Taylor v. Edmunds

• Decision Date: 30 October 1918
• Docket Number: 364.
• Citation: 97 S.E. 42,176 N.C. 325
• Parties: TAYLOR ET AL. v. EDMUNDS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

97 S.E. 42

176 N.C. 325

TAYLOR ET AL. v. EDMUNDS.

No. 364.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 30, 1918

Appeal from Superior Court, Forsyth County; Shaw, Judge.

Action by W. B. Taylor and J. P. Taylor against Thomas V. Edmunds. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. No error.

This is an action to set aside a deed upon the ground of fraud and mistake. The jury having found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant excepted, and appealed from the judgment thereon.

Fred M Parrish and A. E. Holton, both of Winston-Salem, for appellant.

Lindsay Patterson, Jones & Clement, and Craige & Vogler, all of Winston-Salem, for appellees.

CLARK C.J.

The plaintiffs conveyed to Edmunds and Jerome the property in controversy, which is a strip 10 feet wide and 610 feet long and allege that the deed was executed through mistake on their part, and fraud or mistake on the part of the defendant, Edmunds. They further allege that the defendant Edmunds, designedly sent the deed for said strip to the plaintiffs, together with deeds for property covered by the written agreement, which written agreement did not include this strip, for the purpose of having it executed along with the other deeds at the same time, and thus fraudulently obtain title to said strip.

T. V Edmunds and W. G. Jerome were partners, acting as selling agents under a contract with plaintiffs executed March 22, 1912, according to the terms of which, whenever Edmunds and Jerome should have sold $50,000 worth of the property described in said contract, the balance of the property therein named should be conveyed by plaintiffs to them, or to whomsoever they might designate. Jerome testified that after they had sold that amount they divided the remaining unsold lots and had deeds prepared for the purpose of obtaining title; that "he and the defendant, Edmunds, decided that they ought to have the property in controversy (i. e., this strip, 10 feet wide and 610 feet long, lying alongside of the other property); that they knew that this property was not included in the contract, but that the defendant, Edmunds, told him to have a deed prepared which would convey to each of them an undivided one-half interest therein, and that they would take a chance on the plaintiffs' executing it." In pursuance of this direction from Edmunds, Jerome says he submitted to the plaintiffs for execution the deed for this strip sandwiched in between three other deeds and the contract, and all of said deeds were duly executed, and when he carried the deed to the property in controversy back to Edmunds, Edmunds made an exclamation of surprise, and stated "that he did not think Taylor Bros. would execute it."

Assignments of error 1 and 2 are to the admission of the testimony of W. G. Jerome, to whom, jointly with the defendant, T. V. Edmunds, the deed for said strip of land was executed by the plaintiffs that without consideration he had reconveyed his half interest in the property in controversy, and the admission in evidence of his deed of reconveyance. This was competent in corroboration. "Actions speak louder than words," and the best proof possible in corroboration of Jerome's statement of the transaction is the fact that he voluntarily reconveyed the property to the grantors. He was a party to the alleged fraudulent transfer of the property from the plaintiffs to himself and Edmunds. Why should he voluntarily reconvey if he thought himself entitled to the property?

The motion to nonsuit was properly denied. It was in evidence that the plaintiffs had had numerous dealings with Edmunds and Jerome, covering a long period of time, and had executed for them deeds to property amounting to more than $50,000; that the plaintiffs knew that the strip of land in controversy was not included in the contract, and that the defendant also knew that this strip of land was not included therein. There is also the above evidence that for the purpose of obtaining said strip the defendant had a deed prepared embracing it, and sent it to the plaintiffs, sandwiched in with three other deeds and a contract, by the witness W. G. Jerome, who said, when he delivered these papers, "Here are the papers to wind up that property."

It is true as the defendant contends, the plaintiffs were educated men, and if they executed this deed merely by reason of their failure to read the same they are bound by their voluntary act, and should not recover. Dellinger v. Gillespie, 118 N.C. 737, 24 S.E. 538. This is well-settled law, but the evidence in this case tended to show and does show (as the jury find) that, because of the confidential relationship existing between themselves and the defendant, covering a long course of dealings, during which they had executed a large number of deeds sent them by Edmunds and Jerome for lots sold by them, the plaintiffs had a right to assume that he would submit to them for execution deeds only for lands embraced in the contract, and that they were misled by the manner of submitting this deed to them for execution sandwiched in with other deeds for property embraced in the contract of March 22, 1912, and especially that they were misled by the false statement of the defendant's agent, and cograntee, W. G. Jerome that "these papers wind up that property." By that the plaintiffs...