Taylor v. Crane

• Decision Date: 29 May 1979
• Docket Number: S.F. 23735,S
• Citation: 595 P.2d 129,24 Cal.3d 442,155 Cal.Rptr. 695
• Parties: , 595 P.2d 129, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3060 John L. TAYLOR, as City Manager, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Charles CRANE et al., Defendants and Appellants. BERKELEY POLICE ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF BERKELEY et al., Defendants and Respondents. F. 23736.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 695

155 Cal.Rptr. 695

24 Cal.3d 442, 595 P.2d 129, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3060

John L. TAYLOR, as City Manager, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Charles CRANE et al., Defendants and Appellants.

BERKELEY POLICE ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF BERKELEY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S.F. 23735, S.F. 23736.

Supreme Court of California.

May 29, 1979.

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough and Christopher D. Burdick, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants and for defendants and appellants.

Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger, Stewart Weinberg, Stefanie Arthur, San Francisco, Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, Loren R. Rothschild, Lester G. Ostrov, Joel N. Klevens and Stephen Reinhardt, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants and defendants and appellants.

Michael Lawson, City Atty., and Charles O. Triebel, Jr., Oakland, for plaintiffs and respondents and for defendants and respondents.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

This case presents the question of whether an arbitrator's order and award conflicted with the Charter and Ordinances of the City of Berkeley, and are therefore not binding on the city.

I

On the night of April 16, 1974, Charles Crane, a permanent civil service employee with the rank of police inspector, dined at a Berkeley restaurant with a friend. As they left the restaurant, Crane, saw three persons who appeared to be burglarizing his friend's automobile. While pursuing the suspects on foot, Crane fired two shots from his police service revolver, wounding one of the three.

Four days later, City Manager John Taylor discharged Crane on the grounds that he had violated a city police regulation restricting the use of firearms in the course of police duty. ¹ As a member of the Berkeley Police Association, Crane invoked a grievance procedure which provided for arbitration of disputes relating to the discipline of police officers.

After preliminary steps in the grievance process had failed to produce accord, the parties signed an "arbitration submission agreement" (submission agreement), which designated the issue to be decided by the arbitrator as follows: ". . . 'Was Inspector Crane properly discharged by City Manager John L. Taylor as provided in the Charter of the City of Berkeley, applicable Ordinances, Resolutions, Personnel Rules, Regulations, and Department Orders, Rules and Regulations?' If not, what should the remedy be?" William Eaton, an attorney and arbitrator, was designated to hear the case.

On March 6, 1975, Mr. Eaton issued his final opinion and award. The arbitrator found that Crane had violated the police regulations in question. However, Eaton concluded that in view of all the facts, Crane should be suspended, not discharged.

In reaching this conclusion, Eaton carefully reviewed the evidence and circumstances of the case, including Crane's distinguished record. Crane's superiors had testified that he was the best investigating officer the department had ever known. They also testified that Crane worked long hours without thought of reward or extra compensation.

The arbitrator noted that at the time of the incident in dispute, Crane had been working unusually long hours and was under considerable stress. Part of this stress related to the fact that Crane had been warned by the FBI that he had been marked for assassination by a violent political group which he had been investigating in connection with a bank robbery.

The arbitrator also found it significant that the Alameda County District Attorney had expressly determined that Crane's actions did not warrant criminal prosecution under state law. In addition, Eaton noted that the city had been unable to show that it had ever clearly communicated to its police officers that a violation of the regulations in question could result in discharge. Finally, the arbitrator's opinion emphasized testimony that if Crane's discharge were sustained, it would likely end his distinguished career as a police officer.

In these circumstances, Eaton found that Crane's actions constituted sufficient cause for a substantial disciplinary suspension, but not for dismissal. Crane was ordered suspended for 30 days, but otherwise reinstated at rank with back pay.

The city refused to honor the arbitrator's award. The police association filed suit seeking judicial confirmation of the award. The city in turn sought a declaratory judgment that the award was void. After consolidating the actions, the trial court found that under the Berkeley City Charter, the city manager had the exclusive power to discipline or remove city employees. The court ruled that the findings and award of the arbitrator were in conflict with this power and that the award was not binding on the city. Crane and the police association appeal.

