Taylor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medical Examiners

• Decision Date: 18 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 69343,69343
• Parties: 13 Fla. L. Weekly 118 William TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 557

520 So.2d 557

13 Fla. L. Weekly 118

William TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Respondent.

No. 69343.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 18, 1988.

Julian Clarkson and Michael L. Rosen of Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

H. Reynolds Sampson and William Furlow, Tallahassee, for respondent.

OVERTON, Justice.

Petitioner, William Taylor, sought our review of Taylor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, 493 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), in which the district court held an administrative review was not timely filed because it was not filed within thirty days of the original final order entered by the agency, but rather was filed within thirty days of the amended final order entered by the agency. The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:

Does an administrative agency exercising its quasi-judicial power in a license revocation proceeding have the inherent authority to change or modify its final order within a reasonable time after filing it so that the time for taking an appeal begins to run from the date of filing the amended order?

Id. at 500. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the question in the affirmative, but emphasize that it applies only to clerical errors or inadvertent mistakes in an agency order.

The relevant facts reflect that on June 26, 1985, the Board of Medical Examiners filed a "Final Order" finding the petitioner, Dr. William Taylor, guilty of professional misconduct. The final order suspended Dr. Taylor's medical license, but stayed the suspension pending his satisfactory completion of five years' probation. The record of the hearing clearly reflects that the board had determined to impose three years' probation, rather than the five-year probationary term contained in the June final order. After receiving the order on July 13, 1985, Dr. Taylor notified the board in writing, by letter sent via certified mail on July 15, 1985, that the final order contained "an important error ... with regards to the length of the probationary period." He further wrote, "I hope to receive this corrected final order and I am requesting to reserve my period of appeal until I receive it."

On August 8, 1985, the board, in response to Taylor's letter filed an entirely new order entitled "Amended Final Order," which corrected the length of the probationary period to three years. This amended final order incorporated all the other provisions of the June final order and, in its final paragraphs, stated:

Pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the parties are notified that they may appeal this Final Order by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the agency and by filing the filing fee and one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the date this order is filed, as provided in Chapter 120 Florida Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of August, 1985.

On September 6, 1985, Taylor filed a notice of appeal from the amended final order dated August 8, 1985. The Department of Professional Regulation filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that, since the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days of the original June 26, 1985, final order, the district court of appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal on the merits.

The First District Court of Appeal, in a split decision, granted the motion to dismiss, relying on its decision in Systems Management Associates, Inc. v. State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 391 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The majority opinion noted that no statute or rule authorizes the filing of a motion for rehearing which tolls the time for appealing the board's final order, nor does any express authority by statute or rule exist to authorize the agency to retain jurisdiction over its final order, once filed, so as to permit the agency to withdraw the order or change or modify it. The court found that

Dr. Taylor's appeal from final agency action was untimely because his letter of July 15, even if treated as a motion for rehearing, could not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal since it was not authorized by rule or statute and was not filed within thirty days of the June 26, 1985 order, the only final order authorized by statute to be entered by the Board of Medical Examiners.

493 So.2d at 500. The court recognized its result was "unduly harsh." Id.

Judge Zehmer dissented, believing that the "result in this case cannot be reconciled with the notions of due process and fundamental fairness underlying the statutes and rules governing administrative proceedings in this state." Id. at 501. He reasoned that, similar to the inherent powers of courts, administrative agencies may rehear and correct or modify their final orders before their jurisdiction is lost, irrespective of the fact that no express rule exists. He concluded that the board had inherent jurisdiction to correct the erroneous order previously entered by a new amended final order, and that an agency "is presumed to have acted in accordance with the law until it is shown otherwise, and its orders on appeal are presumed to be correct." Id. at 504. He distinguished the facts in Systems Management by noting that the aggrieved party in that case filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied, and no new or amended final order was ever issued by the agency.

Taylor contends his request for correction of an inadvertent mistake in the agency's original final order, because it was made prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period for filing an appeal, should be treated as an authorized and timely motion to alter or amend under rule of appellate procedure 9.020(g). He suggests that a significant difference exists between a request to modify an administrative order for the purpose of correcting a clerical error or mistake and a motion for rehearing or reconsideration, seeking to change the decision of the agency and that unquestionably the agency has the inherent power to correct clerical errors brought about by mistake and inadvertence. Taylor further maintains that the controlling consideration should not be whether the agency took the requested corrective action by entering the amended order within the thirty-day period, but rather whether this was an authorized motion under rule 9.020(g) that was filed with the agency before the time for taking the appeal had lapsed.

We agree that this case is not controlled by Systems Management, the facts of that case being clearly distinguishable, as Judge Zehmer noted. It is important to emphasize that this case does not involve a petition for rehearing or reconsideration, situations in which a party is seeking to change the administrative decision. In this instance, the aggrieved party seeks only to have the amended order correct an admitted substantive error in the original order to accurately reflect the decision of the board.

Rule 9.020(g), Florida Rules of Appellate...