Taylor v. Geico Indem. Co.
| Decision Date | 05 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 8:12-cv-2448-T-AEP |
| Parties | EDDIE K. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause is before the Court on the Defendant GEICO Indemnity Company's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law ("Def.'s Mot."), Dkt. No. 155, and Plaintiff's responses in opposition thereto (collectively, "Pl.'s Resp."), Dkt. Nos. 162-163. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion (Dkt. No. 155) is DENIED.
This action was tried to jury verdict on April 15, 2015, where the jury found for Plaintiff Eddie K. Taylor ("Mr. Taylor") and against GEICO Indemnity Company ("GEICO"). The case arises from a motor vehicle accident involving GEICO's insured, Mr. Taylor, and Ronald Donnerstag ("Mr. Donnerstag"), which resulted in an underlying personal injury lawsuit and verdict against Mr. Taylor and in favor of Mr. Donnerstag and Hsiu Donnerstag ("Mrs. Donnerstag") (collectively, "the Donnerstags").
At trial, the jury heard evidence from Mr. Taylor contending GEICO breached its duty of good faith to Mr. Taylor in handling the Donnerstags' claims. Among other things, Mr. Taylor asserted GEICO failed to keep him adequately informed of a purported settlement offer from the Donnerstags, and failed to settle the case when it could and should have. GEICO presented evidence asserting, to the contrary, that GEICO did not breach its good faith duty and sufficiently protected Mr. Taylor's interests to the extent required under Florida law. Following the close of evidence, the jury rendered a verdict finding Mr. Taylor had established that GEICO acted in bad faith, and also found GEICO to have failed to establish that the Donnerstags were unwilling to settle their claims against Mr. Taylor and that GEICO was not presented with a reasonable opportunity to settle the Donnerstags' claims against Mr. Taylor. See Verdict Form, Dkt. No. 134.
The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) is the same as the standard for granting the pre-submission motion under Rule 50(a). Chaney v. City of Orlando, Fla., 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2537 (2d ed.1995)). Under that standard, "a district court's proper analysis is squarely and narrowly focused on the sufficiency of evidence." Id. A court "should render judgment as a matter of law when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether the evidence was sufficient for [the losing party] to have won, but whether the evidence was sufficient for it to have lost." Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008).
While I review all evidence of record, I am to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. I "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. . .[giving] credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as wellas that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc, 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Moreover, I may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 150; Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, Fla., 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). "The line of demarcation which [I am] required to walk is ephemeral: [I] must conclude that an inference is unreasonable without falling into the trap of weighing all the evidence." Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 851 (5th Cir. 1967); Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1982). "The standard for determining whether an inference is allowable is generally whether it is a reasonable one, that is, whether it is one that 'reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment' might draw from the evidence." Daniels, supra, 692 F.2d at 1326 (citation omitted). Ultimately, I am to leave the jury's verdict intact "if there is evidence from which [the jury]. . .reasonably could have resolved the matter the way it did." Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1264.
GEICO moves for judgment as a matter of law, asserting an insufficient evidentiary basis as well as legal error in the Court's jury instructions. For the reasons that follow, GEICO's contentions are without merit.
GEICO contends that the evidence of record was insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to support the jury's bad faith determination. GEICO first advances a series of theories through which GEICO asserts insufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that the Donnerstags were willing to settle their claims and that a reasonable opportunity to settleexisted.1 GEICO first asserts that no evidence exists that GEICO was provided a reasonable opportunity to settle. GEICO also argues that the Donnerstags failed to provide GEICO with adequate notice of the desire to condition settlement of the subject bodily injury claim on demanded terms regarding the subject property damage claims.
Upon review of the record, neither of these contentions hold merit and a legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists to support the jury's findings in this regard. The jury received three written correspondence from Mr. Donnerstag to GEICO dated July and August 2009, all of which are probative of the proposition that the Donnerstags were willing to settle all claims against Mr. Taylor. A July 9, 2009 letter from the Donnerstags to GEICO stated:
Thank you for talking to me on Monday. We still want to settle our case if you could get the check back from Bay Medical and make it out to me and my wife. You can also put Bay Medical on the check for $10,000. We also think you should pay the $2,000 for the motorcycle and the rental cost we asked for. If you can agree, we will sign anything you need. If you cannot pay, please write and tell us what you can pay. We need the money by the end of the month.
Pl.'s Trial Ex. 1a, Admitted April 7, 2015, Dkt. No. 135 (emphasis added). On August 11, 2009, the Donnerstags again wrote GEICO stating:
My motorcycle was worth $7,000.00 Allstate has only agreed to pay me $5,063.80. You have sent a check for $500. Can you pay the other $1,436.20? My wife and I will sign any paperwork you need. We want to finish this settlement in the next ten days.
Pl.'s Trial Ex. 23, Admitted April 7, 2015, Dkt. No. 135 (emphasis added). Finally, in reply to GEICO's response, Mr. Dunning's late August note, date-stamped August 27, 2015, conveyed that Pl.'s Trial Ex. 26, Admitted April 7, 2015, Dkt. No. 135 (emphasis added). These letters, in and of themselves, could reasonably evidence the Donnerstags' willingness to settle.
Moreover, to the extent GEICO challenges as unreasonable the inference that, despite the amount of medical bills incurred at the time, Mr. Donnerstag was willing to settle all claims against Mr. Taylor for his stated demands, I disagree and ultimately refuse to substitute my judgment for that of the jury. See Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 at 150 (). Indeed, the jury heard deposition testimony of Mr. Donnerstag that directly supports such an inference. Mr. Donnerstag testified that the exchange of letters to and from GEICO accurately reflected settlement communications Mr. Donnerstag would have had with GEICO regarding settling claims against Mr. Taylor. Audio Tr., April 15, 2015, 10:10:50. When asked whether, as of July 2009, Mr. Donnerstag was willing to resolve any claim for bodily injury against Mr. Taylor in return for $10,000, Mr. Donnerstag responded "at that time, yes." Audio Tr., April 15, 2015, 9:48:15. Mr. Donnerstag also responded "yes sir" when asked whether, as of July 9 2009, he was still willing to resolve any claim for bodily injury against Mr. Taylor in exchange for a check for $10,000 made out to Mr. Donnerstag and Bay Medical, noting he "was willing to settle if they met [] what [he] asked for." Audio Tr., April 15, 2015, 9:51:55, 9:59:00. In fact, at multiple points Mr. Donnerstag reiterated that, in addition to the personal injury amount noted above, he would be willing to settle claims against Mr. Taylor if he was paid his stated property value of vehicle, reimbursed for personal property damaged during the accident, and paid for traveling expenses incurred by Mrs. Donnerstag while he was under medical and rehabilitative care.2 Audio Tr., April 15, 2015,9:54:45 ("Yes sir I was willing to accept it."); Audio Tr., April 15, 2015, 9:51:30-9:53:20. GEICO's own claim notes, principally a June 29, 2009 entry, expressly reflect "concern" regarding Mr. Donnerstag's apparent attempts to structure this type of settlement. Pl.'s Ex. 1a, Admitted April 7, 2015, Dkt. No. 135.
Mr. Donnerstag's testimony also strongly supports the encompassing nature and finality of any such settlement, such that Mr. Donnerstag intended to settle all possible claims against Mr. Taylor arising from the accident. He testified he "would have signed anything they had," Audio Tr., April 15, 2015, 9:55:35, "was willing to close this case out," Audio Tr., April 15, 2015, 9:57:30, "wanted to resolve the whole thing period . . . it's open to discussion," Audio Tr., April 15, 2015, 9:58:00, and that his written requests during the material period "would have settled the case right then...
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