II

Article VII, section 28 of the Berkeley City Charter grants the city manager the power and duty to "appoint, discipline or remove" city employees "subject to the civil service provisions of this Charter." ² The "civil service provisions" of the charter authorize the city to establish a personnel board "to administer a personnel system under rules and regulations to be made by the Council." ³

The city council has exercised this authority by adopting Ordinance No. 2342-N.S. (personnel ordinance) and Resolution No. 34,480-N.S. (resolution). Together, these enactments establish a merit system of civil service employment under supervision of the city's personnel board. The personnel ordinance grants tenure to permanent city employees during good behavior and proved fitness for the position. (Personnel ordinance, § 12(a).) ⁴ The resolution provides that permanent employees may be discharged only "for a cause." (Resolution, rule XV, § 1.) ⁵ Disciplined employees have a right to appeal to the personnel board. (Personnel ordinance, § 12(b), § 13(a); resolution, rule XVI, §§ 1 and 2.) ⁶

An alternative method of reviewing the city manager's disciplinary decisions has been created for members of the police association. Pursuant to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.), the city manager and the association have negotiated and executed a supplemental "memorandum of understanding" (memorandum agreement), which the city council has ratified. ⁷ Under the agreement, if the parties are unable to come to terms, the matter is submitted to a six-member "adjustment board," composed of an equal number of city and association representatives. (Memorandum agreement, § 2(d).) If a majority of the adjustment board cannot agree on a resolution of the dispute, it may be referred to an impartial arbitrator. (Id., § 2(e).) When the grievance concerns suspension or discharge, the arbitrator's decision is final and binding "to the extent permitted by the Charter of the City." (Ibid.)

Appellants contend that the memorandum agreement does not conflict with any provision of the city charter. Therefore, appellants assert that the agreement was binding once it was adopted by the city council. (Glendale City Employees' Assn. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 334-338, 124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609.)

To its credit, the city does not argue otherwise. It properly concedes that its charter permits it to agree to arbitrate grievances relating to employee discipline. ⁸ However, the city contends that in this particular arbitration, both the memorandum agreement and the submission agreement (see p. 697 of 155 Cal.Rptr., p. 131 of 595 P.2d Ante ) were improperly interpreted and applied in a way which conflicted with the city charter.

At the outset, it is important to set forth the arbitrator's duties in this case. Under the memorandum agreement, an arbitrator's task is to resolve "grievances," which include any dispute involving the interpretation or application of city rules or regulations governing personnel practices or working conditions. (Memorandum agreement, § 1; see fn. 7, Ante.) One rule requiring interpretation and application in this arbitration was police regulation 106, which provides that an officer's violation of departmental regulations "may be considered sufficient cause for discharge, suspension, demotion, or other penalty."

Under the submission agreement, arbitrator Eaton was to decide whether Crane had been "properly discharged" according to city rules. In view of police regulation 106, Eaton interpreted that agreement as authorizing him to determine not only whether Crane had violated departmental regulations, but also whether a finding of violation provided Sufficient cause for his removal. Appellants assert that Eaton was authorized by the agreements to resolve both issues, while respondents contend that his authority ended with his resolution of the first issue against Crane.

As a rule, courts defer to arbitrators in determining the extent and meaning of arbitration agreements. (Morris v. Zuckerman (1968) 69 Cal.2d 686, 690, 72 Cal.Rptr. 880, 446 P.2d 1000.) Although an award may be vacated if the arbitrator has exceeded his powers (Code Civ.Proc., § 1286.2), ambiguities in the scope of arbitration are resolved in favor of coverage. (Morris v. Zuckerman, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 690, 72 Cal.Rptr. 880, 446 P.2d 1000; East San Bernardino County Water Dist. v. City of San Bernardino (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 942, 953, 109 Cal.Rptr. 510.) Since the question submitted to Eaton was not limited to whether Crane had violated police regulations, these principles justify upholding Eaton's view of what was arbitrable under the agreements.

The city points out that it agreed to arbitrate grievances only "to the extent permitted by (its) Charter . . .." (Memorandum agreement, § 2(e); see fn. 7, Ante.) The city argues that its charter does not permit arbitration of the question of the proper penalty for an employee who has violated city rules. That discretion is reserved by the charter to the city manager, who may not assign it to another party.

Settled principles...