Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 15-685 (RBW)

• Decision Date: 07 September 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-685 (RBW)
• Citation: 205 F.Supp.3d 75
• Parties: Tiffani TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

205 F.Supp.3d 75

Tiffani TAYLOR, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-685 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 7, 2016

Charles Anthony Moran, Moran & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Tiffani Taylor, brought this action against the defendant, the District of Columbia, for an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in conjunction with the plaintiff's administrative challenge as to whether the District of Columbia Public School Systems ("DCPS") was providing her son, D.T., a free appropriate education ("FAPE") as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012) (the "IDEA"). See generally Complaint ("Compl."). Having prevailed on her administrative challenge, the plaintiff then filed this action seeking attorney's fees and costs totaling $102,536.60, in addition to reasonable fees and costs associated with this litigation. See Mem. Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Attorneys' Fees ("Pl.'s Mem.") at 12. This case was then referred to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for a report and recommendation ("Report"), see Oct. 27, 2015 Order, ECF No. 6, which he issued on April 25, 2016, recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. Currently pending before the Court is the Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("Pl.'s Objs."). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,¹ the Court concludes that it must overrule the plaintiff's objections and adopt Magistrate Judge Kay's Report in its entirety.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW²

A. Review of Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) permits district judges to refer certain motions— such as motions for attorney's fees—to a Magistrate Judge for proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of such motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). A dissatisfied party is obligated to raise timely objections to a Magistrate Judge's Report and upon doing so, the Court reviews de novo the portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report that have been properly challenged. Id. The Court, in conducting its review, may "accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the [M]agistrate [J]udge with instructions." Id. Rule 72(b) provides two procedural limitations that affect a district court's review: (1) an objecting party is not permitted "to present new initiatives to the district judge," Heard v. District of Columbia , No. CIV.A. 02–296, 2006 WL 2568013, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2006) (quoting Aikens v. Shalala , 956 F.Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C.1997) ), as the district court may review "only those issues that the parties have raised in their objections to the Magistrate Judge's report," Aikens , 956 F.Supp. at 19 ; and (2) an objecting party relinquishes the opportunity to challenge the district court's adoption of any portion of the Magistrate Judge's Report that an objecting party has failed to timely file an objection. See id. at 20 n. 7 ("A majority of the circuits have a longstanding rule that the failure of a party to object to either the factual or legal aspects of a Magistrate Judge's recommendations waives the opportunity to challenge the district court's adoption of those recommendations."); see also Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 150–51, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) ("It does not appear that Congress intended to require the district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.").

B. Attorney's Fees in IDEA Litigation

Pursuant to the IDEA, a district court may award a prevailing party in an IDEA administrative proceeding "reasonable attorney's fees." § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). In awarding reimbursement of fees, the district court must first decide whether the party seeking the fees is a prevailing party and then determine whether the requested attorney's fees are reasonable. Jay v. District of Columbia , 75 F.Supp.3d 214, 218 (D.D.C.2014) (Walton, J.) (citing Jackson v. District of Columbia , 696 F.Supp.2d 97, 101 (D.D.C.2010) ).

II. DISCUSSION

Neither party has objected to three portions of the fee award recommended in Magistrate Judge Kay's Report: (1) reimbursement of the plaintiff's attorney's travel time at hourly rates equivalent to 50% of the determined reasonable hourly attorney fee rate; (2) the exclusion of 0.2 hours of the total number of hours billed by plaintiff's counsel; and (3) reimbursement of the plaintiff's attorney's costs totaling $186.60. See Pl.'s Objs.; see also Def.'s Objs. Resp. The Court therefore accepts the unchallenged recommendations proposed by Magistrate Judge Kay as reasonable and adequately substantiated. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report's findings as to those aspects of its attorney's fee award. See Report at 22-23.

The plaintiff, however, objects to four of Magistrate Judge Kay's findings: (1) the reduction of the plaintiff's attorney's fees request by 10% based upon the acquisition of only partial relief; (2) the reduction of the plaintiff's attorney's fees rate to 75% of the United States Attorney's Office ("USAO") Laffey attorney fees rates; (3) the reduction of the plaintiff's attorney's fees rate for performing administrative tasks to 75% of the USAO Laffey rates for paralegals; and (4) the reduction of attorney's fees request for the purpose of preserving public funds. See Pl.'s Objs. at 2, 4, 8-9. In response, the defendant requests that the Court deny each of the plaintiff's objections and adopt Magistrate Judge Kay's Report in its entirety. See Def.'s Objs. Resp. at 7. The Court will address each of the plaintiff's objections in turn.

A. The Plaintiff's Prevailing Party Status

1. The Plaintiff's Degree of Success Warrants A Reduction in Fees

Although the plaintiff "prevailed on the most significant aspects of her [IDEA] claims," Magistrate Judge Kay determined that she was only a partially prevailing party because "she failed to obtain ‘wrap around’ services," and therefore, he recommended an overall reduction in the amount of 10% of the fee request because the plaintiff's "relief was limited in comparison to the proceeding as a whole." Report at 11 (citing cases). In objecting to the recommended 10% reduction, the plaintiff asserts that her attorney should be awarded full compensation for his services because her son "received full time placement at a non-public school," which "is an excellent result." Pl.'s Objs. at 2-3 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ("Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, [her] attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.").

"[I]t is the degree of the plaintiff's success that is the critical factor to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee." Platt v. District of Columbia , 168 F.Supp.3d 253, 264, 2016 WL 912171, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting A.S. v. District of Columbia , 842 F.Supp.2d 40, 47 (D.D.C.2012) ). However, " ‘a finding that the plaintiff obtained significant relief’ does not end the analysis." Id. (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 439–40, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). "The ultimate question to be decided by the Court is what is ‘reasonable in light of [the plaintiff's] level of success.’ " Id. (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). "A reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole." Id. (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ).

Here, the plaintiff's level of success at the administrative level warrants a reduction in the overall fees the plaintiff's counsel is entitled to recover. There is no dispute that the plaintiff is a fully prevailing party in Administrative Complaint Case #2014-0233 ("Case 233"). See Report at 9 (citation omitted). On the other hand, there is also no dispute that the plaintiff only partially prevailed in Administrative Complaint Case #2014-0192 ("Case 192"), in which she succeeded on only two of the four claims presented. Id. More importantly, the plaintiff did not receive the full relief she sought. Id. at 10–11. Although the plaintiff failed "to propose appropriate compensatory services" and did not "specify what remedy would effectively rectify the harm," see Pl.'s Mot., Exhibit ("Ex.") 4 (Hearing Officer Determination, Case 192) ("Case 192 Determination") at 14, the administrative hearing officer "conclude[d] that to award the student no compensation for the missed services would be inequitable," id. and thus, he awarded the plaintiff's son "nominal services as compensation," full-time placement in a private school, "[thirty] hours of independent tutoring, and [fifteen] hours of independent counseling or mentoring." Id. But, he did not award the plaintiff's son two forms of relief sought: wrap around services and other services in the form of therapeutic transport, outside counseling, and therapeutic recreation. See id. at 15 ("All other requested relief is denied."). While the plaintiff's unsuccessful claims were procedural in nature and the relief the plaintiff received was substantial, "[t]he result is what matters," Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, and awarding a full fee award to the plaintiff's counsel where the plaintiff "has achieved only partial or limited success," id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, would be excessive. Therefore, because the plaintiff did not prevail on two of the four claims in Case 192 and she did not obtain the full relief sought, the Court, in its discretion, finds that full compensation for all of the work performed by the plaintiff's counsel would be disproportionate to...