Taylor v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1997
• Citation: 707 So.2d 198
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,126 Richard TAYLOR, et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Bay Chevrolet, Inc. 1952072.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 198

707 So.2d 198

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,126

Richard TAYLOR, et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Bay Chevrolet, Inc.

1952072.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 31, 1997.

Ross Diamond III and James H. Frost of Diamond, Hasser & Frost, Mobile, for appellants.

Warren B. Lightfoot and Madeline H. Haikala of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; David M. Heilbron and Leslie G. Landau of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, L.L.P., San Francisco, CA; Richard Dorman of McRight, Jackson, Dorman, Myrick & Moore, L.L.C., Mobile; Thom Rumberger of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, Orlando, FL, for appellees.

ALMON, Justice.

The plaintiff Richard Taylor appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants General Motors Corporation ("GM") and Bay Chevrolet, Inc. Although Taylor's wife and children were also plaintiffs and also appeal, we shall refer only to Taylor as the plaintiff/appellant, for simplicity's sake. Similarly, we shall refer only to GM as the defendant/appellee, although the defendant Bay Chevrolet, Inc., is also an appellee. Taylor sought to recover damages for injuries he sustained when the automobile he was driving ran off the road. Alleging that a defective condition in his 1988 Chevrolet Sprint caused the wreck, Taylor proceeded against GM under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine and a theory of breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

Taylor raises the following issues: (1) Whether the circuit court adequately instructed the jury on the meaning of the term "defective," as that term is used in our formulation of the AEMLD; (2) whether the circuit court erred by refusing Taylor's requested jury instruction stating that Alabama law does not require proof of a specific defect in order to sustain an AEMLD claim; (3) whether the circuit court erred by excluding from evidence GM reports related to 14 other incidents involving Chevrolet Sprint automobiles; and (4) whether the circuit court erred by excluding GM records pertaining to the warranty replacement on other Sprints of parts identical to those Taylor alleges were defective in his vehicle.

On May 20, 1990, Taylor was driving the Sprint along Government Boulevard in Mobile, and his three children were passengers in the vehicle. They were travelling west, just past Interstate Highway 65, when the car suddenly veered right and went off the roadway. Witnesses testified that they heard a sharp bang before the car left the road; after leaving the road, the car struck a concrete marker, became airborne, and then landed near the top of an embankment leading to Montlimar Creek. The Sprint rolled over as it went down the hill, and it came to rest upright in the water of Montlimar Creek. Taylor's spinal cord was crushed in the accident and he was paralyzed from the chest down. The children were also hurt, but their injuries were relatively minor.

On May 14, 1992, Taylor filed a complaint against GM and Bay Chevrolet, Inc.--the dealership from which Taylor had purchased the Sprint--alleging that a defective torque rod bracket and a defective transmission mount had caused the accident. Taylor later added Bridgestone-Firestone, Inc., as a defendant, under a theory of negligent maintenance or negligent repair of the vehicle after purchase. Bridgestone-Firestone settled with Taylor, and the circuit court dismissed it from the action; it is not a party to this appeal.

At trial, Taylor sought to prove that the sharp bang heard by witnesses was the sound of the Sprint's aluminum torque rod bracket fracturing. His expert witnesses testified that the torque rod bracket, as well as the left-side transmission mount, failed because of fatigue. According to Taylor's experts, the failure of these components caused a phenomenon called "torque steer," which they said would cause the vehicle to veer to the right. GM rebutted this evidence with expert testimony indicating that the torque rod bracket and transmission mount actually broke during the impact of the accident, not as a result of fatigue. GM's experts further testified that, even if those parts had failed, excessive or uncontrollable torque steer would not have occurred as a result.

The jury returned a verdict for GM, and the circuit court entered a judgment on that verdict. Taylor moved for a new trial, but the court denied his motion.

Taylor contends that the circuit court failed to adequately instruct the jury on the definition of "defect" or "defective" under the AEMLD. Specifically, two of his requested jury charges would have instructed the jury that " '[d]efective' means the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer as to its safety." The circuit court declined to give the requested charges and, instead, instructed the jury that "defective" means "unreasonably dangerous." This definition comes directly from Instruction 32.12, Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) (2d ed.1993).

