranking officer in the organization, Vacek and Bingham share decision-making responsibilities for FNBN's day-to-day operations.

On October 3, 2001, two days after taking control, Vacek and Bingham met with Taylor and advised her that she was being terminated. They told Taylor that the Special Products Department was being eliminated and that her services were no longer needed. According to Vacek and Bingham, Taylor replied by demanding that McMillan be discharged instead and that she be moved into his position. According to Taylor, she informed Vacek and Bingham that she was working on other types of loans, such as consumer, commercial, and residential, and that she had over $20 million in loans in the pipeline, to which Vacek replied, "We've already made our decision." Taylor also asserts that Vacek refused to discuss transferring her to another position or retaining her as a loan officer in any capacity. Both parties agree that there was no discussion of moving Taylor to any other position within the organization. Taylor further notes that when Vacek was first introduced to a group of employees of the bank, most of whom were female, he remarked, "Do you have any men?" or words to that effect.

After her termination, Taylor filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on February 14, 2002, alleging that she had been terminated because of her gender. On May 15, 2002, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter stating that the information provided to the Commission was insufficient to establish a violation and informing Taylor of her right to file a civil lawsuit. Taylor, however, contends that she did not receive that letter or any other notice from the EEOC regarding the disposition of her charge. In early November 2002, Taylor spoke to Gigi Cox ("Cox"), an employee of Taylor's attorney, Joseph Ahmad, asking whether he had received notice from the EEOC. Because he had not, Cox contacted the EEOC on November 15, 2002, and requested the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. On November 18, 2002, an EEOC investigator informed Cox that the right-to-sue letter had been mailed the previous May. The investigator also provided Cox the certified mail tracking number associated with the letter so that Taylor could attempt to ascertain its whereabouts.

On November 21, 2002, Taylor visited a post office to attempt to locate the right-to-sue letter through the tracking number. The postal worker who assisted Taylor was unable to locate the letter and advised Taylor that the Postal Service had no record of any certified mail associated with that number. The postal worker provided Taylor with a computer-generated document which confirmed that there was no record of the letter. Taylor faxed that information to Cox on November 29, 2002. On December 11, 2002, Cox requested a copy of the letter from the EEOC. The EEOC faxed a copy of the right-to-sue letter to Cox on December 12, 2002. On January 10, 2003, Taylor filed this action, alleging sexual discrimination and seeking (1) back pay, including wages and benefits; (2) reinstatement or front pay, including benefits; (3) attorney's fees, expert fees, and costs; (4) prejudgment and postjudgment interest; and (5) an additional equal amount of back pay as liquidated damages.

2. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir.2003); Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir.2002); Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir.1999). Where a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense and, thus, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, "it must adduce evidence to support each element of its defenses and demonstrate the lack of any genuine issue of material fact with regard thereto." Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1160, 120 S.Ct. 1171, 145 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2000) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 915, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 231 (1997)); see Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986). To warrant judgment in its favor, the movant "'"must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the defense."'" Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (emphasis in original) (quoting Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1194)). "A fact is `material' if it `might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.'" Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505); see Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 471 (5th Cir.2001); Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir.1999); Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir.1994). "An issue is `genuine' if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Bazan, 246 F.3d at 489 (emphasis in original). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; accord Harken Exploration Co., 261 F.3d at 471; Merritt-Campbell, Inc., 164 F.3d at 961. The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. See Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994)).

Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S....