Taylor v. Cruikshank
| Decision Date | 30 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-SA 2006-0078.,No. 2 CA-SA 2006-0067.,2 CA-SA 2006-0067.,2 CA-SA 2006-0078. |
| Citation | 214 Ariz. 40,148 P.3d 84 |
| Parties | Olin Gene TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. Hon. Michael CRUIKSHANK, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent, and The State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest. John Adrian Johnson, Petitioner, v. Hon. Gus Aragon, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent, and The State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Robert J. Hooker, Pima County Public Defender By Walter Palser, Tucson, Attorneys for Petitioner Taylor.
Robert J. Hooker, Pima County Public Defender By Chiko F. Makanjuola-Oyolu, Tucson, Attorneys for Petitioner Johnson.
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Taren M. Ellis and Shawn Jensvold, Tucson, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest.
¶ 1 In separate special action proceedings that we have consolidated sua sponte, petitioners Olin Gene Taylor and John Adrian Johnson seek special action relief from the respondent judges' denial of their motions to dismiss the indictments filed against them in their underlying criminal cases. In their motions, Taylor and Johnson asserted the state lacks jurisdiction to try them on the charges because the applicable limitation period has expired. We reluctantly agree.
¶ 2 The issue presented is appropriate for the exercise of our special action jurisdiction because it is purely a question of law, requiring us to construe a statute. See State v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 534, ¶ 6, 115 P.3d 128, 131 (App.2005); State ex rel. Smith v. Conn, 209 Ariz. 195, ¶ 3, 98 P.3d 881, 882 (App.2004). In addition, although the statute has been amended since the charged offenses were committed, the issue is likely to recur with further technological advances in identifying suspected perpetrators of decades-old crimes, as evidenced by the near-contemporaneous filing of these two underlying cases involving similar facts and raising the identical issue. See Conn, 209 Ariz. 195, ¶ 3, 98 P.3d at 882. Therefore, this is a matter of statewide importance, an additional reason for accepting special action jurisdiction. See Anderson v. Contes, 212 Ariz. 122, ¶ 4, 128 P.3d 239, 241 (App.2006). Moreover, because we conclude the limitation period has expired, accepting jurisdiction eliminates the time and expense of conducting futile trials and ends the cases. See Emmons v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 509, ¶ 8, 968 P.2d 582, 585 (App.1998); Sw. Coop. Wholesale v. Superior Court, 13 Ariz.App. 453, 455, 477 P.2d 572, 574 (1970). Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction of the special actions.
¶ 3 The facts pertinent to a resolution of these cases are few and undisputed. On June 4, 1994, R. reported to the Tucson Police Department (TPD) that she had been sexually assaulted in her residence by an unknown man. On January 18, 2005, nearly eleven years later, a senior criminalist at the TPD Crime Laboratory was asked to analyze the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in the semen sample recovered from R. The criminalist analyzed the DNA on October 7, 2005, and submitted the resulting DNA profile to a state database connected to a national database known as the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). On October 13, she received notice that a known profile matched the profile she had submitted. On February 16, 2006, a Pima County grand jury indicted Taylor for kidnapping, first-degree burglary, and two counts of sexual assault, all class two felonies; sexual abuse, a class five felony; and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, a class three felony. The indictment alleged that the offenses were committed on June 4, 1994.
¶ 4 Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the limitation period in A.R.S. § 13-107(B) had expired and the state therefore lacked jurisdiction to try him for the offenses. Respondent Judge Cruikshank conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the parties presented extensive evidence on the creation of, and the TPD Crime Laboratory's connection to, CODIS, the national database of DNA profiles of convicted offenders. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Cruikshank denied the defense motion, finding the state could not reasonably have matched Taylor's DNA profile to the DNA profile of the semen sample obtained from R. before May 2000. Accordingly, the respondent concluded, the indictment filed in February 2006, within seven years of May 2000, was timely.
¶ 5 On April 26, 1994, J. reported to TPD that she had been sexually assaulted. A semen sample obtained from J. was tested on June 7, 1994. The City-County Crime Laboratory, now the TPD Crime Laboratory, analyzed one marker of the DNA in the sample on October 2, 1998, to see if it matched any records in the laboratory's informal local database. The result obtained did not match any locally held record.