Taylor asks this Court to rule that, by itself, an instruction that "defective" means "unreasonably dangerous" is insufficient. In support of this argument, he cites language in both Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128, 133 (Ala.1976), and General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1183 (Ala.1985), interpreting the word "defective," as it is used in this Court's formulation of the AEMLD, to mean "that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary customer as to its safety."

While this Court has so interpreted the word "defective" in AEMLD cases, the mere fact that particular language appears in an opinion of this Court does not necessarily make that language appropriate for a jury instruction. Alabama Power Co. v. Tatum, 293 Ala. 500, 504, 306 So.2d 251, 254 (1975). In interpreting "defect" or "defective" in the context of AEMLD claims, this Court has employed various language when addressing particular cases. The notes following A.P.J.I. Instruction 32.12--which itself defines "defective" simply as "unreasonably dangerous"--point out the myriad of phrases used by this Court:

"The Alabama Supreme Court has not selected one specific definition of 'defect.' Defective may also mean 'not reasonably safe when applied to its intended use in the usual and customary manner'; 'unreasonably dangerous, that is, dangerous to an extent beyond that which is contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics'; 'not reasonably safe'; 'unreasonably dangerous, i.e., not fit for its intended purpose'; 'does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer as to its safety'; 'so dangerous that a reasonable man would not sell the product if he knew of the risks involved'; 'unsafe when put to its intended use'; 'dangerously unsafe chattel'; 'not reasonably safe'; 'created an unreasonable risk of harm'; 'exposed expected users of a product not reasonably safe to unreasonable risks'; 'dangerously unsafe'; 'not reasonably safe when used for its intended purpose.' "

Although the notes following the pattern instruction present this litany of variant phrases, they do not suggest when some definition besides "unreasonably dangerous" should be employed.

In reviewing a jury instruction to determine if it correctly and adequately sets forth the applicable law, this Court must read and consider the charge as a whole. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Marinelli, 628 So.2d 378, 384-85 (Ala.1993). The circuit court must give a charge that properly presents to the jury a party's theory of the case, and if the circuit court fails to do so, its failure is reversible error. Id. at 384; Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Service, Inc. v. Jericho Plantation, Inc., 481 So.2d 343, 344 (Ala.1985).

The circuit court's jury charge properly instructed the jury that "defective" means "unreasonably dangerous." That the circuit court refused to charge the jury on other definitions of "defective" in no manner compromised Taylor's right to have his theory presented to the jury by a proper instruction. His entire claim could be distilled to the argument that his Sprint was unreasonably dangerous because of a likelihood that the torque rod bracket and the transmission mount would fail. Even though Taylor was not given the exact charge he requested, the circuit court's oral charge substantially covered the same principles as the requested charge. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 657 So.2d 821, 825 (Ala.1994); Volkswagen at 385; Cone Builders, Inc. v. Kulesus, 585 So.2d 1284, 1290 (Ala.1991). Furthermore, Taylor has not convincingly argued how the giving of the requested charge might have led to a different jury verdict.

The "unreasonably dangerous" definition of "defective" contained in A.P.J.I. Instruction 32.12 goes to the heart of most products liability claims and will be adequate for the majority of claims pursued under an AEMLD theory. Thus, no particular alternative definition of "defective" is necessarily due to be given in a jury charge. Were we to require a circuit court to give an instruction setting out all of the possible definitions of "defective," or even a set of particular definitions chosen by a plaintiff, the charge in an AEMLD case would rapidly become cumbersome and confusing to a jury. While there may be certain plaintiffs' theories that will require providing alternative or additional definitions of "defective," those cases should be the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, we believe it is best to require only that the circuit court give an instruction that properly presents a party's theory to the jury. Volkswagen at 384; Jericho Plantation at 344. For most AEMLD actions, A.P.J.I. Instruction 32.12 will satisfy that requirement. Taylor has made no showing that the facts of his case called for some different or additional definitions.

For the foregoing reasons, there was no error in refusing the plaintiff's requested...