Taylor v. Frohmiller

Decision Date06 June 1938
Docket NumberCivil 3989
Citation52 Ariz. 211,79 P.2d 961
PartiesJ. J. TAYLOR, W. R. WAYLAND and J. J. DURKIN, Petitioners, v. ANA FROHMILLER, as State Auditor of the State of Arizona, Respondent
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Original proceeding in Mandamus. Petition for writ denied.

Mr George D. Locke, for Petitioners.

Mr. Joe Conway, Attorney General of Arizona, and Mr. Earl Anderson Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, J.

J. J. Taylor, W. R. Wayland and J. J. Durkin, hereinafter called plaintiffs, filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus against Ana Frohmiller, state auditor, hereinafter called defendant, praying that she be required to approve certain claims for the salary of petitioners, as members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, which they claimed under section 6 of chapter 68 of the regular session of the thirteenth legislatute. The petition set up, in substance, that they had been appointed as members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, and that by section 6 of chapter 68, supra, they were entitled to salaries from July 1, 1937, to December 31, 1937, in the amount set up in their respective claims, but that defendant had refused to approve such claims. Defendant answered, admitting the filing of the claim, and that she had refused to submit or approve it for the reason that section 6 of chapter 68, supra, was unconstitutional, as being in violation of sections 13 and 14 of part 2, article 4 of the Constitution of Arizona. The facts are not in dispute, and may be stated as follows:

In its first special session, 1936, the twelfth legislature adopted chapter 13, being what is commonly called the unemployment compensation law. Section 10 of said chapter reads as follows:

"Unemployment Compensation Commission. (a) Organization. There is hereby created a commission of three members to be known as the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Arizona. The members of the commission shall be appointed by the Governor and shall hold office co-terminous with the term of the Governor.

"(b) Quorum. Any two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. No vacancy shall impair the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all of the powers of the commission.

"(c) Divisions. The commission shall establish and supervise the conduct of two coordinate divisions: The Arizona State Employment Service Division created pursuant to Section 12 of this Act, and the Unemployment Compensation Division. Each division shall be responsible for the discharge of its distinctive functions. Each division shall be a separate administrative unit with respect to personnel, budget, and duties, except insofar as the commission may find that such separation is impracticable. The commission is authorized to appoint, fix the compensation of, and prescribe the duties of the director of the Unemployment Compensation Division, provided that such appointment shall be made on a non-partisan merit basis, in accordance with the provisions of this Act relating to personnel."

It will be seen that subdivision (a) of the section creates a commission of three members, and provides that they shall hold office co-terminous with the governor who appoints them, but fails entirely to provide for any salaries for them. In 1937, the thirteenth legislature concluded that chapter 13, supra, needed amendment in a number of particulars, and it adopted chapter 68 at its regular session in that year. This chapter bears the following title: "An Act Relating to Unemployment Compensation, and Amending Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 18, 19, and 22, Chapter 13, Session Laws of 1936, First Special Session." It is quite lengthy and we need consider only section 6 thereof, which reads as follows:

"Sec. 6.Sec. 10, subdivision (a), chapter 13, Session Laws of 1936, first special session, is amended to read:

"10. Unemployment Compensation Commission. (a) There is hereby created an unemployment compensation commission of Arizona to be composed of three members, to be appointed by the governor for terms of two, four and six years respectively; and thereafter each new member, other than an appointment to fill a vacancy, shall be for a period of six years; vacancies on said commission to be filled for any unexpired term. Each such member shall receive as compensation the sum of one thousand dollars per annum."

It will be noted, in the first place, that the title of the act in no way mentions section 10 of chapter 13, supra, as one of the sections to be amended, and that in the body of the act only subdivision (a) of section 10, supra, is set forth as amended. The sections of the Constitution referred to above read as follows:

"Section 13. Every Act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the title."

"Section 14. No Act or section thereof shall be revised or amended by mere reference to the title of such Act, but the Act or section as amended shall be set forth and published at full length."

It is contended by defendant that section 6 of chapter 68, supra, is unconstitutional for two reasons: first, that the title of the act contains no reference to any amendment to be made to section 10 of chapter 13; and second, that section 6, which purports to amend a certain portion of section 10, supra, does not set forth section 10 in full as amended, as required by section 14, supra, of the Constitution, but only a portion of the section.

We have considered the purpose and meaning of these two provisions of the Constitution in a number of cases, the first being Board of Control of State of Arizona v. Buckstegge, 18 Ariz. 277, 284, 158 P. 837, 840. Therein we said:

"... This section of our Constitution, or sections of similar import, are common to the Constitutions of the different states of the Union. The purpose of these constitutional provisions, it may be said generally, is to prevent surprises that were frequent in legislation prior to their adoption. There was a time when titles of acts were of little importance, and not infrequently bore no relation to the legislation that followed. Omnibus, hodgepodge, and logrolling legislation with all their evils were more or less prevalent. It is said:

"'These provisions are intended to prevent the evils of "omnibus bills" and surreptitious legislation.' 36 Cyc. 1017.

"By confining the legislation to the subject contained in the title, neither the members of the Legislature nor the people can be misled to vote for something not known to them or intended to be voted for."

There can be no doubt that this is the purpose of constitutional provisions of this kind, but we have held, in common with most other courts which have passed on the subject, that it is not necessary that the title of the act should be a complete index to the legislation contained therein. As was said in Re Hauck, 70 Mich. 396, 38 N.W. 269, and quoted approvingly by us in Board of Control of State of Arizona v. Buckstegge, supra:

"'In testing acts of the Legislature by this clause of the Constitution, we should not, on the one hand, be so hypercritical as to require every matter of detail to be stated in the title, nor, on the other hand, so liberal as to render the constitutional provision nugatory. But regard should be had to the letter and spirit of the Constitution the evils it was intended to prevent, the rights it was intended to preserve, and, so regarding it, to test the act which is claimed to be repugnant to this clause candidly and justly, and, if it shall appear that the constitutional provision has been...

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24 cases
  • Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • May 23, 1945
    ...decisions of this court. Taylor v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 211, 79 P.2d 961; Board of Control v. Buckstegge, 18 Ariz. 277, 158 P. 837. In the Taylor case the title of the act appeared as "An relating to unemployment compensation, and amending" certain specified sections of a prior law. Laws 19......
  • State ex rel. Corbin v. Goodrich, 2
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • May 2, 1986
    ...embraced in the act." White v. Kaibab Road Improvement District, 113 Ariz. 209, 211, 550 P.2d 80, 82 (1976), citing Taylor v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 211, 79 P.2d 961 (1938). The broad legislation under the Consumer Fraud Act includes those subjects related to trade and commerce. We find the u......
  • Lewkowitz, In re, 5235
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1950
    ...of Control of State of Arizona v. Buckstegge, 18 Ariz. 277, 158 P. 837, 840; In re Miller, 29 Ariz. 582, 244 P. 376; Taylor v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 211, 79 P.2d 961; and Morris v. State, 40 Ariz. 32, 9 P.2d 404, are in harmony with the rule now reaffirmed for in them we say that the title i......
  • Litchfield Elementary School Dist. No. 79 of Maricopa County v. Babbitt
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • February 15, 1980
    ...liberal" as to render the constitutional requirements nugatory. State v. Sutton, 115 Ariz. 417, 565 P.2d 1278 (1977); Taylor v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 211, 79 P.2d 961 (1938). The word "subject" as used in provisions such as article 4, part 2, section 13 was comprehensively defined in the cas......
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