¶ 6 In September 2005, the state secured a DNA sample from Johnson to confirm a match found in the CODIS database between his DNA profile and the DNA profile of a blood sample recovered from a 2003 burglary in Tucson. In February 2006, the TPD Crime Laboratory analyzed the DNA in the semen sample obtained from J. and submitted the resulting profile to CODIS. It matched the profile of the DNA sample Johnson had previously provided as part of the burglary investigation. A Pima County grand jury indicted Johnson on March 6, 2006, on three counts of sexual assault, class two felonies; two counts of sexual abuse, class five felonies; and kidnapping, a class two felony, all alleged to have been committed on April 26, 1994.
¶ 7 Johnson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute of limitation had expired. Respondent Judge Aragon denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, ruling the state could not have connected the evidence left by the suspect in the sexual assault to the perpetrator "until the Tucson Police Crime Lab was connected to CODIS . . . in November, 2004"1 and that Johnson's DNA profile had been connected to the sexual assault evidence on February 10, 2006. As a result, the respondent found the limitation period had begun on February 10, 2006, "when the State had probable cause of the crime and the connection" to Johnson.
¶ 8 The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitation is the statute in effect when the offenses were committed in 1994. We agree as well. See Martin v. Superior Court, 135 Ariz. 99, 100, 659 P.2d 652, 653 (1983) (); State v. Jackson, 208 Ariz. 56, n. 3, 90 P.3d 793, 796 n. 3 (App.2004) (same); State v. Escobar-Mendez, 195 Ariz. 194, n. 6, 986 P.2d 227, 231 n. 6 (App.1999) (same); see also A.R.S. § 1-244 ().
¶ 9 In addition, Arizona follows the minority view that criminal statutes of limitation are jurisdictional, constituting "a limitation upon the power of the sovereign to act against the accused." State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz. App. 246, 248, 492 P.2d 742, 744 (1972), quoted with approval in Price v. Maxwell, 140 Ariz. 232, 234, 681 P.2d 384, 386 (1984), and Martin, 135 Ariz. at 100, 659 P.2d at 653; see Jackson, 208 Ariz. 56, n. 11, 90 P.3d at 799 n. 11 (). Under our case law, "[s]tatutes of limitation are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused and against the prosecution." Fogel, 16 Ariz.App. at 248, 492 P.2d at 744. And, once a defendant presents reasonable evidence that a statutory period has expired, the state bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it has not. Jackson, 208 Ariz. 56, ¶ 26, 90 P.3d at 800.
¶ 10 We review for an abuse of discretion the respondent judges' rulings on Taylor's and Johnson's motions to dismiss their criminal prosecutions. See State v. Olcan, 204 Ariz. 181, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 475, 477 (App.2003); State v. Sanchez, 192 Ariz. 454, ¶ 4, 967 P.2d 129, 131 (App.1998). "A trial court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or predicates its decision on incorrect legal principles." Jackson, 208 Ariz. 56, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d at 796. This case requires us to interpret a statute, an exercise we perform de novo. See State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 6, 52 P.3d 218, 220 (App.2002). In doing so, we determine the intent of the legislature in adopting the statute, the best evidence of which is the statutory language. Id. We resort to additional considerations "such as the statute's context, history, subject matter, effects and consequences, spirit, and purpose" only if the language proves to be ambiguous. Id.
Former A.R.S. § 13-107(B)
¶ 11 We begin our analysis with the statute in effect in April and June 1994. Section 13-107(B), A.R.S., then read:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for . . . offenses [other than homicide, misuse of public monies, or falsification of public records] must be commenced within the following periods after actual discovery by the state or the political subdivision having jurisdiction of the offense or discovery by the state or such political subdivision which should have occurred with the exercise of reasonable diligence, whichever first occurs:
1. For a class 2 through a class 6 felony, seven years.
1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 223, § 1. Under former § 13-107(C), "a prosecution is commenced when an indictment . . . is filed." 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 223, § 1.
¶ 12 From a grammatical point of view, the statute is less than clear. It does not expressly say what the state must actually or constructively discover. For that reason, this court analyzed the statute at...
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