Taylor v. Davis
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-02028-TLP-tmp |
| Decision Date | 07 March 2022 |
| Parties | PATRICK A. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. D.R.T. DAVIS, Detention Response Team, D.R.T. BRADFIELD, Detention Response Team, D.R.T. ELLIOT, Detention Response Team, and MEDICAL DEPT., At 201 Poplar Ave. Memphis, TN 38103, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
ORDER MODIFYING THE DOCKET, PARTIALLY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT, GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND, AND DENYING PENDING MOTIONS
Pro se Plaintiff Patrick A. Taylor sued Defendants D.R.T. Davis D.R.T. Bradfield, D.R.T. Elliott, and Defendant Medical Dept. at 201 Poplar Ave. Memphis, Tennessee.[1] (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 2 & 4.) Plaintiff moves to appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 5 & 8.) And Plaintiff moves for transfer to the Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”). (ECF No. 9.)
For the reasons below, the Court DISMISSES the complaint IN PART and GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days from the entry of this order in accordance with the requirements set forth below. The Court respectfully DIRECTS the Clerk to modify the docket by adding Shelby County as a Defendant. Lastly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's pending motions for appointment of counsel and for transfer to the TDOC.
According to the complaint, three members of the Shelby County Jail's Detention Response Team (“DRT”)-Defendants Davis, Bradfield, and Elliot (“DRT Defendants”)- assaulted Plaintiff in a staff bathroom. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He alleges that he could not defend himself because the officers handcuffed him before he assault. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that the Jail's medical department, which Plaintiff also named as a Defendant, committed medical malpractice by not following protocol. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he has “blurry vision due to the assault.” (Id. at PageID 3.) In relief, Plaintiff requests $2 700, 000 in compensatory damages. (Id.)
Plaintiff attached various documents to the complaint, including inmate grievance forms and handwritten notes from Plaintiff. According to these documents, correctional officers conducted a shakedown on Plaintiff's level in March 2020, apparently because of a “pod smoking.” (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 11-12.) Two corrections officers strip searched Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 5.) Plaintiff claims that three DRT officers stopped him on the way back to his cell. (Id.) The DRT officers then handcuffed Plaintiff and escorted him back to the strip search room. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, once there, the three DRT officers began to assault him, “one punching [him] in the . . . chest, one hitting [him] in [the] lower stomach, and the older D.R.T was striking [him] in the face.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that the DRT officer striking him in the face “struck [him] [to] the point that the other D.R.T. Member had to pull the older D.R.T. officer off [him].” (Id.) Then the DRT officers told Plaintiff they would return to see Plaintiff if he said anything. (Id.) Plaintiff says he tried to seek medical attention and was denied. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance a few days later. (Id. at PageID 4.) Plaintiff alleges that in April 2020 one of the DRT members who committed the assault threatened to kill Plaintiff. (Id. at PageID 7.)
Plaintiff also attached an interoffice memo written by Shelby County Sheriff's Office's (“SCSO”) Lieutenant T. Anderson related to Plaintiff's complaint about the incident. (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 11.) According to the memo, Plaintiff had argued with the Jail's staff after the pod shakedown. (Id.) The memo also states that officers overheard other inmates “encourag[ing] [Plaintiff] to complain about having chest pains so [he] could go to medical in order to state that D.R.T. inflicted this injury.” (Id.) It then says that the Jail's medical personnel did not see any of the “facial … bruises and swelling” Plaintiff claimed to have and noted only the complaints of chest pain. (Id.) But Plaintiff asserts that the nurse at the Jail's medical department “saw the bruises and marks on [his] chest [and] stomach” and that “she couldn't miss how swollen [Plaintiff's] face was when she looked at [him].” (ECF No. 1-4 at PageID 16.) Plaintiff alleges that he asked the nurse to take pictures of his injuries, and she declined. (Id.)
After Plaintiff appealed the grievance ruling, SCSO Captain Dotson reviewed surveillance footage and concluded that the shakedown occurred “without incident” related to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1-6 at PageID 21.)
Courts have to conduct screenings for every civil complaint “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). When a court screens a complaint, it has to dismiss the complaint or any portion of it that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Courts apply the same level of screening to all civil complaints filed by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The requirements of § 1915(e)(2) overlap the criteria of § 1915A.”). Under the in forma pauperis screening provision, the court must “dismiss the case at any time” if it finds such a deficiency. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under these screening provisions, courts determine whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted using the same standard it uses to evaluate a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under this standard, the court accepts as true the complaint's “well-pleaded” factual allegations and determines whether they “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681); see also Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 Fed.Appx. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011) . “A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). But the court need not accept as true any conclusory allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. With that in mind, every legal conclusion in a complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” (Id.)
Courts liberally construe pro se complaints and hold them “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). But even pro se complaints must satisfy the plausibility standard. See Barnett, 414 Fed.Appx. at 786; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (). And pro se litigants still must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011). Courts “have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.” Thomas v. Romanowski, 362 Fed.Appx. 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)). And courts are not “required to create” a pro se litigant's claim for him. Payne v. Sec. of Treas., 73 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
To begin with, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force and deprivation of medical care.[2] To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) “the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, ” and (2) “the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff asserts claims against the DRT Defendants and Defendant Medical Dept. at 201 Poplar Ave. Memphis, Tennessee, an address which the Court noted above corresponds to the Shelby County Jail. For starters, Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against the Shelby County Jail or its Medical Department, because neither qualifies as a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) ; Hix v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 196 Fed.Appx. 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (“the defendant medical departments are not ‘persons' under § 1983”); see also Morseman v. Hopkins Cnty. Jail Staff, No 4:21-CV-P108-JHM, 2022 WL 243903, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2022) (); Anderson v. Morgan Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3-14-cv-516-TAV-HBG, 2015 WL 7281665, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2015) (collecting cases). And so the Court construes Plaintiff's claims against the Shelby County Jail's medical...
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