Taylor v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1907
• Citation: 54 Fla. 635,45 So. 574
• Parties: TAYLOR et al. v. FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

45 So. 574

54 Fla. 635

TAYLOR et al. v. FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

December 17, 1907

Appeal from Circuit Court, Brevard County; Minor S. Jones, Judge.

Bill by Henrietta W. Taylor and others against the Florida East Coast Railway Company. Decree for defendant, and complainants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In a proceeding for the specific performance of a contract, a temporary injunction will not be granted, unless the allegations of the bill of complaint warrant a decree of specific performance, nor unless it also appears that an injunction is appropriate and just.

The granting or denying of a temporary injunction is largely within the descretion of the trial judge; but such discretion is controlled by established principles of equity. If the allegations of the bill are sufficient, and the evidence in support thereof is ample to warrant the granting of the temporary injunction, and no sufficient defense is made, an order denying an injunction will be reversed.

Whether the duty a common carrier, a railroad corporation, owes to the public is materially and injuriously affected by the contract obligations of the corporation to individuals cannot be arbitrarily determined by the corporation for itself.

Where a common carrier railroad corporation asks for and receives land upon which to construct its road, and as a consideration therefor promises to maintain a spur track and depot at a certain place upon lands given for that purpose, and the party giving the land, relying upon the promise of the corporation, incurs great expense in improving his property for use in connection with the advantages of the spur track and depot and the operation of trains thereon, and the breach of the promise results in an injury that cannot be adequately compensated in damages, equity may enforce performance of the promise in the manner and to the extent agreed, at least in the absence of a proper showing of superior rights of the public.

A deed conveying lands to a railroad company for its right of way by the owner of a hotel situated near to the proposed road containing an agreement on the part of the corporation 'to maintain the spur track, depot, and platform, and to operate all its regular passenger trains upon said spur track to said depot during what is known as 'winter tourist season,' which consideration is binding upon the party of the second part, its successors and assigns,' taken in connection with the conditions that surrounded the parties and the purpose to be accomplished, indicates an intention that the agreement should remain in force at least during a continuance of substantially the same mutual conditions and relations of the parties and their privies.

Where the owner of land conveys it to a railroad corporation for the right of way of its main line, and the corporation violates its agreement contained in the deed of conveyance to maintain a spur track and depot on the spur track, the grantor of the land cannot enjoin the running of trains over the main line, since the public have rights requiring uninterrupted service over the main line.

While equity will not ordinarily decree the specific performance of contracts requiring continuous acts involving skill judgment, and technical knowledge, contracts relating to the operation of railroads may be specifically enforced.

While a common carrier railroad corporation may not be bound by a contract which renders the corporation incapable of performing its duties to the public, yet where the subject-matter of a contract made by such a corporation is not foreign to the lawful purposes of the corporation, but is fairly within its authorized powers and purposes, and the contract is not forbidden by statute, and is not otherwise illegal, it will not be nullified by the courts.

Where a railroad company accepts a deed conveying to it land for its right of way, and so uses the land, any valid contract or agreement contained in the deed of conveyance is binding upon the railroad company, even though the company did not sign the deed; and, under proper circumstances, such agreement may be enforced in equity by specific performance.

Where the owner of a hotel conveys land to a railroad company upon which to construct its right of way for the main line, a spur track, and depot, and the deed of conveyance contains an agreement upon the part of the railroad company to maintain the spur track and depot to a point near the grantor's hotel, and to operate all its regular passenger trains upon the spur track to the depot during a certain season of the year, and it appears that a controlling consideration for the conveyance was the maintenance of the spur track and depot thereon and the operation of passenger trains over the spur to the depot, which would be peculiarly beneficial to the grantor's hotel property and business, and extensive improvements of the hotel property are made upon the faith of the agreement to maintain the spur and depot and to operate the passenger trains as stated, such agreement may be specifically enforced in equity, unless such enforcement will directly, materially, and injuriously affect the rights of the general public. This accords with the public policy declared in chapter 4203, p. 139, Acts 1893; section 2848 Gen. St. 1906.

Where a court of equity properly acquires jurisdiction of a cause to enforce specific performance of a contract, the court will proceed to administer complete justice by adjudicating all matters properly presented and involved in the case. Injunctions, both mandatory and restraining, may be granted, and damages may be awarded, upon proper allegations and proofs, when necessary to do complete justice.

COUNSEL

Cooper & Cooper, for appellants.

Geo. M. Robbins, for appellee.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

The cause of action alleged is, in brief, that Fred F. Taylor and the appellee in 1892 entered into an agreement by which, in consideration of the conveyance of certain described lands by Taylor to defendant on which to build a portion of defendant's main line, and also a designated spur track Y, depot, and platforms, at Rockledge, Fla., and the payment by Taylor of $2,500 towards the erection of the track and depot, and the release of claims for damages amounting to $2,500 to the defendant by Taylor, the defendant agreed to construct a Y and a spur track from its main line to a point near where a hotel owned by Taylor was being reconstructed, to erect a depot and platforms there, and to maintain said spur track, depot, and platforms at said point, and to operate all its regular passenger trains upon the spur track to the depot during what is known as the 'winter tourist season' in that locality; that the defendant constructed the spur track and erected the depot; that Taylor was in possession of said land, and on said understanding and agreement permitted defendant to construct its track upon the land and to take possession thereof under said understanding and agreement; that, relying upon said agreement and the great advantages to accrue therefrom and from the construction of the spur track near his hotel on Indian river, then being reconstructed, said Taylor changed his plans from simply reconstructing the then existing hotel, and built a large, modern, and expensive hotel building for the accommodation of tourists, and expended thereon about $65,000, and also purchased additional property immediately north of the hotel property and improved same at a cost of about $18,000; that said expenditures were made upon the reliance of Taylor on said agreement; that Taylor and wife conveyed the land to defendant, the consideration stated in the deed of conveyance being that the defendant 'having constructed a spur track from the main line of its railway into Rockledge and erected a depot at the easterly end of said spur track, and its agreement to maintain said spur track, depot, and platform and to operate all its regular passenger trains upon said spur track to said depot during what is known as the 'winter tourist season,' which consideration is binding upon the party of the second part, its successors and assigns'; that defendant accepted the deed and the money as aforesaid, had the deed duly recorded, and took and still holds possession of the land conveyed under the agreement; that after the winter of 1894 in accordance with said agreement the depot was continuously and regularly maintained at the end of the spur track near the Indian river and within 200 feet south of said hotel, and regular passenger trains of defendant operated over same to said depot, and the depot maintained as stated in the agreement; that until October 16, 1906, defendant recognized its obligation to maintain said depot at the end of the spur track near the hotel and to operate its regular passenger trains during the tourist season to said depot, and up to about October 21, 1906, did so in pursuance of the terms of said agreement and said deed; that, after the construction of said track and depot, Taylor completed the hotel, and the same was profitably operated on account of its location on Indian river, and on account of its accessibility from said track and depot and the attractive appearance of the hotel and grounds to tourists and travelers on arriving over said track at the said depot; that on November 25, 1905, Fred F. Taylor died intestate, leaving Henrietta W. Taylor, his widow, Albert A. Taylor, and Blanche Taylor Peck, his only children, and that Henrietta W. Taylor had duly elected to take a child's part in the estate; that Fred F. Taylor died seised and possessed of the hotel property, and that said widow and heirs have fee-simple title to said property; that on Sunday, ...